Returning Muslim veterans were shocked by what they regarded as the French government’s heavy-handed actions after Sétif, and some (including veteran Ahmed Ben Bella) joined the MTLD. Ben Bella went on to form the MTLD’s paramilitary branch, the Organization Speciale, and soon fled to Egypt to enlist the support of President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Pro-independence Algerian Muslims were emboldened by Ho Chi Minh’s victory over French forces at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam in May 1954, and when Algerian Muslim leaders met Ho at the Bandung Conference in April 1955, he told them that the French could be defeated.
Ben Bella and his compatriots formed the Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front, FLN) on October 10, 1954, and the FLN revolution officially began on the night of October 31–November 1. The FLN organized its manpower into several military districts (wilayas). Its goal was to end French control of Algeria and drive out or eliminate the colon population. Wilaya 4, located near Algiers, was especially important, and the FLN was particularly active in Kabylia and the Aures Mountains. The party’s organization was rigidly hierarchical and tolerated no dissent. In form and style it resembled Soviet bloc communist parties, although it claimed to offer a noncommunist and non-Western alternative ideology, articulated by Frantz Fanon.
As France increased the number of its military forces in Algeria to fight the growing insurgency, French officials sought support from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners in the Algerian War, arguing that keeping Algeria French would ensure that NATO’s southern flank would be safe from communism. As a part of France, Algeria was included in the original NATO charter. Washington’s position was nonetheless that European colonial empires were obsolete. Furthermore, U.S. officials believed that the United States could positively influence decolonization movements in the developing world.
Figure 1 French troops ready for action in the Bab-El-Oued District of the city of Algiers in Algeria, after the area had been sealed off by the military, March 26,
The Arab League promoted Pan-Arabism and the image of universal Arab and Muslim support for the FLN. The French granting of independence to both Tunisia and Morocco in March 1956 further bolstered Algeria’s Muslims. When France, Britain, and Israel invaded Egypt in the Suez Crisis of 1956, both the United States and the Soviet Union condemned the move, and the French, unable to topple Nasser, were forced to contend with an FLN sup-ply base that they could neither attack nor eliminate.
On August 20, 1955, the FLN attacked colon civilians in the Philippeville Massacre, and colon reprisals resulted in the deaths of several thousand Muslims. The year-long Battle of Algiers began in September 1956 with FLN operative Saadi Yacef ’s terrorist-style bombing campaign against colon civilians. Meanwhile, other FLN leaders targeted governmental officials for assassination. The FLN movement faced a setback on October 22, however, when Ben Bella was captured.
In December 1956 and January 1957, battle-tested French troops with combat experience in Indochina arrived in Algeria to restore order in Algiers. Among them were General Raoul Salan (commander in chief ), paratrooper commander Major General Jacques Massu, and Colonels Yves Goddard and Marcel Bigeard, both of whom were adept at intelligence gathering and infiltration. Massu’s men made steady headway, and Goddard himself captured Saadi Yacef in September 1957. The Battle of Algiers was now won. The French Army, however, employed torture to force FLN operatives to talk, while others were murdered in the process. The FLN, on the other hand, also routinely murdered captured French soldiers and colon civilians.
Despite victory in Algiers, French forces were not able to quell the Algerian rebellion or gain the confidence of the colons. Some colons were fearful that the French government was about to negotiate with the FLN. In the spring of 1958, colon Ultra groups began to hatch a plan to change the colonial government. Colon veteran Pierre Lagaillarde organized hundreds of Ultra commandos and began a revolt on May 13, 1958. Soon, tens of thousands of colons and Mus-lims arrived outside of the government building in Algiers to protest French government policy. Massu quickly formed the Committee of Public Safety, and Salan assumed leadership of the body. Salan then went before the throngs of protesters. Although the plotters would have preferred someone more frankly authoritarian, Salan called for the return to power of General Charles de Gaulle. Although de Gaulle had been out of power for more than a decade, on May 19, 1958, he announced his willingness to assume authority.
Massu was prepared to bring back de Gaulle by force if neces-sary, but military options were not needed. On June 1, 1958, the French National Assembly made de Gaulle premier, technically the last premier of the Fourth Republic. Algeria had managed to change the political leadership of the mother country.
