Charitable Trust
The main aim of charitable trusts is for benefit purposes and it is not for individual beneficiaries or objects. Also, charitable trusts must considere to be of such value and importance to the community that they receive favourable treatment. Lord Macnagthen summarized these purposes into four categories. These are the relief of poverty, the promotion of education, the advancement of religion, and all other purposes beneficial to the community1. In order to be charitable, each disposition must contain a public benefit as seen in IRC v Baddeley2, and the purpose must be wholly and exclusively charitable in Williams' Trustees v IRC3. The issue in Caesar's first will might falls under charitable trust for advancement of education and trusts for other purposes for the community. In the Charities Bill 2005, it states that any amateur sporting activities which fall within an educational context may in principle be promoted as a charitable trust for the advancement of education. This was stated by Buckley LJ in Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales v Attorney-Genera4.The sporting facilities need not be limited to only schools or institution. In IRC v McMullen5, a trust to provide facilities for pupils at school and universities in the United Kingdom to play association football or other games or sports was held valid by the House of Lords. Also, trusts for
Trust Law: With particular reference to the views of Lord Wilberforce and Lord Hodson in McPhail-v-
Trust Law: With particular reference to the views of Lord Wilberforce and Lord Hodson in McPhail-v- Trusts owe much of their present existence to the role of Equity but they have also been confined by the very same principles. The certainty requirements of Trusts is one such example of the role Equity plays, it has however managed to break from the confines of certain equitable principles by enlightened judicial intervention which places a greater reliance on different equitable principles. The law relating to certainty has been formulated, in line with equitable principles, in various cases in the nineteenth and twentieth century. These cases were somewhat agglomerated in I.R.C.-v-Broadwater Cottage Trust by Jenkins L.J. but confusion predominated his judgement because it was impossible to draw a clear line between argument and judgment. It is however possible to define some points from his judgment. He seems to feel bound by Morice-v-Bishop of Durham in that the courts could not validate a trust that was out of their control. Of more importance was his idea that a trust could not be created by the courts arbitrarily. He did understand the difficulties this presented, but again he seems to suggest he was bound by Re Ogden and unable to detract from the complete list test laid down in it. To understand why Jenkins L.J. and Lord Hodson felt confined we must look at the
Trusts: 3 certainties
Elizabeth Newbury Property 2 Practice Coursework Sally is wishing to transfer her shares in Home Clean Ltd, and her gold Krugerrands. She is attempting to set up a third party trust, the named property to be held on trust by Tony for the benefit of the beneficiaries, Bertha and Colette. As it is the intention of Sally to create a trust by transferring the property to Tony to act as a trustee, then the trust is incomplete until the transfer is made. It is important to know whether or not the transfer has been made because if it has not then Tony does not hold the property on trust for the benefit of the beneficiaries and the property will instead be left to her husband in her will. The starting point is that any person who is attempting to create a trust must fulfil certain requirements before their attempt can be given legal effect. These requirements, known as the three certainties, were classified by Lord Lonsdale in the case of Knight v Knight. These are certainty of intention, (the intention to create a trust is clear), certainty of subject matter (the property intended to be the subject of the trust is identifiable), and certainty of object (the beneficiaries of the trust are clearly identified). Secondly, it is important to consider the formalities for Sally (the settler) to transfer the legal estate in the trust property to Tony (the trustee). As the property is a
Can equity perfect an imperfect gift?
