The Prisoner’s Dilemma paradigm simulates the social dilemmas faced in life and the decisions individual face in whether to cooperate or compete. This involves two individuals having the choice of either cooperating with their partner in crime and claiming innocence, or accusing their partner in crime. If both sides co-operate the outcome is favourable for both, however, if one or both decide to compete and exploit the other the outcome is less favourable. For example if both prisoners should receive a 5 year sentence for their crime yet both co-operate they will each receive a 2 year sentencing due to a lack of evidence. If they both defect there is enough evidence for a sentence of 4 years each, however if one co-operates and another competes the competitor will receive no sentencing whereas the co-operator will receive the full 5 year sentencing. The rational action in this dilemma is to exploit the other participant yet if they acted irrationally and co-operated the reward for each would be greater (Felkins, 2006).
The voter’s paradox in much the same way as the prisoners dilemma suggests that while it would be communally better if everyone contributes, the individual is always better of for not contributing. Fisheries for example highlight how although eventually a certain species will become extinct take, for example lobster, it is in the Fishermans best interest to fish for lobsters more readily as they will undoubtedly receive a greater price for their catch (Felkins, 1996, as cited in Felkins, 2006). The nuts game by Edney (1979) highlighted how in situations where cooperation and patience can result in a greater outcome 65% of individuals will still compete and take as much as they can within the first 10 seconds. Therefore, when people form long queues in times of possible scarcity they are not acting irrationally as the are simply ensuring their own self interests and well being. Olson (1971) went as far to suggest “Rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests.” Forming long queues, therefore, to ensure acquiring resources can be deemed to be an irrational behaviour, as there is a degree of co-operation, which can be seen from the Nigerian petrol queue.
Initial fuel shortages in Nigeria led to a panic situation with behaviour such as fighting and damaging others cars in order to reach the petrol pumps being common. This rational decision to claim petrol for oneself, however, as the prisoner’s dilemma suggests did not benefit anybody. Therefore, petrol was wasted as motorists fought over the nozzle and those who received petrol could not drive away due to other motorists surrounding the petrol station. The comparison between individual and collective rationality then emerges with co-operation via queue forming becoming the rational choice with the majority believing this to be most beneficial to them as individuals (Wiseman, 1979). Individuals who attempted to compete, therefore, and exploit this cooperation via queue jumping were pushed out of the queue by those cooperating due to generalized reciprocity (Komorita et al. 1991). This cooperative behaviour can be explained via the tit for tat (TFT) strategy. If cooperation is shown in the form of queue forming other individuals will copy this cooperation suggesting in terms of outcomes this is the best strategy to adopt (Sabini, 1994).
For co-operation to emerge there has to be a certain level of trust and communication. In a social dilemma such as a possible scarcity of resources an n-person prisoner’s dilemma will develop where if individuals act to maximise their own gain, everyone will suffer hence the original rational actions become irrational. Forming queues, therefore, rather than taking the supposed rational action of competing is rational in itself as an action is only irrational if there is another action which would result in a higher payoff overall.
References:
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Sabini, J. (1994). Classic findings in social psychology: Tit for tat. Social Psychology.(2nd ed.) (ch. 11, pp. 360). W. W. Norton & Company Ltd.
Sahtouris, E. (1999). Evidence of evolution. Earthdance: Living Systems in Evolution. Retrieved January 7, 2008, from the World Wide Web:
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