If the offer to students was unilateral, there would be a binding contract and the tutor would be correct, as the principle in carlill would be applied.
The effect of this is that a binding contract only comes into force when the students accept the offer. If the student accepts the offer, the tutor would be correct in stating there is a legaly binding contract. As all the requirement have been fulfilled. If, however the statement made by the tutor was correct, and that a binding contract was formed when the offer was made and not when the offer was accepted there would be legal obligations formed between parties when there was no intent to be bound. If an offer was made and there was an instant obligation someone, for example selling a car may be bound to sell that one item to many people, which would clearly be impossible. This rule was created for this reason, so that contracts were not formed which could not be preformed. The principle that an offer must be accepted froms a way of protecting the offeror.
To make a binding contract the acceptance must exactly match the offer. The offeree must accept all the terms of the offer. However, in certain cases it is possible to have a binding contract without a matching offer and acceptance. The offer can also be teminated by the university, or via a lapse of time. Where an offer is stated to be open for a specific length of time, then the offer automatically terminates when that time limit expires. Where there is no express time limit, an offer is normally open only for a reasonable time. In Ramsgate Victoria Hotel v Montefiore (1866). Termination of an offer occurs when an offer has been accepted so if the student gets the required grades to gain entry to the university, the university should award a place to the student. Should all 450 of the students that applied to the university comply with the requirements and wish to go to that university and nowhere else, all of the students are legally owed a place at the university even though there are only 187 places. The offer may be revoked by the offeror at any time until it is accepted. However, the revocation of the offer must be communicated to the offeree(s). Unless and until the revocation is so communicated, it is ineffective as in Byrne v Van Tienhoven (1880). The revocation need not be communicated by the offeror personally, it is sufficient if it is done through a reliable third party. Once the offeree has commenced performance of a unilateral offer, the offeror may not revoke the offer. In order for the university to revoke an offer, they must bring it to the attention of the offeree before the point of acceptance. This would terminate and end the offer which would make it impossible to accept. This principle can be seen in Payne v Cave. offer may be made subject to conditions. Such a condition may be stated expressly by the offeror or implied by the courts from the circumstances. If the condition is not satisfied the offer is not capable of being accepted. Therefore if the students do not get the requirements stated via the university the offer is terminated.
This question deals with offer and acceptance and the tangle of communications needs to be unraveled in order to establish whether an agreement has been reached and, if so, on what terms. If there is an agreement, it may also be enquired as to the likely remedy. In order for an acceptance of an offer to be valid it must follow the mirror image rule therefor accpetance must be unconditional and the acceptance must be identical to the offer proposed. This was firslty illustrated in the case of Hyde v Wrench. Here, it was held that a counter offer of £950 invalidated the origional offer of £1,000, and the offer of £1,000 could not then be accepted as the new offer invalidated the original offer. Brenda’s phone call could possibly just have been an enqiry. In the case of , Jaques & Co. v Mclean here the defendants telegraphed stating ‘please wire whether you would accept delivery over two months, or if not the longest you would give’. This was distinguished from the case of Hyde v Wrench. It was merely an inquiry whether they would modify the terms of the offer and therefore the origional offer still stands. This issue would have an influence as to whether the ‘acceptance’ of the offer would become a legally binding contract., it would indicate that the phone call was asking if there was a discount available which would be an enquiry therefore following the precident set by Stevenson v Mclean the offer would still stand. If Brendas phone call was a counter offer the origional offer of 200 filing cabinets would no longer stand. As in her reply to an offer, the offeree (Brenda) introduces a new term or varies the terms of the offer, then that reply cannot amount to an acceptance. Instead, the reply is treated as a "counter offer", which the original offeror is free to accept or reject. A counter-offer also amounts to a rejection of the original offer which cannot then be subsequently accepted.
