Extended Essay - The Role of a UN-Secretary General to Achieve World Peace: The Endeavor of U Thant in Handling the Cuban Missile Crisis

        Advised by the forty-five delegations of non-aligned countries, U Thant sent two identical appealing messages on 24th October directly to Premier Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union and President John F. Kennedy of the United States. The entreaty involved voluntary deferment of all quarantine measures and arms shipments to Cuba for three weeks. These written messages were the first evidence of U Thant’s peaceful, unbiased negotiation.

        The Americans’ initially responded to U Thant’s message with dissatisfaction. Since his message did not request the deconstruction of the Cuban missile sites and removal of the weapons, the US dreaded that it would have to consent to remove the blockade without a parallel action to any military activity in Cuba. The US ambassador Adlai Stevenson even asked U Thant to delay sending the message for a day. Furthermore, U Thant was requested to restrain mentioning only “vague references to verification”  and without references to the Cuban missile sites by Secretary of State Dean Rusk in the speech which he had decided to deliver at the Security Council meeting the same day. All the more, the president himself ordered Stevenson to force U Thant to postpone his speech. To all these demands, U Thant refused since he might have perceived fruitful consequences and therefore, demonstrated his capability to make independent decisions as a Secretary-General.

        On 24th October, at the Security Council meeting, U Thant proclaimed the contents of the two messages as well as the possible negotiation through a common ground; that, with the US’s assurance of not invading Cuba, all weaponry would be removed. He further expressed his opinion that “moderation, self-restraint and good sense…above the anger of the moment or the pride of nations…will prevail over all other considerations.” This statement reflected his understanding of overcoming war with negotiation and peace.

        U Thant’s public statement was strongly criticized by the Soviet Union ambassador Valery Zorin, for not vigorously disapproving the US’s quarantine on Cuba. Irritated by his persistent censure, U Thant suggested to Zorin to make this claim at the Security Council meeting, which he did so. Taking Zorin as an example, it could be possible that most Russians would have initially thought his statement was unsatisfying. Yet, U Thant’s instruction to Zorin further proved that a Secretary-General stood as a neutral independent figure. Moreover, U Thant sent a message to Moscow explicating the efforts he had undertaken to be unbiased and requested the explanation of the objection. Two days later, Khrushchev notified the Secretary-General that Vasily Kuznetsov, First Deputy Foreign Minister, would arrive to head the Soviet Delegation. Here, U Thant displayed the authority of a Secretary-General, going to such an extent as to relegate Zorin in order to solve the issues with a more impartial negotiator.

        In the evening, on 25th October, U Thant received a cable from Khrushchev with a positive response to his appeal. It read: “I understand your concern…I agree to your proposal, which is in the interest of peace.” Khrushchev’s reply was a critical evidence of U Thant’s success in his very first initiative. The New York Times praised his achievement in its article: “Thant Bids U.S. and Russia Desists 2 Weeks.” Ambassador Stevenson expressed his admiration for U Thant’s accomplishment by claiming that it was “the indispensable first step in the peaceful resolution of the Cuba crisis.”

3. Second Phase: Negotiation Peak

U Thant’s peaceful agreement improved the crisis at sea when Khrushchev ordered several of his ships to withdraw. However, “freighters and tankers,” including a Soviet tanker (Bucharest), were still approaching the interception area where a war could erupt upon intervention by the US navy. The superpowers were still challenging each others’ rights. Khrushchev had sent a cable to Kennedy saying, “We will not simply be bystanders with regard to piratical acts by American ships on high seas…to protect our rights.” The solemnity of the crisis had yet to pass.

Right then, the US requested U Thant to make another appeal to the Soviet even though it had not agreed to his first message yet. Kennedy said to Stevenson, “See if U Thant on his own responsibility will ask Mr. Khrushchev not to send his ships pending modality.” Seeing an opportunity, U Thant agreed to include the contents, which he contemplated as bases of achieving peace, in his message:

1. Concern over an imminent war between the confronting nations
2. Fear of previous discussions turn into futility
3. Plea to delay the Soviet shipments to Cuba
4. Assurance of the US withholding the attack to advancing Soviet ships

        On 25th October, U Thant sent this cable to Khrushchev and at the same time, sent another to Kennedy, advising him to strain his forces from directly antagonizing the Soviet navy. In this way, being an unbiased Secretary-General, U Thant had verified his action by appealing to both nations instead of only the USSR. Moreover, he had anticipated that Khrushchev would be able to avoid embarrassment, giving him an honorable way out without displaying weakness by momentarily stopping the advancement for peaceful negotiations.

