History of the Holocaust.

Of the many controversial and argued issues in both The Abandonment of the Jews and The Myth of Rescue the most important and convincing by both sides is the issue of the bombing of Auschwitz. As Rubinstein puts it, “whenever I have lectured on the topic of rescue, either before scholarly or non-scholarly audiences, the bombing of Auschwitz has always and invariably been aired in question time” (157). For good reason, as both authors have attributed to the fact that bombing either Auschwitz itself or the railroads leading to the extermination camp would have a devastating effect on the gas chambers at Auschwitz, thus saving many lives. If, then, there is no question as to the effectiveness of this plan, there must be satisfactory explanation as to why it was not carried out by the Allied forces.

In The Myth of Rescue, Rubinstein states that along with other “subsidiary reasons” (158), the Allies did not bomb Auschwitz mainly due to the fact that “no person or group in the democracies, however deeply they felt the sufferings of Europe’s Jews, proposed the destruction of any extermination camp” (Rubinstein 158). However, this argument does not seem to hold up against both Wyman, and even Rubinstein himself. In The Abandonment of the Jews, Wyman recounts that two escapees from Auschwitz, Rudolf Vrba and Aldred Wetzler, provided thorough and detailed descriptions of the death camps as well as a statistical record of the systematic torture that had been taking place. Their report was spread to governments worldwide and by late June of 1944 the intentions and activities of Auschwitz were well know to the Allied countries as well as to the world on a whole. Even Rubinstein tells of a Slovakian Rabbi who had escaped the train to Auschwitz and suggested bombing the railways between Hungary and Poland that would eventually reach the United States Secretary of State and that “pressure was thus emerging from a number of rescue groups for some of the rail lines to Auschwitz to be bombed” (Rubinstein 160). Rubinstein believes that by stating in italics “rail lines”, and not Auschwitz itself, he saves himself from contradicting his central argument that no Jewish or non-Jewish community in the democracies had thought of the idea of bombing Auschwitz. However, this only proves the contradictory argument that there were groups putting pressure on the American government to stop the increasingly known procedures at death camps like Auschwitz, thus furthering Wyman’s argument that the US held back in saving Jews from their deaths. This inconsistency in Rubinstein’s argument of Auschwitz leads to a question of the legitimacy in his other arguments as well as a stronger argument behind Wyman’s thesis.

Another central point of discussion included in both books involves the role and success of the War Refugee Board at the time of the Holocaust. While Wyman both credits the Board’s achievements of saving thousands of Jewish lives and suggests that an earlier installment of the Board could have saved even more lives, Rubinstein tears apart Wyman’s argument piece by piece. He believes that the numbers of Jews saved by the War Refugee Board are both impossible and “wholly fallacious”(Rubinstein 188). Rubinstein brings historical evidence of instances, that make it impossible that the Board could have saved the amount of Jews Wyman had suggested, to support this argument. For example, when debating the number of Transnistrian Jews saved by the Board, he argues that, “it is doubtful that representatives of the War Refugee Board played more than a marginal part in any decision by Antonescu to allow the Transnistrian Jews to be repatriated, even after taking into account the facts that they were in no danger of being deported to Auschwitz in any case, and that only minimal numbers returned from Transnistria to Old Rumania before the end of the war” (Rubinstein 190). Nevertheless, Rubinstein credits the War Refugee Board’s successes to have reached 20 000 saved Jewish lives, a “wholly meritorious” (Rubinstein 196) achievement but not near the figure of 200 000 lives that is suggested by Wyman. However, by stating this figure, or even the possibility of this number of Jews that were saved, he is in direct contradiction to his thesis. Moreover, Rubinstein only speaks of what the Board had failed to accomplish and neglected to respond to Wyman’s suggestion of more action by and an earlier establishment of the War Refugee Board. As a result, Rubinstein’s argument does not serve as a direct opposition to Wyman. As Rubinstein so intricately accounts for the inaction of the Board, he supports Wyman’s thesis that claims more could and should have been done in an attempt to save the Jews.

Both arguments and both authors provide carefully constructed arguments with evidence to back up their claims. However, the accuracy and legitimacy of that evidence brought forth in both cases is unclear and it is, at times, impossible to distinguish the true occurrence of some events. Nevertheless both sides to the debate of the role of the Allies during the Holocaust are important to research. Although Rubinstein’s arguments may seem misdirected or even contradictory, the overall implication of his thesis is indispensable. The rescue of the Jews was not a simple task to be carried out by the Allies with many factors, such as ending the war against Hitler, also on the agendas of the Allied governments. Yet, Wyman’s acknowledgement of the harsh reality that there were ways to save the Jews being tortured and killed seems to take precedence in the mind of the reader. It is for this reason that The Abandonment of the Jews gives a far more compelling argument.

To this day, what remains of the Holocaust are only the memories of those who survived the Nazi occupied camps. It is these stories and remembrances that leave no room for any excusable reason for inaction on behalf of the Allied countries.  The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum does not only pay tribute to those who perished at the hands of the Nazis but also serves as a constant reminder that “far too little was done”.