The assertion that in order to provide the war with legality that another resolution was needed is false, as William Taft and Todd Buchwald contend, if Iraq was found to be pursuing a wider conflict as it did by Saddam Hussein providing Palestinian militants with financial support, then attacking Iraq was legally justified and as Michael Dunne notes, choosing to pursue a fresh UN resolution was only an option that would’ve been helpful in America’s aspiration of Iraqi regime change.
Colin Powell (The US Secretary of State) meanwhile advised that pursuing a fresh resolution would make taking military action against Iraq easier as it would allow for a greater possibility of multilateral support. Bush contends that he was in favour of getting a fresh resolution as it would’ve enabled the United States to receive the assistance of international partners, namely Great Britain but that he himself had reservations about the capability of the United Nations to police an Iraq that was in violations of at least 16 United Nations Resolutions. It is known that in the White House Administration it was only Powell who supported going through the UN route; as a result, Powell was seen as the only figure within the White House who exercised prudence. A skill that other figures in the White House were deemed to have lacked and why Powell was the most common White House representative at the United Nations.
In order to lobby for a fresh resolution, the United States (and Great Britain) had to contend with a United Nations Security Council that was largely against war and Bush reserves most of his criticism in his account for France, Germany and Russia. Against Germany, he felt enormously let down by Germany’s Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, who Bush suggests actually supported war against Iraq but reneged on his commitment to supporting America’s pursuit of military action when it became clear to Schroeder that war was almost totally opposed within Germany and his re-election was jeopardised if he continued to support such a commitment. These accusations have since been refuted by Schroeder who has accused Bush of not being truthful. For France and Russia, Bush suggests that their economic interests influenced their position. This is supported by Christopher Meyer who suggests that both France and Russia were “bought off” by Saddam Hussein in return for oil exploration contracts and oil supplies. Bush also felt that it was imperative that coercive diplomacy was tried in order for the United Nations to fully address the threat that Saddam presented, yet Jacques Chirac (The French President) felt that a normal diplomatic approach would suffice which resulted in criticism from Bush who claimed that unless a threat of force was used, any diplomacy would be useless. Richard Cohen (Political commentator for the Washington Post) summarised the support for war by noting that the majority opinion inside America was that France was lacking in logic by not wanting to be a part of a war strategy.
Bush devotes little time in his memoir to the method employed in gaining a fresh UN Resolution.
Weapons Inspections:
When UNSC Resolution 1441 was passed by a majority of fifteen to zero by the United Nations Security Council on the 8th November 2002, one requirement made was that Iraq allowed weapons inspections back into the country, having left in protest four years earlier. Failure to comply would ensure that Iraq would face “serious consequences” as per the terms of the resolution. This was essentially Iraq’s final chance to comply. Under the terms of the UNSCR 1441, Iraq had 30 days to submit a “currently accurate, full, and complete declaration” of all WMD-related programs. The resolution made clear the burden of proof rested with Saddam. The inspectors did not have to prove that he had weapons. He had to prove he did not.
Iraq submitted its declaration within the 30 day deadline to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Unfortunately, it was pages full of worthless information that Bush considered as being designed to deceive whilst Hans Blix described it as being “rich in volume but poor in information”. When reviewing the declaration, Blix told the UNSC that he had not seen any evidence that solved any outstanding disarmament issues and that UNMOVIC was neither in a position to confirm Iraq’s statements nor in possession of evidence to disprove them. Blix’s inspection team had also discovered warheads that Saddam had failed to declare or destroy. Blix said “Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament that was demanded of it.”