        

All this time, Kennedy was convinced that U Thant would bring light to the problem; “U Thant is supposedly arranging for the Russians to stay out. So we have to let some hours to by…” Therefore, he immediately agreed to U Thant’s second appeal. This showed that the US had acknowledged U Thant’s efforts by having high expectations from him.

The Secretary-General once again made a feat when both leaders replied in agreement to his appeal. Once again, U Thant’s achievement made the front page on the New York Times: “Moscow Agree to Avoid Blockade Zones after New Plea from Thant on Talks.”

        The matter then progressed to uprooting the offensive arms in Cuba. With the standstill of the Soviet ships as well as the US’s assurance of non-violence movement, the US delegation, led by John J. McCloy, and the Soviet delegation, led by Vasily Kuznetsov, along with U Thant himself, discussed over the issue of dismantling the Cuban missiles. The Security Council meetings from 25th October to 28th October were probably the most significant ones in bringing peace to the crisis.

        During these meetings, U Thant proposed a crucial offer, a ‘non-invasive pledge formula,’ which would become the backbone of the resolution. A few weeks ago, on 8th October, Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos delivered a speech in which he pledged to remove his ‘defensive’ weapons in return for the US’s guarantee of non-aggression against his country. U Thant took full advantage of this communist propaganda to form a feasible solution in the crisis; pressing on a deal for exchanging the American invasion of Cuba with dismantling its missile sites. The Secretary-General had used a brilliant tactic to turn the Cubans back on their words. With a new hope of ending the crisis arisen, both Khrushchev and Kennedy accepted this new proposal to discuss with their respective advisors.

        On 26th October, U Thant once again, proposed another agreement; that, he would lead a UN team to Cuba in order to discuss about the dismantling of the missiles. During this period of negotiation, he requested Cuba to halt all of its military construction. At the same time, he proposed a pretense UN observation of the English Thor missiles so as to “save the Russians’ face,”in order to present his impartiality. He then sent a cable to inform Premier Castro of Cuba and in turn, received an invitation to Havana. The crisis was swiftly expected to come to an end.

4. Third Phase: Mission to Cuba

All optimism was shattered when Khrushchev sent an agreement on 27th October to fulfill U Thant’s deal only if the Americans withdrew their Jupiter Missiles in Turkey. Rejected by the Turkish Government to follow Khrushchev’s demand, the US had no other choice but to agree with the Joints Chief of Staff’s plan to invade Cuba on 28th or 29th of October.

To make matters worse, on 28th October, Premier Fidel Castro sent a cable to Kennedy stating that the president’s guarantees were inadequate unless he included the following: “cessation of the piratical acts from Puerto Rico, economic blockade, subversive activities, violation of Cuban airspace, and withdrawal of US forces from Guantanamo.” Furthermore, a U-2 American pilot had been reported to be missing after being attacked over Cuba. In fact, Castro even appeared to be forcing the Russians to commence a nuclear invasion against the US.

        Due to the rising tension, U Thant decided to make an immediate trip to Havana to consult with Castro himself. The New York Times quoted: “Thant’s Cuba Talks Fruitful; He Will Fly to Havana Today; Blockade Halted during Trip.”

The Secretary-General organized two groups of UN personnel: the first group with seventeen important security officers, while the second group comprised nineteen people including military staff and communication officers. U Thant had planned thoroughly to leave with the first team and would summon the second team upon achieving permission from Castro to observe the dissembling of the missiles in Cuba as soon as possible.

        Unfortunately, without informing the Secretary-General, the UN people had arranged twenty-eight pieces of luggage of “communications equipment, supplies, typewriters and other paraphernalia,” to carry out a UN supervision in Cuba. Bringing in such materials without consent from Castro would evolve into a conflict between the UN negotiators and the Cubans. Despite being furious, U Thant did not reveal his anger as he had always controlled his feelings no matter how dire the consequences he faced. Remaining calm, he brought an end to the confusion by revealing the truth to the Cubans; that, the equipment had been brought without his authorization and that, they would be returned to the plane. Without this instant action, the entire mission could have failed immediately.

