I think.
Anything that thinks exists.
I exist.
If we rely on Burman, whose notes are quoted by Williams, Descartes did admit that the suppressed premise ‘anything that thinks exists’ is ‘presupposed by the cogito’. But now we can doubt this premise: ‘Anything that thinks exists’. Would an Artificial Intelligence computer exist if it thought to itself that it existed? Or, on the contrary, would those with some kind of a serious brain damage that would not allow them to think, not exist?
At this point we can say that just as there are reasons for us to doubt the existence of our bodies, there are reasons to doubt the existence of our minds. Depending on whatever we believe, we can draw our own conclusions from ‘Cogito ergo sum’. If I believe that reasoning is a purely physical process, then the from fact that I am thinking it will follow that I do have a brain. if I have a brain, it must follow that I have other body organs to which this brain is attached.
If, on the other hand I believe that I have a Cartesian mind
As Williams suggests in his book , and I agree with him, Descartes accepts the ‘cogito, ergo sum’ ‘anticipating the answers to many questions which will come later’. The next move would be to prove the separateness of mind and body followed by the existence of the omnipotent God. On the basis of the fact that he thinks and therefore exists he concludes that he is a ‘substance whose whole essence or nature is simply to think, and which does not require any place, or depend on any material thing, in order to exist’. That is certainly true if you a dualist, but if you are not, there is not enough evidence given by Descartes in order to his dualist point of view.
Descartes sets too high a degree of doubt. He goes beyond his own evidence. It seems that his final aim is to show that God exists and that the mind is non-physical, separate from the body. He has the initial stage of doubting everything and the final one, where he is sure of the existence of God and Cartesian mind. However, he ‘imports’ thoughts. Not always the conclusions that he draws follow coherently from the premises.
In order to be executing the act of thinking there needs to be the mind which performs the act thinking. I am thinking, therefore I cannot doubt the existence of my mind. However, I can doubt the existence my body. From that it follows that body and mind are two separate substances.
If all there is to a person is the body, and our thoughts are simply the physiological processes that take place on our brain, then Descartes’ argument fails, because he himself says that the existence of the body is ‘a belief suspended in Doubt’. Not only is ‘Cogito ergo sum’ the basis for the further proof of the separateness of the immaterial mind and physical body, and therefore the basis for the proof of the existence of God. It is also a statement that was meant to be free of any subjective judgement that we as human beings are bound to have due to our misleading senses. However, we can only follow Descartes if we share dualist or namely, Cartesian dualist point of view. If we do not, then there is nothing that stops us from doubting our own existence. For, if we doubt the existence of our bodies, we consequently doubt the existence of our brain, and therefore any thoughts that we have might be exposed to doubt.
Bibliography
Primary literature:
• Descartes, Rene Meditations and Other Metaphysical Writings, Penguin Group. Translation by Clarke, Desmond M. (2000)
Secondary literature:
• Cottingham, John, edited by (1995). The Camridge Companion to Descartes, Cambridge University Press, Chapter 5 Cogito and its Importance by Markie, Peter.
• Morton, Adam (1999). Phylosophy in Practice, Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
• Sorell, Tom (1987). Descartes, Oxford University Press.
• Williams, Bernard (1978) Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, Pelican Books. Chapter 3.
Lecture notes:
Descartes, R. Meditations, translation by Clarke, D.M., p 18.
Williams, Bernard (1978) Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, p 93
Williams, Bernard (1978) Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, p 92
Williams, Bernard (1978) Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, p 77
Cottingham, John, edited by (1995). The Camridge Companion to Descartes, p 143
Williams, Bernard (1978) Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, p 93