Both Blair and Bush agreed that Saddam had violated the terms of UNSCR 1441 and as a result had justification to enforce the “serious consequences”. Blix was also concerned with Iraqi constraints being placed on the weapons inspections and felt it was having a detrimental effect on the progress of inspections although did not share the same opinion as Bush on the terminology of what “serious consequences” actually meant, as Christopher Meyer acknowledges, the terminology diluted the potential of resolution 1441. With France and Russia able to legitimately claim it did not mean war as a consequence of Iraq violating the resolution. The US meanwhile maintained that it did. In his speech to the United Nations on the 6th of February 2003, Colin Powell stated that:
''Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option, not in a post-September 11th world,''
Adding that Iraq had unquestionably violated United Nations resolutions, including the latest one, demanding that it cooperate with inspectors and disarm. To which the French, Russian and Chinese envoys responded by stating that weapons inspectors needed more time to complete their work. In the opinion pages in the New York Times, it was felt as if Iraq was not disarming and that the UNSC needed to unite in order to pressurise Saddam into disarmament. There were also calls for a second UN Resolution to determine a final deadline for full and proper Iraqi compliance with existing resolutions.
Failure of intelligence:
One aspect of the Iraq war and its build-up was a complete failure on the part of the intelligence services to fully comprehend the threat that Iraq posed. As Bush concedes in his memoirs, intelligence should have been sternly verified but he was misled. In fact, intelligence was the foundation on which the White House Administration went to war and tried to win international support in the process and its subsequent failure to not only find the Weapons of Mass Destruction that the intelligence services declared Iraq had but to also declare that Iraq harboured terrorists and supported terrorist activities was a position of great embarrassment for the coalition especially when it was proved such assertions were false. One particularly humiliating example of this is provided by the case of Mohammed Atta (suspected leader of the 9/11 hijackers) and an Iraqi contact who were alleged to have met in Prague in April 2001. This was later verified as false, yet the Americans called it fact. Even after American intelligence agencies such as the CIA and FBI had investigated it and both concluded the meeting never took place. The American administration also had supposed evidence that Mohammed al-Zarqawi (Deputy to Osama Bin Laden) had spent two months in Baghdad receiving medical treatment and that other al-Qaeda operatives had moved to Iraq. The CIA worked with a major Arab Intelligence Service to get Saddam to remove Zarqawi but he refused.
When compared to Tony Blair’s memoirs, Bush devotes only a small amount to intelligence reports and this is unfortunate for a historian who wants to use “Decision Points” to gain an insight into the workings of the White House Administration during the run up to war.
Propaganda:
The failure on the part of the American media to challenge the information that it was being given is an issue that resonates with most opponents to the war, with many questioning why the media didn’t adopt the approach taken by the European media, in particular the British. A possible explanation for this has been offered by Jim Lehrer who dismissed the concept of criticising information it was given by the White House by stating that news is only worth reporting if it happens in Washington. Given the White House’s inclination for using such terminology as “liberation” when referring to the potential occupation of Iraq, war was far easier for the majority of the American public to comprehend. As a consequence George W. Bush and his administration virtually had a “free-ride” to war as he faced no real questioning of “why Iraq and why now?” from his domestic media unlike Blair. The success of the White House Administration to scare the American public into supporting war is not new, as the war in Vietnam showed; opposition to war only entered the mainstream media when there was clear opposition to that war in Congress. Bush alludes to the overwhelming public support for military action to be taken against Iraq however the ability of the White House to manipulate its public was profound. A poll conducted in June 2002 on behalf of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations showed that although removing Saddam was popular with the American public, only 20% supported unilateral action, compared to 65% who supported multilateral action or going through the United Nations but when it became clear that America may have to act unilaterally there was still a majority support from the American public.
Conclusion on this memoir:
The memoirs of George W Bush contribute very little to the historical record. It lacks detail and the reader is not left in a position where a full account of what was happening in the White House during the run-up to war can be gleaned. This is in contrast to the memoir of Tony Blair who explained at length his decisions for going to war.