        On 30th October, U Thant’s first meeting in Havana with Castro was a failure. Even though Thant had stressed on the plea for trading the US’s pledge of not invading Cuba for UN’s supervision of dismantling the Cuban missile sites, as agreed by Khrushchev, Castro bluntly rejected this offer. This might be due to Castro’s desire to gain power as a strong military leader of Cuba by possessing these offensive weapons. In addition, he might not believe the US’s promise of not invading Cuba, and so, could not accept U Thant’s proposal.

The very same day, U Thant received good news from a Soviet general; that, the Soviet had begun disassembling the missiles in Cuba and would complete the operation by 2nd November. This was encouraging news not only for the national security of the US, but also for the world to avoid a nuclear warfare.

        On 31st October, despite Thant's second meeting with Castro remaining futile, he still managed to persuade Castro to return the body of the US pilot, Major Rudolph Anderson. Returning to New York, U Thant could conclude that his trip to Cuba had been fairly successful; he had acquired direct information of withdrawal of missiles in Cuba as well as retrieved the US pilot’s body.

5. Resolution

From 1st to 20th November, U Thant continued to serve as a mediator to ensure an absolute cessation of the crisis. During this time, he achieved consent from Castro, in agreement from both the US and the USSR, to send the ICRC (International Committee of Red Cross) to verify the uprooting of missiles in Cuba, instead of the UN observers. On 20th November, after the US air surveillance of the withdrawal of Soviet bombers in Cuba, Kennedy lifted the quarantine. The Cuban missile crisis had come to an end.

The following results have been obtained from the UN’s intervention in the Cuban missile crisis:

• Dismantle of the Soviet nuclear missiles from Cuba
• US’s pledge with USSR of not invading Cuba
• Fidel Castro became a stronger military leader of Cuba due to the disappearance of foreign invasion
• Peace prevailed regionally and globally preventing nuclear warfare
• Reputation of U Thant acknowledged by the world

From this historical event, we can learn the lesson that resolving a crisis by peaceful means such as table-talks, negotiations and political discussions, mediated by the United Nations, are better than military option. An early UN intervention prevented the eruption of war unlike U Thant’s late intercession during the Vietnam War (1st November 1955-30th April 1975). Due to numerous battles between the US and the Communists, there were thousands of Vietnamese and Americans causalities along with the downfall in the economic activities of the country. Cuba, Russia and the United States had all managed to avoid unnecessary casualties as a result of the third Secretary-General’s endeavor to achieve world peace.

6. Conclusion

        

        Throughout the whole crisis, the Secretary-General had taken thorough approaches to resolution. By announcing his statements publicly or sending unbiased, effective appeals to the respective leaders, a great impact had been made on the result of the negotiation. The contents of these messages, in which he requested both the United States and the Soviet Union leaders to perform certain actions, indicated his neutral position when mediating between the superpowers. No matter the consequences he faced, such as when the nations reached the brink of war even during the negotiation, U Thant managed to deescalate the tension. He even travelled to Cuba to negotiate personally with its leader, Fidel Castro, when the latter rejected the plan of dismantling the missile sites, and also went to the extent of persuading Castro to return the body of the U-2 American pilot. All these events presented U Thant’s unyielding efforts in bringing peace to the conflict.

        However, the Soviets, including the Soviet Union Ambassador Valery Zorin, had argued that they had their rights to bring shipments to Cuba as they were travelling on an international route, and claimed that the United States was manipulating the Secretary-General to gain their advantage in the crisis.  On the other hand, the Americans protested that they, too, had their rights to protect their country from the threat of nuclear weapons in Cuba. Despite these biased claims, the duty of a UN Secretary-General was to solve the crisis requested by the nations' leaders, as U Thant had accomplished to do so and had received much praise for it.

On 7th January 1963, Ambassadors Stevenson and Kuznetsov sent a joint letter of gratitude to U Thant stating that they wished to express to him their gratitude for his efforts in helping their Governments to escape the threat to peace which previously occurred in the Caribbean area. Stevenson would also pointed out that the solution to the crisis “was a classic example of performance by the United Nations in the manner contemplated by the Charter…It provided through the Secretary-General…the means of conciliation, of mediation and of negotiation.” Truly, U Thant’s exertions in facilitating tactful and ingenious unbiased proposals as well as transmitting de-escalating messages have influenced the negotiations overpoweringly.

