The origin of Piedmont-Sardinia’s agenda of unifying Italy came from a romantic figure named Giuseppe Mazzini. Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-1872), a son of a doctor from Genoa, was highly intelligent and joined the Carbonari in 1827. He founded his own movement, ‘Young Italy,’ in March 1831, and was a republican who spread a nationalist message. By doing this, he hoped to increase patriotism so that Italians could expel the Austrians and bring about the unification of Italy. He provided an inspiration to nationalists everywhere. He argued that true liberty would only be possible when Italy was united as a single nation. His society was, therefore committed to nationalism – ‘the universality of citizens speaking the same tongue,’ as he put it. Mazzini believed they had been insufficiently committed and had expected countries, such as France, to do their work for them. Mazzini called on the Italian people and, in particular, the young people, to prove themselves worthy of their destiny, to educate themselves and to fight for a ‘free independent republican nation’ (Morris, 257). Mazzini’s revolutionary ideas and attempts were spectacularly unsuccessful. During the 1850s many Italians came to reject the republican idealism of Mazzini. His methods had clearly failed and it seemed appropriate to seek an alternative (Wilmot 1992, 230). Nonetheless, he was very successful as a publicizer of ideas. He succeeded in ‘defining the goal and arousing enthusiasm among practiced soldiers and statesmen.’ He is therefore important, not so much for what he did, but for the way he inspired many young radicals in this period. He gave their liberalism a new fervor and optimism which kept the cause alive in the face of adverse circumstances (Morris, 258). In fact, Garibaldi was one of his disciples who he saw hope. Mazzini found Garibaldi as a promising leader who could eventually play a key role and carry out his beliefs in unifying Italy. Thus, through Mazzini’s network (publicity), he spread Garibaldi’s fame throughout Italy (Riall 2007, 43). Mazzini counted Garibaldi to accomplish his dream: the Unification of Italy.
Even if Garibaldi was the real father of Italy who led the unification of Italy, Cavour played a key role in assisting the Risorgimento with his implementation of economical and political policies as well as his diplomatic skills in order to stabilize and bring progress to Piedmont-Sardinia. In other words, the Italian constitutional nature was determined by the work of Cavour and of the Piedmontese monarchy while its geographical extent in the end was largely determined by the programme of the radical nationalists; Garibaldi. The first major policy of Piedmontese government directed by its master Cavour in order to create a stable state prosperous enough to dominate Italy was the contest for power and influence between the Church and the State: the creation of Siccardi Laws – a substantial first move in a decade of Piedmontese anti-clericalism. Church courts and other ecclesiastical privileges were abolished, the number of holy days was limited, and the senior Piedmontese churchman, Archbishop Fransoni, was imprisoned when he ordered his clergy to ignore these measures. Further anti-clerical measures were reinforced by Cavour: the suppression of 152 monasteries and 1,700 benefices in 1855, further restriction on the influence of the Church, and also added an equivalent of an extra £145,640 to the state’s income. Also, Cavour, as the Minister of Finance and Commerce concluded a string of free-trade treaties. These were concluded with Belgium, France, and Britain. They had the dual purpose of forging international links with the more advanced states of western Europe, and of attracting into Piedmont the raw materials and machinery necessary for its development and its territorial expansion (in the future). In addition, Cavour floated large internal and foreign loans to pay off the war indemnity owed to the Austrians and to finance the industrial projects of the government. Furthermore, it had produced a number of impressive projects to advertise its status as the most advanced of the Italian States. Of Italy’s 1,798 kilometers of railway track in 1859, Piedmont had 819 kilometers. To add on to its prestige, Italy’s first steamship, the ‘Sicilia’ was built in Genoa in 1855, and Italy’s first home-produced railway locomotives were built. Also, further schemes were in progress for the construction of the Mont Cenis tunnel through the Alps, and for the modernization of the port of Genoa. As a result, in the course of the 1850s, Piedmont’s trade trebled in value; and by the end of the 1850s, Piedmont had effectively claimed first place in Italy, not only in terms of constitutions and of military leadership, but in material terms as well. And without Cavour, all of this progress would’ve not been possible (Morris, 372). There is no doubt that Cavour created the infrastructures for Garibaldi to pursue his ‘revised’ agenda – to unify Italy.