De Gaulle visited Algeria five times between June and December 1958. At Oran on June 4 he said about France’s mission in Algeria that “she is here forever.” A month later he proposed a budget allocation of 15 billion francs for Algerian housing, education, and public works, and that October he suggested an even more sweep-ing proposal called the Constantine Plan. The funding for the massive projects, however, was never forthcoming, and true Algerian reform was never realized. In any case, it was probably too late for reform to impact the Muslim community of Algeria.
Algeria’s new military commander, General Maurice Challe, arrived in Algeria on December 12, 1958, and launched a series of attacks on FLN positions in rural Kabylia in early 1959. Muslim troops loyal to the French guided special mobile French troops called Commandos de Chasse. An aggressive set of sorties deep in Kabylia made much headway, and Challe calculated that by the end of October his men had killed half of the FLN operatives in Kabylia. A second phase of the offensive was to occur in 1960, but by then de Gaulle, who had gradually eliminated options, had decided that Algerian independence was inevitable.
De Gaulle braced his generals for the decision to let go of Algeria in late August 1959 and then addressed the nation on September 19, 1959, declaring his support for Algerian self-determination. Fearing for their future, some Ultras created the Front Nationale Français (French National Front) and fomented another revolt on January 24, 1960, in the so-called Barricades Week. Mayhem ensued when policemen tried to restore order, and many people were killed or wounded. General Challe and the colony’s governor, Paul Delouvrier, fled Algiers on January 28, but the next day de Gaulle, wearing his old army uniform, turned the tide via a televised address to the nation. On February 1, 1961, army units swore loyalty to the government. The revolt quickly collapsed. Early in 1961, increasingly desperate Ultras formed a terrorist group called the Secret Army Organization (OAS) that targeted colons whom they regarded as traitors.
The Generals’ Putsch of April 20–26, 1961, seriously threatened de Gaulle’s regime. General Challe wanted a revolt limited to Algeria, but Salan and his colleagues (Ground Forces chief of staff General André Zeller and recently retired inspector general of the air force Edmond Jouhaud) had all prepared for a revolt in France as well. The generals had the support of many frontline officers in addition to almost two divisions of troops. The Foreign Legion arrested the colony’s commander in chief, General Fernand Gambiez, and paratroopers near Rambouillet prepared to march on Paris after obtaining armored support. The coup collapsed, how-ever, as police units managed to convince the paratroopers to depart, and army units again swore loyalty to de Gaulle.
On June 10, 1961, de Gaulle held secret meetings with FLN representatives in Paris and then on June 14 made a televised appeal
for the FLN’s so-called Provisional Government to come to Paris to negotiate an end to the war. Peace talks during June 25–29 failed to lead to resolution, but de Gaulle’s mind was already made up. During his visit to Algeria in December, he was greeted by large pro-FLN Muslim rallies and Muslim anticolon riots. The United Nations (UN) recognized Algeria’s independence on December 20, and on January 8, 1962, the French public voted in favour of Algerian independence.
After the failed coup, a massive exodus of colons commenced. Nearly 1 million returned to their ancestral homelands (half of them went to France, and most of the rest went to Spain and Italy). Peace talks resumed in March at Évian, and both sides reached a settlement on May 18, 1962.
The formal handover of power occurred on July 4 when the FLN’s Provisional Committee took control of Algeria. In September, Ben Bella was elected Algeria’s first president. The Algerian War resulted in some 18,000 French military deaths, 3,000 colon deaths, and about 300,000 Muslim deaths. Some 30,000 colons remained behind, including the socialist mayor of Algiers, Jacques Chevallier. They were ostensibly granted equal rights in the peace treaty but instead faced official discrimination by the FLN govern-ment and the loss of much of their property. The FLN remained in power until 1989, practicing a form of socialism until changes in Algeria necessitated changes in internal affairs.
Important Note: This work is owed to ‘The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars’ in an entry attributed to William E. Watson. Please don’t forget to mention this if you are to use this work for any of your writings. Thank You.
-A.W.