Why were the 1930's a decade of disappointment for the labour party?

Why were the 1930’s a decade of disappointment for the labour party?

By the mid 1920’s, with one year of government experience under their belt, the labour party appeared to be making some progress. Although the government of 1924 had collapsed after less than a year, Labour had proved to the country that they were in fact capable of conducting a moderate government; achieving various useful moderate reforms. Not only were these reforms relevant to potential success but also it is important to remember that the Labour Party now held a secure place in the two party system while at the same time taking the majority vote in the left of centre in British politics. With these achievements attained it would seem that the Labour party now had the grounds for optimism and further success in the future. However when looking at the party organisation, electoral achievements, the success of the national government and the intensifying divisions within the labour party in the 1930’s we can see that the early and promising successes of the 1920’s was followed by disappointment in the subsequent decade.

One of the main disappointments for the party in the early 1930’s was the collapse of the second labour government. By 1931 the devastating effects of the 1929 Wall Street Crash were reaching a climax as the depression continued to cripple the economy. Unemployment benefits were now costing the government £112.5m more than they were in 1929 and the economy was suffering because of it. The severity of the economic situation called for extreme unity and resolution yet all the Labour government could offer was indecisiveness, hesitation and confusion on the matter. While Sir Oswald Mosley appealed for radical action in his ‘memorandum’, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Phillip Snowden, backed the traditional view that in order to rescue an economy out of a crisis such as this it is only necessary to cut government expenditure. With government ministers so divided on the issue it made it virtually impossible for MacDonald to make a sound decision. By August he had been persuaded to take unemployment cuts of 10 percent and on the 22nd he proposed it to the Labour Cabinet for approval. The outcome of this internal vote was devastating to the survival of the second Labour government. While 11 cabinet ministers voted for the unemployment cuts, a worrying 9 ministers opposed it. This almost 50/50 split exposed the disturbing internal division of the Labour Party.

I think this public exhibition of weakness is the first and perhaps the most influential cause for disappointment in the 1930’s. Not only does it illustrate the Labour party’s inability to make quick decisions at a time when the country needed it most but it inevitably lead to the resignation of the Prime Minister and the total collapse of Labour power in government. This early downfall would seriously hinder any chances the Labour government had of reconstructing a reliable and well-organised party that would gain significant support in the future. This party split is wholly significant to the reasons why the 1930’s was a disappointment for the Labour party.

MacDonald’s resignation as Prime Minister did not in fact turn out to be an abdication of power over government. Just two days after the labour party collapsed, it emerged that MacDonald would head a national government that would represent the Liberal party, the Labour party and the Conservative party. It is not this formation of a new government that particularly damaged the Labour party it was, more importantly, the electoral result that were so in favour of the new National Government. The October general elections saw the electorate supporting the National Government with an outstanding majority. While the National Government took 558 seats the Labour party won a measly 56 seats showing the sudden rejection of the Labour party. This massive defeat in election results was again devastating to the potential success of the party as it destroyed any opportunities of defeating the national government in future elections and gaining enough support to form a government. Theoretically it would be at least two elections time before they could make a serious comeback. For almost the same reasons as the effects of the labour party split, the election results again drew attention to Labour’s weaknesses and therefore became a main cause for disappointment in the early 1930’s.

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But it wasn’t election results alone that proved the 1930’s as a decade of disappointment. The effectiveness of the leadership in any party must be taken into account when considering the successes, achievements and failures of a particular time period. In the 1920’s the Labour party achieved much for the country and indeed for the party’s status. It is not surprising that when we compare the 1920’s and its achievements with the 1930’s and its lack of achievements that a major difference between the two decades is the nature and degree of stability within the leadership of the party. By the mid 1920’s MacDonald emerged as Labour’s most experienced and capable senior leader they had ever had. With government experience, the trust and admiration of the parliamentary party and the trade unions we can argue that the 1920’s Labour leadership was it a state of stability. However the 1931 crisis was too much of a strain on MacDonald and he was forced to abdicate his Labour leadership. This was devastating for the party as there was a lack of appropriate senior Labour ministers who could capably secure leadership. It is this important point that causes so many problems in the 1930’s and is therefore a main cause for disappointment in this decade. With MacDonald gone, Arthur Henderson immediately takes over. However, with no presence in the House of Commons, as he lost his seat, his leadership was already weak and by the time he was replaced by George Landsbury it was clear that the leadership was titular in nature only. Landsbury was a pacifist, an idealist and not well equipped for leading a party through it’s most difficult decade. In 1935 Landsbury was replaced by Clement Attlee who, out of all the Labour ministers, was considered to be the least charismatic and was only granted leadership because there was really no one else. His time is deemed largely unproductive and many Historians have agreed that he didn’t make an impression on British politics or the Party until the wartime period. This brief overview should illustrate the unpredictable and erratic nature of the 1930’s Labour leadership. This sense of disappointment is heightened by the comparison with the successes of leadership in the 1920’s. This is a huge reason for disappointment in the 1930’s as what the party really needed in a time of difficulty was a period of steady, reliable leadership. Not only is this bad for the party but it also publicly displays Labour’s inability to govern themselves internally, which ultimately would detract from electorate support in the future. It was important to look at the 1920’s leadership as the comparison between the successful decade and the unsuccessful heightens the sense of disappointment for the unsuccessful- the 1930’s.