“A Journey” - Tony Blair
British Policy and diplomacy towards Iraq:
In 2001, Blair commented how he had become increasingly concerned by Iraqi WMDs and urged Bush to take action; however when the prospect of regime change was then highlighted, an official of the United States government recalled that Britain were horrified of a prospective regime change and when Resolution 1284 was negotiated, the British were adamant that regime change was not a part of the resolution. Following Blair’s re-election in June 2001, there was a steady discussion between American, British, French, German and Russian diplomats about new sanctions that would force Saddam into allowing UN inspectors back into Iraq. At this point, the Americans had plans for a repeat exercise of ’98 if Saddam refused to comply but their attitude was one of steadiness instead of continued diplomatic pressure. Blair admits that he was the strongest believer in strong action although he was not thinking of Saddam’s removal. Blair also recalls that during his first few years in office, he and former President Bill Clinton realised that the best policy towards Saddam Hussein would be one of containment. However, Blair accepted that 9/11 changed the focus with the potential of Saddam’s removal being legitimate. He fully believed that Saddam was violating “The Blair Doctrine” which was established in 1999. In this doctrine, Blair said it was perfectly legitimate for countries to intervene in the affairs of another country if neighbouring countries were being destabilised as a result of a mass influx of refugees or other consequences of internal problems. Given the invasion of Iraqi refugees into other countries, Blair firmly believed that removing Saddam would be a huge benefit for the world although he realised that the removal of a dictator was not a prerequisite for war and so the focus had to be the WMDs that Iraq had in its arsenal as they were conflicting with sixteen U.N. resolutions. Alistair Campbell notes that during a discussion between the two, Blair felt that regime change was a way of removing the threat of Iraqi WMDs.
Cabinet discussion:
When Blair realised that America was intent on war with Iraq (in April 2002 according to Meyer), he believed that it was his duty to ensure that Britain was alongside its greatest ally and had hoped to be an influence on Bush’s war strategy. Chris Mullin however felt that Tony Blair was looking like Bush’s “poodle”.
There were rumours of discontent from within Blair’s cabinet, Clare Short and Robin Cook were the strongest critics of a possible war with Iraq, and Short accused the United States of bullying in relation to the United Nations. Blair however pointed out that the Americans were not the only ones culpable of bullying; the French for example had threatened to block Bulgaria’s admission into the European Union if the Bulgarians supported war.
Both Short and Cook ultimately resigned when it was clear that war was inevitable. Both though resigned under different circumstances, Blair's willingness to go to war with neither "international authority nor domestic support" prompted the much respected Robin Cook's resignation from the Cabinet on 17 March. As Alistair Campbell notes, the cabinet as a whole wanted Short to leave as she was seen as difficult. John Prescott (Then Deputy Prime Minister) admitted in The Telegraph that there had been some argument over war but this would confirm Blair’s assertion that far from being dictatorial over Iraq, Blair encouraged cabinet debate. Yet strangely, such a statement is seemingly unsupported by Chris Mullin and Alistair Campbell, Mullin commented that once the issue had passed then it would be important for cabinet to discuss Blair’s style of government. Mullin firmly believed that Blair had staked everything on Iraq and had even risked the reputation of his party. Whilst Campbell notes how as of September 11th 2002, Tony Blair didn’t want a debate until the recall of parliament. Campbell asserts that Blair was becoming presidential.
The UN Route:
Unlike George W. Bush, Tony Blair was much more willing to go through the UN Route and wanted to persuade Bush about the advantages of multilateral rather than unilateral action but due to passage of time, it was felt necessary for a fresh UN resolution stating that Saddam was in breach of UN resolutions in order for resolution 678 to be the basis of further action then UNSCR 1441 was a legal necessity.
At a meeting in April 2002 at Crawford, Texas, Blair was finally able to understand the intentions of America. Blair told Bush that whilst he realised America had the resources to take unilateral action, Britain would support America at all times. However, in order to build a sterner case he had to go through the UN to build a larger coalition, at this point Bush conceded that America did not want to go it alone. Given the importance of this meeting, it is surprising that Blair neglects to give a thorough account of what took place although he does write comprehensively about the process of gaining a UN resolution and this is perhaps where the memoir is strongest. In September 7th 2002 the British returned to Camp David with the hope of getting a firm United States commitment to at first gain a fresh UN Resolution giving Saddam Hussein one last opportunity to comply with the resolutions that had been imposed on him.