        

Though U Thant had received support from both superpowers while bringing end to the conflict, it would not have been possible to overcome the real possibility of war without the Secretary-General himself. As President John F. Kennedy quoted, “U Thant has put the world deeply in his debt.” As a result, U Thant had played a crucial part as a neutral figure in keeping the peace and preventing the nuclear warfare between the United States and the Soviet Union.

7. Bibliography

Books

Abram Chayes, International Crises and the Role of Law: The Cuban Missile Crisis, London, 1974.

        

Ernest R. May, Philip Zelikow, eds., The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Harvard University Press (HUP), 1997.

Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National

Security Archive Document Reader, New York: The New Press, 1992.

James G. Hershberg, “Russian Documents,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, n.p., n.d.

Ramses Nassif, U Thant in New York, 1961-1971, A Portrait of the Third UN Secretary-General, C. Hurst & Company, London, 1988.

Richard Ned Lebow, “Domestic Politics and the Cuban Missile Crisis: The Traditional and Revisionist Interpretations Reevaluated,” Journal of Diplomatic History, 14 (Fall 1990).

Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis, W. W. Norton & Company, 1969.

U Thant, View from the UN, Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1978.

Magazines

Editorial New York Times, October 25; October 27; October 30, 1962.

Gertrude Samuels, “The Meditation of U Thant,” New York Times Magazine, December 13, 1964.

Websites-URLs

A. Walter Dorn and Robert Pauk, The Cuban Missile Crisis Resolved: "Untold Story of an Unsung Hero," Ottawa Citizen. Walter Dorn, 22 Oct. 2007: A12. Web. 6 Jan. 2010

(< http://www.walterdorn.org/pub/8>).

Edward C. Keefer and Erin R Mahan, eds.  Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976:  SALT I, 1969-1972.  Volume XXXII.  Washington, DC: United States Government Publication Office, 2010

(<>).

Graham Allison - Foreign Affairs - The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50: “Lessons for U.S. Foreign Policy Today,” July/August 2012

(< http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137679/graham-allison/the-cuban-missile-crisis-at-50>).

Hla Oo's Blog - 1974 U Thant Uprising - Former UNSG U Thant (<>).

Michael Dobbs - The National Security Archive - One Minute to Midnight: "Kennedy, Khrushchev and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War," 18th June 2008 (<>).        

Oracle Education Foundation - The Cuban Missile Crisis- Fourteen Days in October                                          (<>).                        

October 27, 1962: U.S. and U.S.S.R. in confrontation at U.N. Security Council (<>).                                        

Picture of U Thant - Havel's House of the History: Autographs of Leaders of the United Nations, 6 (<>).                        

Picture of Poltava on its way to Cuba - About Facts Net - Cuban Missile Crisis Pictures 1 (<http://aboutfacts.net/DocsCubanMissleCrisisPictures1.htm>).

Sergei Khrushchev - “How My Father and President Kennedy Saved the World,” n.d., 26 February 2010

(<http://www.americanheritage.com/content/how-my-father-and-president-kenedy-savedworld>).

8. Appendices

Appendix 1: Dr. Than NaingPersonal Interview Transcript

11th September, 2012

39, Kyauk Myaung Township, Yangon

Z.K.Z: What do you understand by the UN's Secretary-General?

T.N: According to some books, the article (1) 4 of the UN Charter states that he or she is one who handles administration, gathers human resources, peacekeeping and mediation. In my point of view, I believe the last two features that define a Secretary-General are most significant. After all, the need for that person is to minimize international conflicts, that is, to maintain peace for as much as possible.

Z.K.Z: Even as a Burmese citizen, U Thant managed to become a Secretary-General. Can you explain how he had achieved this distinguished position?

T.N: To start with, I want to explain briefly about U Thant’s life from his birth in 1909. Although he had been born into a wealthy Burmese merchant family and became a high school headmaster, he could not, of course, attempt to accomplish this feat alone. He needed support, which was given by his friend, U Nu, who was then Burma’s prime minister. First, he became secretary to the prime minister and then, received the honor of being the Burmese representative to the United Nations.