Acceptance must be communicated to the offeror as seen in Felthouse v bindley., by the offeree or someone authorised by the offeree. If someone accepts on behalf of the offeree, without authorisation, this will not be a valid acceptance. Where an instantaneous method of communication is used, e.g. telex, it will take effect when and where it is received. However this has been broadened extended in cases where dealings arent face to face, or where there may be a lag in acceptance by the offeree and the point at which that offer is received by the offeror. This principle was highlighted in Entores v Miles Far East corp, where LJ Denning stated that if acceptance as not heard by the offeror, the offeree must make sure the offeree has heard that acceptance take place and must continue to make it clear to the offeror that she/he is trying to accept. In the case of faxes, telexes and other types of communication which are instant the acceptance takes place when the offoror is aware of the fact that the offer has been accepted. In this case Alan had said the offer was open for one week ending on Friday 7th December. Brenda then phoned Alan the next day on his mobile and left a voicemail message, she then later that day decided the offer was a good deal and she faxed Alan telling him to ignore the voicemail message and accepted his original offer. Assuming the offer hasn’t been revoked by a counter offer, there would be no contract between and Brenda and Alan until he read the fax. However Alan has heard the voicemail message before reading the fax and had phoned charlie who then accepted the offer, there is a binding contract.
David and Alan do not have a contract based on the following reasons; firstly the offer was made to Brenda and not David he was only told of the offer by Brenda. The time limit on the offer has lapsed as he posted his letter on the 8th December and the offer ended on the 7th December. This can be seen in the case of Ramsgate Victoria Hotel Co v Montefiore. In June offers to buy shares were issued and were accepted in November. The fact that the acceptance was by post is of no real significance. The postal rule states that the acceptance takes place as soon as a correctly addressed letter is posted, and not when it is received. This is different to the usual rules of acceptance which states that both the offeror and the offeree must be aware of the acceptance. This precedent began in the case of Adams v Lindsell, and was confirmed in Household fire Insurance v Grant. Unlike the case of Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball co, this offer was not made to the world at large, but to Brenda and Charlie. This was shown in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Fry where it was held in order for a contract to be formed, there must be a meeting of minds which would involve both parties being aware that there was an intention to be bound to each other. In this case, Alan has no intent to be bound to David.
I would advise Brenda differently depending on whether the phone call was counted as a counter offer. If it was a counter offer, she would have no cause for action. If the phone call wasn’t a counter offer and she could prove that she had taken reasonable steps to communicate acceptance, in this case the fax. If it was within office hours she may have a cause for action. The advice I would give to David would that he has no claim on the grounds previously discussed above, for this reason it would not be advisable for him to follow this claim.
Bibliography
Mary Chapman, Contract Law 2nd Edition, William Publishing
Tort 2nd Edition, Paula Giliker & Silas Beckwith, Tort 2nd Edition, Sweet & Maxwell
E McKendrick, Contract Law 6th Edition, Palgrave Macmillian
G. Trietel, An Outline of the Law of Contract 6th edition, Oxford UP
University of Lancashire Obligations 1 Handbook
Halsburys Laws of England, Chapter 633
Partridge v Crittenden [1968] 2 All ER 421
Fisher v Bell [1960] 3 All ER 731
Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Boots Cash Chemists Ltd - [1953] 1 All ER 482
Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1893] 1 QB 256
Payne v Cave (1789) 3 Term Rep 148
Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball company [1893] 1 QB 256
Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball company [1893] 1 QB 256
Lord Denning in Gibson v Manchester City Council [1979]
Ramsgate Victoria Hotel v Montefiore (1866) LR 1 Ex 109
Byrne v Van Tienhoven (1880) 5 CPD 344
For example Dickinson v Dodds (1876) 2 ChD 463
As seen in Errington v Errington [1952] 1 All ER 149
Payne v Cave (1789) 3 Term Rep 148The
Financings Ltd v Stimson [1962] 3 All ER 386.
To make a binding contract the acceptance must exactly match the offer
[1863] 1 New Rep 401, 11 WR 429
Powell v Lee (1908) 99 LT 284.
[1866] LR 1 Exch 109, 4 H & C 164