Despite the successes Cavour had and achieved, Cavour also faced in failures which ‘jeopardized’ the unification of Italy. The Piedmontese participation in the Crimean War was a failure. Neither the military interventions nor the Congress of Paris was as successful for the Italian cause. Cavour’s first aim for territorial compensation for Piedmont’s efforts (Parma) was never seriously considered by the congress. Also, his second aim to obtain some commitment from the powers on the subject of the Austrian presence in Italy was not possible due to the fact that France had troops of its own in Rome. Thus, in the context of 1856, Cavour had failed to achieve a diplomatic initiative and had not created the conditions necessary for a military solution to the problem of the Austrian presence; thus the unification of Italy (Morris 373). Cavour’s efforts to provoke Austria into war failed (Farmer, 18). In fact, Cavour had difficulties and failures in executing his goals. It is true that he was a well known, a skilled diplomat but nevertheless he had quite a few difficulties and failures in diplomacies that were linked to the Italian Unification:
A cunning opportunist, Cavour was to play a major role in Italian unification. However, unification did not come about according to any carefully conceived plan on his part. Indeed, pre-1860 he did not conceive of the possibility of Italy as a unitary state” (Farmer, 18).
This portrays the difficulties and confusions Cavour had towards the idea of unifying Italy. Another example of Cavour’s failure is when his attempt to arrange a revolution in Naples in favor of Victor Emmanuel failed (Farmer, 19).
Also, the Plombières agreement (July 1858 between Cavour and Napoleon III) whereby France was to receive Nice and Savoy as repayment for its military aid at the war of 1859, fighting against the Austrians (Morris, 374) was another failure (lost of public support) for Cavour. It had been ignored at Villafranca as France’s undertaking to clear the Austrians from Lombardy and Venetia, remained unfulfilled, and due to Napoleon’s lack of reaction towards the revolts in the Duchies. Nevertheless, it was resurrected in a Franco-Piedmontese agreement concluded in Turin in March 1860. It was decided that Savoy and Nice on the one hand, and Emilia and Tuscany on the other, should hold plebiscites to decide their future allegiances (Morris, 378). Thus, Cavour and his ministry handed over Nice and Savoy to France which raised a major cabinet revolt at that time. Cavour became very unpopular among the Italians.
Furthermore, the armistice concluded at Villafranca on 11 July 1859 demonstrates another failure of Cavour and his Piedmontese government. This ended the war of 1859 between Franco-Piedmontese forces and Austrian forces. This emphasized the extent to which the fate of Italy depended upon wider European considerations. Not only were the negotiations limited to the rulers of France and Austria, but Napoleon III was motivated more strongly by events in the Rhineland than by those in Italy. Also, it seemed like Napoleon was motivated to some extent by logical misgivings about Piedmont’s conduct of war. Napoleon was unhappy about the contribution of Piedmontese troops (40% short of the agreed amount of soldiers contributed by Piedmont). It seemed unlikely that the small kingdom would be able to fulfill its promise to pay France’s campaign expenses if the war continued for much longer (Morris, 376-378). Thus, Napoleon pulled out his troops leaving only Piedmontese forces to fight against Austria. Hence, Piedmont could no longer proceed with their plans (Cavour’s plan for the central duchies) therefore they agreed on the armistice. This left Piedmont with Lombardy, minus the important border fortresses of Peschiera and Mantua, and Venetia as well.
