Week 5
Dian Qu
Utility and Justice
Can the claims of justice be subsumed under the utility principle?
The definition of “Justice” as a philosophical concept has long been disputed. It has been viewed in one sense, as being “identical with the ethics of whom should receive benefits and burdens, good or bad things of many sorts, given that others might receive these things” (Honderich 1995). On the other hand, Conventionalists assert that “justice” can be understood as what is due to each person given by the laws, customs and shared understandings of the community of which the person is a member (Brian & Matravers). The slight differentiations between the many efforts to the provision of a suitable definition led Mill to attempt to reconcile a broad sense of what “justice” is perceived to represent, with the theory of utilitarianism. Mill argues that the utility principle can be used to explain the idea and the sentiment of justice. However, after close reflection on Mill’s ideas it appears that “justice” cannot be so easily subsumed under it.
The utility principle is commonly understood as being a standard that judges the moral rightness or wrongness of actions on the basis of their outcome using the maxim, “the greatest happiness for the greatest number”, or the one as Mill stated, “actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to promote the reverse of happiness.” It does subsume the notion of justice in some ways. Firstly, to be just to each other is a means to ensure happiness for each individual and the society as a whole. As Mill asserted, the idea of justice is the idea of perfect obligation with correlative rights. That is to say, just people cannot by any means harm another by aggression against him (her) and his (her) property or by failure to comply with his (her) justified expectations because that is what he (she) has valid claims for. If this does happen, a punishment for unjust beings should follow. Otherwise, it would be impossible to build up trust between each other and no one will be able to fully enjoy a pleasurable life because of the constant worries over one’s safety or the safety of one’s belongings. Without justice regulating the society, people will have to face so much uncertainty that it is impossible to be happy. For instance, if the boss promises the workers a certain amount of salary, but doesn’t fulfill his promise, he is being unjust to the m, violating their rights of getting paid by the expected amount. This can adversely affect the workers’ happiness and lead to a decrease in working efficiency as the workers may not put in as much effort as before or some may even stop working; the final result would be a reduction of happiness for all including the unjust boss. Therefore we can say that justice is an assurance for a well-ordered society, in which people can form a sense of security, a basic condition for happiness which is certainly on the utilitarian ground. Secondly, Mill has reasonably argued that the sentiment of justice, namely, the desire to punish comes from the concerns of utility. Mill, as always, noticed the unique features of human’s sentiment that we are not only concerned if the injustice is done to us or our offspring; we (at least the moral ones among us) also care about our fellow-men and the collective community that we belong to. For example, we will condemn spontaneously the criminals we hear about from others or read about in the news, even though he (she) hasn’t caused direct harm to us; we are extending our sympathies to our fellows. If some enemies come to invade a village, almost all villagers will join the battle to defend their village, though some may not experience particular damages from the invaders. Acting for the general interest is acting in conformity with the utility principle. In addition, the utility principle seems to provide ground for justice in its accommodation of both impartiality and equality. Impartiality is an important obligation of justice. It means that we should treat equal cases equally. The only exception to this rule is where it conflicts with a higher duty. According to Mill, the utility principle, or the greatest happiness principle, is concerned with the general happiness, i.e. the happiness of all and not just of some. An adequate evaluation of an action must take into account the happiness or suffering of all who are affected by it, and happiness or suffering should be counted irrespective of who is experiencing it. Bentham's dictum, "everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one" was intended to emphasize the point. Therefore, a just pianist will not say what he is playing is good simply because he enjoys the process; on the contrary, he should consider all the people his music has affected, and count their pleasure or pain caused by it without giving higher or lower weight to a particular person.