As noted previously, the United Nations was not well received in the United States whereas for the United Kingdom it was very much the priority. Blair received notice of Bush’s intention to pursue a fresh resolution on the advice that it was a lot easier to have a coalition rather than unilateral action and Blair managed to portray his concerns over the implications of unilateral action.
Blair concedes that UNSCR 1441 didn’t state military action was to follow, yet it explicitly reaffirmed Resolution 678, and any French and Russian attempt to state that military action needed another resolution was rejected. Blair however concedes that a case could be made for a further resolution being necessary to authorise force but an argument to the contrary is just as equally valid with resolution 1441 providing clear scope that if there was not full compliance on the part of Saddam, then resolution 678 could still be applied thus legalising action.
Weapons Inspections:
John Kampfner writes how in October 2002, the British believed that the Rumsfeld-Cheney axis was undermining the credibility of Hans Blix. Indeed, The Pentagon asked the CIA to investigate him and when he was unequivocally found to be free of any wrongdoing, neoconservatives in US government tried to influence conservative commentators in both the US and UK to weaken Blix’s competence in confronting Saddam.
Yet, in his memoirs, Blair undermined Blix’s performance, saying he was inconsistent with his communication about Saddam’s compliance with inspections. Blair accused Blix of quite naturally feeling the “weight of the politics of the inspection”. At first Blix said Saddam was failing to comply and then as a result of seeing the consequence of Saddam’s non-compliance, Blix shifted his opinion with “Saddam might comply”. When reviewing Blix’s diaries this opinion is shared, for much of them Blix wrote how Iraq was not fully complying.
As of the 27th of January 2003, when Blix delivered his report to the United Nations Security Council, he was still critical of a lack of Iraqi compliance with inspections and was again critical in a press conference at Baghdad on the 9th of February 2003 although he did say that Iraq had been helpful on process in providing the inspectors with access to the sites that they (the inspectors) had wanted to visit however Blix was critical of Iraqi disarmament issues. Blix though is critical of the United States, when he suggests that they declared how the inspection team were wrong in its findings of a lack of WMD material. This is contrary to the United Kingdom, who did not suggest that the inspectors had been wrong. Blix also points to an American and British difference in the estimation of how soon Iraq could acquire a nuclear weapon. America said that Iraq could build a nuclear bomb within months of obtaining fissile material which was consistent with the International Institute of Strategic Studies whilst Britain said that as long as sanctions remained effective, Iraq would not be able to produce nuclear weapons as per the International Atomic Energy Agency assessment. It ruled that it would take 5 years to produce the fissile material required. However, if they could obtain it from abroad then it would only take two years. Of Blix’s crucial report delivered to the United Nations Security Council on the 27th of January 2003, Chris Mullin confirms in his diary that Jack Straw (Then British Foreign Minister) believed it showed Saddam had WMD material. However, the failure of intelligence was fundamental in providing Blair with the reason to go to war. It was a failure on Blair’s part though to make sure that the intelligence was strongly verified. Blair maintains that the tactic of coercive diplomacy worked and notes that had they backed off in 2003 then UNMOVIC were never going to get the interviews and could’ve wrongfully concluded that Saddam had given up ambitions for a WMD programme. Thus resulting in sanctions being lifted and creating further problems in trying to reapply them to a regime that was previously cleared and given the rise in oil prices, Saddam would’ve had the capital to realise his wish of a WMD programme.