In fact, Napoleon III had other intentions for supporting the Italian Unification; he had other interests. In fact, he did not want the Italian Unification but instead wished for a federal Italy in which he can use and manipulate in order to protect his vast empire especially from Austria and Prussia; form an ally – a pact. In addition, Napoleon opposed the idea of a unified Italy since it could pose a threat to France and question their security (the French borders): “In July 1860 Britain rejected a French proposal to block Garibaldi’s assault in Naples – the crossing was made and southern Italy conquered” (Wilmot, 236).
In contrast to Cavour’s failures, Garibaldi had an accumulation of successes in 1860s which led to the eventual unification of Italy. He was perhaps the most successful, and certainly the most spectacular, military leader in the wars for Italian independence. His victories especially in Sicily (1860) and Naples (1860) helped bring about the unification of Italy, while the story of his battles during the siege of Rome in 1849, in the mountains of Lombardy in 1859 and during the conquest of southern Italy 1860 provided the basis of nationalist legend (Riall, 42).
Garibaldi’s conquests (invasions) of Sicily (May 1860) and Naples (September 1860) reveals Garibaldi’s intelligence. Garibaldi chose not to cross the border from Naples into the Papal States after his succession of conquests. Garibaldi did not attack the Pope because he wanted to prevent a major international crisis involving the French garrison in Rome (because Napoleon III was claimed to be the protector of the Pope) and possibly other Catholic powers (Morris, 379-380).
Despite of Garibaldi’s attempts to unify Italy by conquering the South, Cavour did not assist him. In fact, he decided to act after Garibaldi had sailed for Sicily and conquered it. Cavour acted to Garibaldi’s campaign by prohibiting any additional aid to Garibaldi from the Piedmontese ports such as Genoa and Livorno:
we have decided not to allow any new expeditions to be prepared from the ports of Genoa and Livorno, but not to stop the sending of arms and munitions, provided that it is carried out with a degree of prudence (Morris, 391).
It is clear that Cavour decided to let Garibaldi proceed with his campaign; however, he did not allow any further aid to Garibaldi. This cements and authenticates on the fact that Cavour was a slimy opportunist. This was done purposely by Cavour in order to “save appearances so as not to increase our diplomatic difficulties” (Morris, 391). In other words, he allowed the Thousand to sail from Piedmont, but was also determined to keep his options. ‘If the insurrection is put down,’ he observed in private, “we shall say nothing; if it is successful we shall intervene in the name of order and authority” (Lee, 82). Cavour believed that the best solution and alternative to Garibaldi’s expedition was to just watch and pretend they were nonchalant and somewhat supportive of Garibaldi’s expedition: “To take no action would enable Garibaldi to establish a rival state in the south or, at best, give him the credit for the unification of Italy” (Lee, 77). This was due to the fact that the French were unconcerned about Garibaldi’s campaign, “France has shown less displeasure than I expected” (Morris, 391). In other words, Cavour was dissatisfied with France’s passiveness towards Garibaldi’s expedition. This meant that there was no room and hopes for any negotiation with the French as to stop Garibaldi’s campaign. Thus, Cavour had no possibilities of stopping Garibaldi through foreign and domestic government aid since King Victor Emmanuel fully supported Garibaldi, “always ha[d] a weakness for Garibaldi and Rattazi” (Morris, 391). In conclusion, it is clear that Cavour disliked Garibaldi’s expedition due to the fact that it opposed his ideas/plans, and was somewhat ‘risky.’ But moreover, Cavour was paranoid about Garibaldi. To be specific, he was concerned that Garibaldi might get too much credit for uniting Italy if he continued unchecked. In other words, he had doubts and was unsure about the next actions and steps Garibaldi would take because he knew well that Garibaldi would eventually play a bigger role by achieving and accomplishing more goals that will certainly help in the unification of Italy (Farmer, 19).
