Intention
The Criminal Justice Act 1967 shows that intention falls into the category of a ‘subjective’ state of mind. As opposed to an ‘objective’ state of mind, this shows whether a consequence of an action was actually intended by the accused person rather than a ‘reasonable person’.
There are two distinctions of intention, which were made by Jeremy Bentham who said that it was the consequence of an action, which was intentional. This view, however, has changed to that of an action being intentional as to its consequence (Card, Cross & Jones, Criminal Law, 15th Edition, para. 3.24, p63): -
- Direct Intention:
This type of intention can be generalised as the ‘aim’ of an act: if a person directly intends a consequence (end result), it is his/her primary aim or purpose to achieve that consequence. In Mohan ([1976] Q.B. 1), direct intention was defined as ‘a decision to bring about a certain consequence’, however, it is argued that there is no simple definition of intention in criminal law, but that it depends on whether the jury decide that the accused had intended a consequence or not.
- Oblique Intention
The second type of intention is that of Oblique Intention. In this situation, a consequence, which results from an action, is not intended to be the primary aim of the action, but is foreseen by the accused and is likely or virtually certain to occur (Nedrick [1986] 1 W.L.R 1025 (CA)).
In Moloney ([1985] A.C 905 HL), Lord Bridge believed that foresight of a consequence was not actually intent as to that consequence and that foreseeing it, as secondary to the previous actions was merely an “invitation” to the jury to find any intent in the accused persons mind and that “the judge…should leave it to the jury’s good sense to decide whether the accused acted with the necessary intent…” (Lord Bridge of Harwich in Moloney). This analysis was confirmed in Hancock and Shankland ([1986] A.C 455 (HL)) where it was said that foresight of a virtually certain consequence is not intention as to that consequence. In Hancock and Shankland, Lord Scarman also stated that it was necessary to tell the jury about the relevance of probability.
Has the Mens Rea element been proved?
In this offence, the Mens Rea of Intention is required.
- Direct Intent
To recap on direct intent, this is when the accused made ‘a decision to bring about a consequence’ (Mohan), and in this case, Carla had a specific aim/purpose for her action – to kill the fox (even thought it was not a fox, she still had the intention to kill it). It is proved that she had this definite aim as she went out to ‘finish it off’. This shows that she wanted to bring about the consequence of killing the animal, which in the criminal law shows direct intention.
There is no need to go into Oblique Intention as in this case direct intention has been proved.
Therefore, as the actus reus and mens rea of this offence have been satisfied, Carla is guilty of an offence contrary to s.3 of the Deer Act 1991.
2) Dinesh has been charged with an offence contrary to s11 (7)(a) of the Deer Act 1991.
Section 11(7)(a) of the Deer Act 1991:
Actus Reus = If any person obstructs any authorised officer or constable making an inspection under this section
Actus Reus of the offence broken down into its elements (Acts/Omissions/Events & Circumstances/Consequences):
*Act → Obstruct an officer/constable making an inspection
*Circumstance → Must be an authorised officer or constable
Is the Actus Reus satisfied?
This offence requires an act of obstruction to an officer that would stop him/her from physically making an inspection. In this case, Dinesh ignores the officers request. It can be argued that this is a type of ‘obstruction’ to the officer making an inspection, but the fact that he ignored him shows that he did not do an act in obstructing him but he committed an omission as to obstructing him. An omission would not suffice in this offence, as it requires an act to be carried out.
Therefore, in my opinion Dinesh does not satisfy the Actus Reus elements.
As the Actus Reus has not been proved, there is no reason to look at the Mens Rea element of intention for this offence.
3) Earl has been charged with an offence contrary to s11 (7)(b) of the Deer Act 1991:
S11 (7)(b) of the Deer Act 1991:
Actus Reus = If any person makes or causes to be made in a record book any entry which is false or misleading in a material particular
Actus Reus of the offence broken down into its elements (Acts/Omissions/Events & Circumstances/Consequences):
*Act → Make or cause false or misleading records to be made in a material particular
*Circumstance → Must be a material particular
*Consequence → A false or misleading record is made
Is the Actus Reus satisfied?
The information shows that Earl has committed the actus reus of the crime he is charged with, as his actions satisfy the elements of the actus reus.
Mens Rea = Knowingly or recklessly
The mens rea word ‘knowingly’ can be interpreted in different ways. According to Lord Devlin, there are 3-types of knowledge, called degrees of knowledge: -
- Actual Knowledge
This is when the accused truly knew of the circumstances of his/her act.
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Wilful Blindness (knowledge of the 2nd Degree)
In a case where a person is wilfully blind as to a circumstance, he has actually realised the risk of his actions, or that a risk exists but nevertheless still continues with the action without making any ‘enquiries’. (Roper V Tailor’s Central Garages (Exeter) Ltd ((1951) 2 TLR 284, DC)
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Constructive Knowledge (knowledge of the 3rd Degree)
The third degree of knowledge becomes irrelevant when mens rea words such as ‘knowingly’ are used in the definition of the offence. It only applies and suffices in crimes that use words such as ‘reasonable cause to believe’ or ‘reason to believe’. It occurs when a person didn’t know of a surrounding circumstance, but ought to have known. (Roper V Tailor’s Central Garages)
Recklessness is a subjective state of mind, meaning that a risk must have been obvious to the accused. Subjective recklessness is the ‘conscious taking of an unjustified risk’ (C, C & J, para 3.41). The accused, when carrying out his/her act, has realised there is some risk that a particular consequence can occur and therefore it is ‘unreasonable’ for him/her to take that risk (R. v Stephenson [1979] 1 Q.B. 695 (CA, CRIM)) and (Cunningham [1957] 2 Q.B. 396)
Recklessness can be said to have foresight of a consequence, as the accused does realise a risk, thus foreseeing it.
Has the Mens Rea element been proved?
Earl does not know that the light on the calculating machine is showing red, and so he has no ‘actual knowledge’ about the circumstance. However, Earl thought it was showing green, and he knows he is colour blind, so he must have realised there was a risk, but continued without making any enquires. This shows wilful blindness (the 2nd degree of knowledge). This satisfies the mens rea of this crime under s.11 (7)(b) of the Deer Act 1991 so Earl is wilfully blind and is guilty of the offence.
Word Count (excluding case citations, references and question titles): 1,432
Bibliography
Books:
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Criminal Law 15th Edition – Card, Cross & Jones, Butterworths, 2001
- Criminal Law (Text with materials) Fifth Edition, CMV Clarkson & HM Keating, Sweet & Maxwell (London), 2003
Cases:
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Mohan [1976] Q.B. 1; [1975] 2 W.L.R. 859
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Nedrick [1986] 1 W.L.R 1025; [1986] 3 All E.R. 1
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Moloney [1985] A.C. 905; [1985] 2 W.L.R 648
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Hancock & Shankland [1986] A.C 455; [1986] W.L.R. 357
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Roper V Tailor’s Central Garages (Exeter) Ltd ((1951) 2 TLR 284, DC
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R. v Stephenson [1979] 1 Q.B. 695 (CA, CRIM)
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Cunningham [1957] 2 Q.B. 396; [1957] 3 W.L.R. 76