…

After the death of the second Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, in a plane crash on his mission to Congo on 18th September 1961, the Soviet Union under Khrushchev proposed the Troika plan to the UN to appoint three UN Secretary-Generals to precede Hammarskjold, one representing the Communist world, one for the West, and one for the group of non-aligned nations. But, the United States opposed the plan and immediately decided to choose the third Secretary-General, one from a neutral nation. On 3rd November 1961, U Thant of Burma was appointed the position of an acting UN Secretary-General and then on 30th November 1962, the third permanent Secretary-General. He was chosen due to his previous efforts in giving birth to the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as his contributions in the Congo Crisis, working under Hammarskjold.

Z.K.Z: Among his greatest accomplishments, which do you think has revealed U Thant’s strength to maintain the role as the head of the United Nations?

T.N: It is true that he has tackled numerous disputes and wars such as the West Iranian problem, the Borneo problem, the Cyprus crisis, the Prague Spring, the Congo civil war, and the India-Pakistan war, but, his contribution in ending the Cuban Missile crisis is the most well-recognized. During this crisis, which was also one of the most challenging problems encountered by the Secretary-General, he exposed his potential of mediating between the two adversaries, the US and the USSR, as well as maintained peace throughout the discussions to overcome the imminent calamity of a nuclear warfare.

…

So, I think it is acceptable for him to be awarded the title ‘Maha Thray Sithu,’ by the Burmese government in 1961, and also the ‘Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding,’ by the Indian government in 1965. He lived up to these titles when he demonstrated his strenuous efforts in the Cuba crisis, and therefore, is appointed to serve the second term at the United Nations.

Z.K.Z: Can you say that U Thant has acted as an important figure in solving the Cuban missile crisis?

T.N: The Secretary-General was, of course, a very significant person since he acted as a medium through which the conflicting nations had communicated. Without him, I am sure that a nuclear war…the third World War would have started then.

Z.K.Z: Do you believe U Thant remained as a neutral figure all this time?

T.N: Some people, especially the Russians, claim that U Thant was being controlled by the US government while the Americans stated that he was just acting independently. I agree with what the Americans say because according to many books and articles I have read about him, he is an impartial person and does not follow others’ biased orders if he doesn’t see any benefit to the situation.

Z.K.Z: How do you think the world, including you, view this man?

T.N: U Thant, through bringing resolutions to international conflicts, has gained immense popularity from many nations. However, with the disappointment he has caused in the Arab-Israel conflict and his negative view towards the Americans' attack on Vietnam, his relationships with Israel and the US deteriorated rapidly.

…

Despite his strengths and weaknesses, I am still proud to be a Burmese citizen to know that another of us has climbed to the peak of the world and has been awarded praise for handling numerous critical international conflicts.

Z.K.Z: Do you think that he has achieved his role as a peace keeper till his death?

T.N: An irony is present in this case. On 25th November 1971, three years after his resignation from the UN, U Thant passed away due to lung cancer. While he has accomplished the role as a conciliator throughout his personal life as well as his terms as a Secretary-General at the UN, his death leads to a civil war in his native land, Burma. Since he is a friend of U Nu, the military leader General Ne Win planned to make a common funeral for the late Secretary-General and even decided to bury him at a distant cemetery in Kyandaw. Raged and inflamed, thousands of demonstrators, including monks and University students, rampaged around Yangon, setting fire to buildings. Sadly, many of these rioters were arrested by the Burmese military government and the remains of U Thant were sealed in a mausoleum near the Shwedagon Pagoda. Such tragedy happened to the body of a person who had embraced peace and loathed violence throughout his life.

Appendix 2

Figure I: U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations (1961–1972)

Appendix 3

Figure II: US Ambassador Adlai Stevenson displays photos of Soviet missiles in Cuba at the UN Security Council meeting of October 25, 1962.

Appendix 4

Fig III: Location of Soviet missile sites and airfields in Cuba (1962)

Appendix 5

Fig IV:

Appendix 6

Fig V: U Thant’s mausoleum on Shwedagon Pagoda Rd., Yangon

Appendix 7

List of Weaponry on the Indigirka bound for Mariel, Cuba on 4th October:

        

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