Another important reason as to why the 1930’s was a decade of disappointment were the various internal conflicts and divisions. In the 1920’s the Labour Party suffered a significant electorate loss due to various attempts by the Communist parties to forge public links between Labour and Communism. With the likes of the Cambell case and the notorious Zinoviev letter Labour voters were terrified of a government that might give in to communist revolution. These events cost labour electorate support. With such fears already embedded in the 1920’s, one thing Labour did not want to do in the 1930’s was create any situation that would be reminiscent of these links with Communism. Unfortunately the activities of Sir Stafford Crips, a prominent figure among the Labour party ministers, achieved exactly this when he converted to Marxism and formed an independent socialist league. With behaviour such as sponsoring socialist programmes such as 1936 campaign ‘Popular front’ Crips actively promoted communist ideas. The activities of Crips expose important reasons as to why the decade was a particularly disappointing era for the Labour party. Not only did they remind people of their fear of a communist revolution but again it highlighted the deep-seated unrest that was consuming the labour party during this time-period.

By the mid 1930’s political division within the party was further emphasised when it became clear that various leading Labour ministers were contradicting each other with their different political beliefs. On one hand George Landsbury and a small minority became devout pacifists, always promoting answers that avoided any conflict, while on the other hand Ernest Bevin and various ministers promoted the slogan; ‘defeat fascism whatever the cost’. With one section of the party defending peace and another advocating violence and aggression as an answer it is no wonder that Labour could not gain enough support in the 1935 elections to act as a serious contender against the National Government. This is important evidence suggesting the disappointment of the 1930’s; the confusion the contradicting messages created meant it was impossible for Labour to appeal to specific sections of the electorate for support. With party beliefs contradicting each other it is also no surprise that the outcome of this internal division created further problems. For example as a result of this internal division Labour’s attitude towards British foreign policy became inconsistent and ambiguous. When the League of Nations called for a policy of ‘collective security’ to unite its members in order to prevent any future conflict in Europe, Labour confidently and publicly supported the campaign. Yet when the League called for a vote on funding for rearmament Labour voted against it which thereby contradicted their emphasised support for collective security. This inconsistency in policies and action made it incredibly difficult for Labour to gain support from the electorate. People were not looking to vote for a party whose policies were not only vague but contradictory too.

When considering the 1930’s as a decade of disappointment it is only fair to also examine the external factors, which were beyond Labour’s control, that may have caused significant damage to the party. The success of the National Government in the 30’s is of course relevant to why Labour experienced various defeats during the time period. As soon as the national government was formed they took immediate action to stabilise the economy- something that Labour hesitated in doing. By taking Britain off the gold standard the £ fell from $4.80 to $3.30. Britain reaped the benefits of a realistic exchange rate and as the pound became weaker British exports became cheaper and therefore more competitive. The speed at which the national government acted highlighted Labour’s hesitation and emphasised the party’s incapability of coping with such a situation. With the National Government going on to establish themselves as an entirely capable organisation Labour now appeared weak in comparison. ‘If a national government could handle the pressure why couldn’t labour?’ was no doubt a question haunting Labour supporters during this time. The success of the National Government highlighted all Labour’s weakness and was therefore an important external factor that caused much disappointment for Labour in the 1930’s.

It is also important to look at the Conservative dominance in the national government in relation to Labour’s failures. If we look at the composition of MPs in government we notice that Conservatives severely outnumber Labour. With 11 conservative MP’s and only 4 Labour Mps the party was outnumbered making it difficult for Labour to have any real influence over government action. This meant that the chances of Labour implementing their policies were slim as they would ultimately be overruled by the majority. In the 1931 elections the national government won 554 seats of which 473 were conservative and just 13 were labour. This officially proves conservative dominance and publicly denounces Labour as a favourite party. The conservatives had the majority support of the public making them the strongest and most powerful party in government. For this reason conservative dominance is an important cause for disappointment because if one party holds such a large majority it is thereby impossible for Labour to execute any of their own policies at all, virtually crippling their power throughout the 1930’s.

