The cause of the heightened radical protest throughout this period could be due to the increase in economic distress. National debt increased, along with agricultural unemployment due to returning soldiers and Britain faced greater foreign competition over goods. The 1815 Corn Law caused increased bread prices which led to hunger. Hunger can be an important factor in protests as ‘hunger politics’ mean people are getting desperate. With regard to some of the protests described as radical, “evidence points more to the desperation of hunger than to careful, concerted revolutionary planning” (Evans). A general correlation with economic depression and radical activity can been seen and Cobbett’s belief that “only people with empty stomachs were receptive to radical political argument” is an exaggeration but also holds some validity. It’s been noted that the economic depression in 1826, though shorter was sharper and was not accompanied by a radical revival. The unrest was exposed in different ways, mainly by the Luddite movement with ‘swing riots’. Thompson sees Luddism as a “quasi-revolutionary movement” so some would say that if economic distress had been continuous, Luddism could have become more threatening and may have supported revolutionary parties at a greater level.
The phrase most commonly used to describe the government’s approach to dealing with radical pressure from 1793 is ‘Reign of Terror’. This consisted of three main policies – intimidation, legislation and propaganda.
The government used intimidation in three ways. Firstly, between 1790 and 1793, they looked to courts to keep an eye on and discourage radical protest in localities. Secondly, by 1793 the Home Office was expanded and a small Secret Service established. The government used the spies to infiltrate known radical groups and report any threats. This was successful in helping keep track of radical movements but sometimes the spies encouraged riots or exaggerated situations to justify their earnings so this wasn’t always an effective method. Arguably, this could mean that various reports of new, intimidating radical protest may not have been as threatening as was believed at the time, thus reducing the view that Britain was ‘ripe for revolution’. Thirdly, the government brought prosecutions against leading radicals.
In addition to intimidation the government passed several laws designed to reduce the activities of radicals. First, in 1794, Habeas Corpus was suspended, in 1795, the Treasonable and Seditious Practices Act and the Seditious Meetings Act were rushed through parliament after an attack on the King’s coach. This was a major bloc to face the radicals as it disallowed meetings of more than 50 people. This meant they couldn’t meet up and design plans of action or response. This was a skilful effort by the government to curb radical action. Finally in 1799 & 1800 the Combination Laws banned the development of trade unions.
The propaganda campaign consisted of dramatic increases in “conservative publications” which stated positives of the existing system and labelled radicals “dangerous traitors and anarchists”. Evidence shows the policies were very effective as they managed to take advantage of the feelings of patriotism which were heightened by the war and fears of invasion. As a result of this, support for Pitt’s government steadily increased during the 1790’s. It can be said this would increase opposition towards radicals, again reducing the chances of a rapidly expanding network and thus reducing the support of a full scale revolution. Nevertheless, historians are still divided over how effective the ‘Reign of Terror’ was. Most believe it was an “expedient emergency response to a perceived domestic crisis” which by 1795-6 had “eliminated the threat of popular radicalism”. (Peaple & Lancaster). On the other hand, others believe the ‘Reign of Terror’ was “counterproductive” because it “suppressed radicalism” and drove more extreme elements of the movement ‘underground’” where they were arguably more “dangerous and potentially revolutionary” (Thomis & Holt, 1977). It appears the ‘Reign of Terror’ was a response to the belief that the nation was, or could be, threatened by revolution.
To expand on this, there was “popular loyalist feeling across the country”. People with these feelings were increasingly joining loyalist associations and forming counterrevolutionary organisations. Although these groups were often financially backed by the elite, evidence shows they were realistic reflections of popular feeling at the time. This is important because it shows us there were people prepared to go up against and resist radical protest and that a large part of the country was not attracted to radical ideals. This evidence goes against the view that Britain was set for revolution because there was still much opposition. Historians estimate that several thousand groups were in existence by 1793. The groups took on many roles, starting with “intimidation of known radicals in their local area” (Peaple & Lancaster). They also helped distribute loyalist propaganda. They “not only sought to intimidate their radical opponents, they also succeed in encouraging loyalty and patriotism among the public” (Dickinson 1985).
