which could not be removed without causing structural injury were chattels.
This approach continued in Berkley v. Poulett.5 in which the question of whether pictures
fitted into recesses in panelling at Hinton House were fixtures or chattels. Scarman LJ added that a
workman’s solution to how the paintings should be attached to the walls was not the determining factor
in deciding whether or not they were fixtures.
The degree of annexation also relates to such free standing objects as statues. According to the
general rule stated earlier free standing objects would be regarded as chattels; however they still may
be regarded as an integral part of the landscape of design and so seen as fixtures, according to the
second test. The chief example of this is D’Eyncount v. Gregory.6 In which an argument over statues in
the grounds of a stately home lead to the decision that they were not fixtures as they were intended to
be part of the landscape. The case of Holland v. Hodgson7 shows us the importance that is set upon the
second test.
These well-known rules provide that any object or structure fixed to a building
should be treated as part of it. It is a test therefore of fact in each case as to whether a structure is free-
standing or physically fixed to the building. Generally it would be reasonable to expect some degree of
physical annexation, together with indications that the annexation was carried out with the intention of
making the object an integral part of the land or building. It may be difficult in some individual cases to
decide whether a particular object or structure is a fixture or not. Free-standing objects, such as statues,
may be fixtures if they were put in place as part of an overall architectural design; this could include
objects specially designed or made to fit in a particular space or room. But works of art which were
placed in a building primarily to be enjoyed as objects in their own right, rather than forming part of
the land or the building are not likely to be properly considered as fixtures and so it is not that the law
lack coherence and certainty but that each case should be decided on its own individual facts and so the
law should remain as it stands.
1 Thompson, M.P., Modern Land Law Second Edition, Oxford 2003, p. 14
2 Thompson, M.P., Modern Land Law Second Edition, Oxford 2003, p. 7
3 [1997] 1 W.L.R. 687; H Conway [1998] Conv. 418.
4 [1902] A.C. 157.
5 [1977] 241 E.G. 911.
6 (1866) L.R. 3 Eq. 382.
7 [1872] L.R. 7 C.P.
- If a chattel is found on someone’s land and the true owner cannot be located the general rule is
that the finder of an item acquires a good title against all but the true owner, as the true owner will
always have a superior title to the object in question than the finder or the landowner. This is shown in
the case of Moffat v. Kazana.1 In this case the plaintiff hid bank notes in a biscuit tin in his house. Later
when he sold the house, one of the workmen discovered the money and so he contended for the money
to be returned. It was held that the plaintiff never released himself of the title to the money as at no
time had he any intention to pass it on. So his title to the money was good not only the finder of the
money, the workman, but also the new owner of the house.
In regards to objects found under the surface of someone else’s land the general rule is that
land owner will always have a superior claim to the object than the finder. The first example of which
is in Elwes v. Brigg Gas Co.2 In which a prehistoric boat buried six feet below the surface of the land
was held to belong to the landowner. This rule also applied to South Staffordshire Water Co. v.
Sharman.3 Where the defendant, while cleaning out, under the plaintiffs' orders, a pool of water on their
land, found two rings. It was held that the rings belonged to the landowners.
However there are some exceptions to the rule that the landowner has a superior title to things
found below the surface. The general rule only applies if the true owner of the chattel cannot be found.
However landowners are excluded from claiming ownership of items that are regarded as treasure as
they are seen as belonging to the crown.4 Although landowners own mines and minerals contained in
the land, but this exempts coal and gas which are considered to belong to the public.5
In regards to things that are found above the surface we can look at the case of Armory v.
Delamirire.6 In which it was said “The finder or a thing though he does not by such finding acquire an
absolute property or ownership, yet he has such a property as will enable him to keep it against all but
the rightful owner”. However there is an exception to this rule, which is if the finder is trespassing, he
has no rights to the property as was shown by Donaldson LJ in Parker v. British Airways Board.7
“The plaintiff was not a trespasser in the executive lounge and, in taking the bracelet into his care and
control; he was acting with obvious honesty. Prima facie, therefore, he had a full finder's rights and
obligations”
This rule also applies was also shown in Waverly Borough Council v. Fletcher.8 In which the defendant,
when using a metal detector, found a brooch, but as the council had already stipulated that no digging
was allowed in the park, his actions were seen as that of trespassing and so severely weakening his
right to the object in question.
The finding rule also excludes items which are found but where the land owner has expressed
an intention to exercise control over any objects found on their land. An example of this issue is shown
by Donaldson LJ in Parker v British Airways Board.9 He said the plaintiffs “rights could only be
displaced by the defendants if they could show as occupiers an obvious intention to exercise such
control over the lounge and things in it”.
In conclusion the law on finding objects on or beneath the surface of somebody else’s land
seems satisfactory as the general rule applied in the common law give a clear outline as to has rights
over objects found. The exclusions to these rules are also satisfactory in that they are reasonable and
clear for anyone to understand. The only disputes over the law are where different parties will use
different areas of this law to support their claim however the rule of common law always prevails in
giving the correct answer.
1 [1969] 2 Q.B. 152.
2 (1866) 33 Ch.D. 562.
3 [1862] 2 Q.B. 44.
4 Treasure Act 1996
5 Petroleum (Production) Act 1934 s.1; Coal Industry Act 1994, s.9.
6 (1722) 5 Stra 505
7 [1982] 1 All E.R
8 [1996] Q.B. 334.
9 [1982] 1 All E.R
Bibliography
Thompson, M.P., Modern Land Law Second Edition, Oxford 2003
Green, K. & Cursley, J., Land Law Fourth Edition, London 2001