Failure of intelligence:
It is perhaps the failing on intelligence on the part of the Secret Information Services (SIS) that led to the war in Iraq and as such, due to Blair taking charge, it was his failing. As Eunan O'Halpin notes, under Blair, sensitive and highly technical material was evaluated by people who lacked expertise and this was apparent in the September 2002 dossier when the famous “45 Minute” claim was made. It was compiled in secret and this presented a problem. Scientists were not able to verify whether the “45 Minute” claim was correct. On 18th September 2002, Dr Brian Jones (head of nuclear, biological and chemical branch of the Ministry of Defence Intelligence Staff) wrote of his concerns over the “Strength of judgements being made in the dossier, some of which they believed were not supported by the intelligence”. Neither Jones nor his members of staff was permitted to view the intelligence that had reached SIS headquarters on the 29th of August 2002 from a hugely dubious source (An Iraqi Military Official) on the grounds of utmost secrecy. It was instead verified by unqualified personnel whose knowledge in the field of WMDs and ability to make a thorough assessment of information was limited. In A Journey Blair concedes that the intelligence failure was profound and doesn’t contradict the Butler Report which ruled that there were doubts over the integrity of the human intelligence sources; and as a consequence the quality of intelligence received by officials (including ministers) was compromised. Blair also harbours regret over the issuing of the “dodgy dossier” in February 2003 but claims that the famous “45 minute” assertion (made in the September 2002 report mentioned previously) was only included once officially and was continuously overplayed in the media but as Robin Cook notes in his memoir, Blair emphasized the claim again in his speech to the House of Commons on 18th March 2003. On why the “dodgy dossier” was introduced, Blair asserts that the public wanted to see the evidence on Saddam with the proof being the formulation of intelligence. As Jane M. O. Sharp implies though the report wasn’t created by credible intelligent reports but by PHD dissertations and open-source journal articles and there is no mention of this in A Journey. However, he makes it clear to the reader what was happening during intelligence briefings and this does contribute to a historical record.
Propaganda:
There was a propaganda campaign launched by Downing Street to win support for war in Iraq with the hardest question to answer being “why Iraq and why now?” Although the British media were very sceptical of war, indeed, one survey conducted by Channel 4 News showed that 1/3 of Britons felt Bush posed a greater threat to world peace than Saddam.
To build the case for confronting Iraq, the Foreign Office delivered a 23 page document tilted “Crimes and Human Rights Abuses”, which included a two decade span of atrocities and human rights violations committed by the regime. This though led to international human rights groups complaining that Downing Street were using propaganda in order to further their wider military goals.
Alistair Campbell notes Blair felt that it was imperative to base the case for war on two arguments. These being a humanitarian cause and a possibility that Saddam’s could unite with terrorists and others who shared an ambition to disrupt British interests such an assertion (that Saddam had links to terrorists) was dismissed by the Joint Intelligence Committee as early as 2001.
It was though Blair’s renowned ability as a public speaker that won him most support, this was evident in his House of Commons speech on March 18th 2003 and at the Labour Party Conference in Glasgow on February 15th 2003. In both speeches, he outlined the threat Iraq posed and why Saddam had to be confronted. According to the BBC, Blair’s House of Common’s speech was the finest he had delivered.
Conclusion on this memoir:
Whilst the memoir is more significant from a point of historical research than Decision Points, a proper understanding of the run up to the Iraq war can only be gleaned from reading various other sources.
Conclusions on whether political diaries and memoirs useful contributors to the historical record:
There is no doubt that diaries and memoirs do contribute to the historical record but as with the two memoirs that have been studied there is a definite bias in them. As noted in the introduction, for a thorough understanding of a significant event it is vital to review a wide range of sources as memoirs or diaries will have the potential to be biased and to not be wholly representative of the truth; the problem of editing memoirs or diaries for commercial purposes also poses a problem of some information being omitted from the published version, despite this, diaries and memoirs can be an exceptional source of information if they are written close to the event that they seek to describe. They are also a vital starting point for historians intending to research an important event and because of this they do contribute to the historical record but an academic historian would always consult a wide range of sources in order to carry out a thorough investigation.
Blair’s chief press secretary. 2 British Ambassador to the United States in the build-up to invasion.
An influential Labour backbencher 4 The Chief UN Weapons Inspector who was often the focus of the media as it was he that would provide briefings on whether Iraq was complying with the various demands placed upon it in terms of disarmament.
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Blair: UN must deal with Iraq: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/2765151.stm - 15th February 2003. Last accessed 01/03/2011.
18th March 2003: Blair sets up Iraq vote win: http://news.bbc.co.uk/democracylive/hi/historic_moments/newsid_8189000/8189443.stm Last accessed 10/03/2011