The Peterloo Massacre meant radical ideas became a national cause. Informed by spies of crowds gathered to listen to speeches by Henry Hunt, the district magistrates sent in the local yeomanry to break it up. This resulted in people being crushed and others being cut down by yeomanry. It’s not clear what happened once the yeomanry charged, how many were killed or whether the demonstrators planned to cause trouble but it’s clear that the government was blamed. The deaths provided the radical cause with martyrs which the press exploited to maximum effect, successfully sending the radical message across the country. The Peterloo massacre indicates the fear felt by the government towards the radicals as without knowing whether the meeting was peaceful or revolutionary, the yeomanry were sent in with fairly disastrous consequences. It can be argued that this reaction shows Britain was close to revolutionary level at this point.
1830-32 are further years of instability within Britain. There were many riots and some historians believe this was the time which Britain came closest to revolution.
In October 1831 riots gripped a number of cities including Bristol and Nottingham reflecting the defeat of the second Reform Bill. 12 rioters were killed and many were injured when order was finally restored forcibly by troops after 3 days. This did the government no favours. Reverend J.L. Jackson, in an eyewitness account says that “above 70 people have been killed, besides a large number who have been wounded” which is a known exaggeration now but possibly the belief at the time. He also blames “our wretched ministers”. Arguably, it can be seen from this that government popularity among the people further decreased as, like Peterloo, they were blamed for the deaths. The fabrication in the account stating 70 died could be a deliberate exaggeration by the paper to turn people against the government and towards radicalism. If this succeeded Britain could be seen to be heading closer to revolution.
The other instance when protest seemed to be most aggressive was in May 1832. “A number of historians conclude that this is the point at which Britain came closest to experiencing revolution” (Peaple & Lancaster). When the King invited Wellington to form a new Tory ministry after Greys resignation there was a general outcry because the public believed this would create a “clampdown on the protest movement” and “inevitably block reform”. Strikes and demonstrations began again throughout the country. The Whigs returned not long after but the tactics drawn up were considered and organised so the question here is, if the crisis had been prolonged, would a revolution would have taken place. Historians are still divided over this but I feel there would’ve been a strong threat if Wellington had succeeded in forming his government.
“It is usually the case that revolutions occur when political change fails to respond to economic distress”. This was indeed the case in Britain. To sum up, much was made of the threat of revolution to try and push the Reform Bill through a reluctant parliament. However there does appear to be a strong ‘revolutionary mix’. There were many factors present which are required for revolution, such as economic distress reflected in the ‘swing riots’ and the example of a successful revolution in France. Thriving political unions were set up and the middle and working classes were collaborating. The defeat of the second Reform Bill caused widespread unrest and E.P. Thompson claims that “Britain was within an ace of revolution” and identifies the autumn on 1831 and The Days of May, 1832, as the potentially revolutionary moments. This statement could well be true but E.P. Thompson is recognized as being left wing and a communist so would want to believe in revolution.
However, it can also be argued that the widespread unrest did not pose a major threat to the governing elite. There seems there was little preparation and it doesn’t appear the middle and working classes were working towards the same aim. Many of the more radical groups were to isolated from the rest of society to make much of an impact and “widespread and generalised economic discontent…was largely missing from Britain” as the real wages stayed relatively stable. The radical parties of the period seemed to want moderate reform of the parliamentary system, rather than its complete overthrow. The 1832 Reform Act gave them this reform and it appears to be this which ultimately diffused the situation. The terms of the Act gave the middle classes what they were campaigning for so their support for the radical campaigns dwindled which made the potential revolution much easier to control.
I believe that Britain had many revolutionary factors but they didn’t all come together in a way which could cause revolution. The government handled the situation well and the network of spies helped suppress any major chance of a revolution.
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Bibliography
The Great Reform Act of 1832
British History For AS Level 1783-1850 - Derek Peaple and Tony Lancaster
The Peterloo Massacre 1819
Britain Before the Reform Act: Politics and Society 1815-1832 - Eric.J.Evans
Labour and Reform: Working-Class Movements 1815-1914 - Clive Behagg