Thus, he tried his best to somewhat stop Garibaldi’s expedition after he realized that Garibaldi would proceed with his campaign. However, Cavour had limited power and support to carry out and implement stricter policies on (or against) Garibaldi and his expedition, “Public opinion in Turin is moving against Count Cavour; he may fall and never regain power” (Morris, 391). Furthermore, Cavour jumped into conclusions and misunderstood the actions of Garibaldi which delineates the fact that Cavour was somewhat foolish and coward-like; he wasn’t able to control his emotions in his political affairs:
It was an arrogance which Cavour detested but also misunderstood; for Garibaldi was actually working for the extension of Victor Emmanuel’s authority and not, as Cavour feared, for the realization of Mazzinian republicanism (Lee, 83).
Furthermore, Mazzini, one of the ‘fathers’ who contributed or led the idea of unifying Italy, denigrates Cavour for being a ‘traitor’ or a coward for only wanting to expand the Piedmontese borders and not the Italy as a unitary state:
Between you [Cavour] and us, sir, an abyss yawns. We represent Italy – you the old, covetous, faint hearted ambitions of the house of Savoy. We desire above all National Unity – you territorial aggrandizement for Piedmont... [Also] vehemently opposed to the revolutionary republicanism of Mazzini and his followers, he did not take seriously the idea of national unification (Wilmot, 231 & 233).
Cavour considered unification of the entire peninsula neither possible nor desirable; he therefore differed fundamentally from Garibaldi, who argued that ‘a single Italy must be our first goal,’ and who hoped to incorporate the existing states of Piedmont, Sardinia, Lombardy, Venetia, Parma, Modena, Tuscany, the Papal States and Naples (Lee, 76). This clearly cements on the fact that Cavour was nonchalant towards the public consent unlike Garibaldi who was the embodiment of the public; an advocate. Furthermore this reported comment made by Cavour recorded by Massari in his diary in 29 December 1859 solidifies on the fact that Cavour was uninterested and actually wanted the next generation to accomplish the unification of Italy, “We must leave Naples out of it. United Italy will be our children’s achievement. I’m satisfied with what we’ve got, so long as we can reach Ancona” (Wilmot, 234). In addition, this proves how Cavour was not at all ambitious like Garibaldi.
All in all, Cavour did not, like Mazzini and Garibaldi, believe in Italian Unification. (Wilmot, 232). Garibaldi’s contribution to the cause of Italian unity was vital. His exploits made him a focal point for patriotic emotion. His conquest of the south in 1860, against all the odds, was a major element in the unification process. He could have established himself as dictator of southern Italy but believed national unity to be more important than personal ambition (Farmer, 20). But, he handed the south to King Victor Emmanuel. To be specific, it was:
On 26 October Garibaldi saluted Victor Emmanuel as ‘the first king of Italy’ and handed over his conquests. Refusing titles and wealth, he retired to Caprera with a year’s supply of macroni and little else (Farmer, 19).
Garibaldi conquered the South for the good of Italy, the whole nation, and not for his own interests. His action clearly proves how he was a modest and unselfish minister who sacrificed himself in order to serve duties to Italy – he accomplished many goals that were necessary to unify Italy. In addition:
Garibaldi was prepared to fight anywhere – in Lombardy against the Austrians in 1848 and 1849, in Rome against the French in 1849, and in Sicily and Naples against Bourbon rule in 1860. Cavour, however, envisaged only an enlarged Piedmont, which would include Lombardy and Venetia only. (Lee, 76).
The Italian nationalist and soldier, Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807-82), was “perhaps the greatest, and certainly the most famous, of the new breed of ‘Great Men’” (Riall, 41-42). He was considered as one of Italy’s ‘Great Men’, and in addition “in terms of importance, originality and sheer renown, he may be the nineteenth – century’s greatest of all ‘Great Men’” (Riall, 47). This cements on the fact that Garibaldi was the greatest of all ‘Great Men’ in the 19th century, greater than Cavour, Napoleon III, Mazzini, and King Victor Emmanuel.