Another crucial external factor is the considerable rise in support of extremist groups. In 1929 the British Communist party membership was 2500 but by 1939 membership had increased to 18000. This caused disappointment in the 1930’s in that if people were so inclined to resort to extremism then the Labour party were obviously not offering enough left wing, socialist policies. With communist membership increasing almost seven fold on its original number Labour were loosing their socialist voters and leaving them with no other option but the far left, extremist parties. This is further evidence that the party was not productive in gaining support in the 1930’s.

After studying the various reasons why the 1930’s was a decade of disappointment I can conclude that the most important causes for disappointment were the internal problems created mainly by the unstable nature of the 1930’s leadership and the political divisions between the party ministers. This internal division was the cause of the 9-11 cabinet split that in turn caused the collapse of the 2nd government. If this collapse had not occurred then the national government would not even have had a chance to exceed labour in achievements and public support. With this theory that the external problems could not have transpired if it weren’t for the internal problems I can thereby conclude that the most essential evidence for disappointment in the 1930’s can be found in the study of the internal problems that lay embedded in the Labour party by the end of the 1920’s.

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How far do these sources support the view that the General Strike was not an industrial dispute?

Sources A and E initially stand out as the counter argument for this question as they defend the strikes motives as purely industrial. The remaining sources, B, C and D, advertise the strike as a political movement directed as an attack on government. To answer this question, however, it is important to look at the origins, content, reliability and motive of all the sources in question.

When considering to what extent the sources support the view that the general strike was not an industrial dispute we have to look at all the sources that do support this view. Looking at the origins of sources B, C and D it is no wonder that they all support the view that the strike was not simply industrial. Source B was derived from the British Gazette, which was a newspaper that only appeared during the time of the strike and whose aim was to ‘educate’ the public about of the situation. It is important to note that the newspaper was edited by Winston Churchill, a Conservative, who was renowned at this time for his hostility towards the strike. With this in mind it is no wonder that the source begins with the quote; ‘Constitutional Government is being attacked’ and boldly includes ‘The General Strike is a challenge to parliament and is the road to anarchy and ruin’ also incorporating ‘The strike is intended as a direct hold up of the nation to ransom…’. These quotes are from the Prime Minister commenting on what he believes to be the motives of this strike. The language is highly emotive most likely to provoke the same feelings within the public audience. With the source so readily quoting parts of the speech that promote the strike as political motivated this source fully supports the view that the General strike was not an industrial dispute.

When looking at Source D as further support it is useful to note that the speaker is a Liberal whose main message seems to be that the general strike is illegal. He argues that the ‘general strike…is not a trade dispute at all’. From this we can see that Simon is denouncing the strike as an industrial dispute. Unlike Source B it is a direct quote from someone who’s obvious motives are not necessarily in defending the government. He uses less poignant language than B suggesting a lack of motive for provoking emotions in his audience. With this source derived from a Liberal’s mouth it is a reliable an less biased opinion than that portrayed in Source B. In the same way Source C strengthens this argument, as again the motives of the source are indirect. Taken from the diary of a socialist wife married to Sydney Webb, a leading member of the Labour party, the source is again relieved from bias. The beginning seems to suggest the strike is politically motivated at ‘starving the majority into submission and it would be the end of democracy’, which indicates the notion of using the strike as a way to obliterate the government democracy. The source can therefore be used as evidence suggesting the strike was not an industrial dispute.

However the other two sources, E and A, support the view that the strike was just industrial in nature. Looking at the origins of the source it is no wonder Source A argues ‘The trade unions are fighting in defence of the mine-workers only.’ The Daily Herald was a Labour supportive newspaper that was notoriously supportive of the TUC, publishing their views and comments on the situation, during this time. The source is obviously biased in this sense but still presents important opinionated evidence that argues the dispute was in fact industrial.

Source E was written by an industrial TUC worker. The clear message is that ‘The TUC does not challenge the Constitution…the council is engaged in an industrial dispute…’ This was the anticipated propaganda response; an immediate and defensive reaction which strongly deplores the strike as a politically motivated dispute.

These two sources strongly oppose the statement. However when considering the reliability of the sources we must remember that both sources are derived from TUC influenced sources making them highly opinionated and biased. So although A and E put across valid opinions and are undoubtedly consistent I think that the case for a politically motivated dispute is stronger. With Source B being a conservative view, Source C a socialist and Source D a Liberal all the sources are derived from opposing parties yet they all agree that the strike may have had ulterior motives. The dates of the sources spread throughout the strike ,form the 6th May to the 11th, showing that opinion did not change with the progress of the strike further validating the evidence. Although B is highly biased, when juxtaposed with the two less biased sources, the case yields strength. I think that although there are two sources that don’t support the statement they are not strong enough by themselves to override the other argument. In conclusion the sources do support this view to a large extent.

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