When is a gift completed?1 This very simple question has caused a great deal of debate between academics after decisions of recent case law in this area. The dictionary definition of a gift is '...the complete transfer of property to another.' 2 Here both legal and equitable title pass and the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property. To perfect a gift, it is necessary that the relevant form of transfer relating to the type of property involved is employed. If not, there is an imperfect gift, and equity will not perfect an imperfect gift.3 This can be differentiated from a trust, which is dependent upon identifiable property being transferred from its legal owner to one or more trustees to hold and manage property for benefit of ascertainable beneficiaries.4 For a trust to be constituted, the legal title to trust property must be transferred to trustees for a valid trust to be constituted. The modern case law in particular with regards to shares in a private limited company mainly consists of scenarios where intended gifts or shares are thwarted due to the donor's non-compliance with some requirement of transfer either at law or equity.5 This essay will critically analyse how methods of constituting a trust or gift have evolved through case law, to a stage now where there seems to be a relaxation of the orthodox principles applying to imperfect gifts.6 Indeed some
The fifth and sixth dimensions of land
The fifth and sixth dimensions of land <op>1.23 If land is capable of description in three physical dimensions, and of extension into a fourth dimension by the component of time, English law soon added two further dimensions of analysis. These extra dimensions turned on the 'legal' or 'equitable' quality accorded to the various abstract rights which had emerged from the medieval conceptualism of estates. It came to be recognised that each estate could itself be 'the subject of "ownership" both in law and in equity' (Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) per Deane and Gaudron JJ). Although for historical reasons 'legal estates and equitable estates have differing incidents', it is truly the case that 'the person owning either type of estate has a right of property' (Tinsley v Milligan (1994) per Lord Browne-Wilkinson). Indeed, much of the rich complexity of today's law of property results from the potential duality of estate ownership, for amidst other consequences it makes possible that most distinctive of English contributions to jurisprudence, the institution of the trust (1.26; 6.34). <ha>Legal and equitable rights <op>1.24 Within the field of proprietary rights in land, English law still draws a fundamental distinction between legal and equitable rights. Historically this distinction was grounded on the fact that legal rights were enforceable only in the common law courts of
Scientology and Charitable Status
. Introduction In today's society, charitable status is of significant importance. The controversial Church of Scientology, founded by the science-fiction writer L. Ron Hubbard, has long craved charitable status in the United Kingdom but was turned down by the Charity Commission in 1999. The Times article titled 'Scientologists set to cash in on tax break'1 has raised some interesting legal and policy issues related to the charitable status of religious organisations since the enactment of the 2006 Charities Act. On the surface, the article raises practical issues of fiscal privileges but the article also provides an opportunity to discuss some broader policy considerations related with religious charities and how the Charities Act has made some subtle but significant changes to how they are treated. In this essay I intend to examine the legal impact of the changes the Charities Act 2006 has had on religious charitable status and on the Church of Scientology's bid for charitable status. In addition, I will consider some of the broader policy issues rising from the changes from the 2006 Act and the debate surrounding religious charities more generally. But before discussing the legal and policy implication of charitable status of religious organisation, first it is appropriate to address the benefits of charitable status. 2. Advantages of Charitable Status Much of charities
Equity Coursework
Equity Coursework Introduction The two articles by Jonathon Garton and Margaret Halliwell both address the decision in Re Rose1 on the issue of perfecting imperfect gifts. Prior to Re Rose2, Milroy v Lord3 was the main case on this issue, where Turner L.J. stated, "...the court will not hold the intended transfer to operate as a declaration of trust, for then every imperfect instrument would be effectual by being converted into a perfect trust."4 These two articles, however, have different view points on this issue and present arguments as to whether the decision in this case is correct or not; there has also been some suggestion that it has opened the floodgates for future cases to argue that the courts should perfect the passing of imperfect gifts. There are many legal experts who agree with one article over the other; however, there are many other experts that agree with certain issues raised in both the articles. I will look at both articles, critically analysing both of them, and suggest which article takes preference. Starting Point - Milroy v Lord Milroy v Lord is the starting point for which to understand the main aspects of both these articles. In this case, the settlor delivered up the executed transfer form and share certificates but the defendant's name was never entered on the bank's register of members and so legal title had not been transferred to the
Compare the private trust, the trust of imperfect obligation and the charitable trust. What policy ends does the law aim to achieve by it's different treatment of each of these trusts?
EQUITY & TRUSTS Compare the private trust, the trust of imperfect obligation and the charitable trust. What policy ends does the law aim to achieve by it's different treatment of each of these trusts? In order to make a comparison between private and charitable trusts it is necessary first to identify certain key elements. Firstly what is a trust. A trust is a relationship which arises where one person (trustee) is compelled in equity to hold property for the benefit of another (beneficiary) or for a purpose permitted by law. Secondly the types of trusts which are in existence. There are many types of trusts in existence some of which include public, private, express, resulting (when beneficial interest returns to the settlor) and constructive trusts. Finally the context of law in relation to private and public trusts. This can be seen in charities in the form of the statute of Charitable Uses Act 1601 and Charities Bill 2005. A private trust is a trust which is essentially for the benefit of individuals or a specified group of people. It is enforceable by such beneficiaries as a private trust. A charitable trust is more generally known as public trust, which promotes the well being of the public by relieving poverty, advancing education, advancing religion or serving some other purpose beneficial to the community. It is enforceable by the Attorney General as a charitable
consider whether the test for certainty of objects applicable to fixed and discretionary trust is reliable
2007/8 Assessed Coursework LX3051 TRUSTS Word Limit: 2,500 Answer BOTH parts Each part is worth 50% of the marks . Consider whether the different tests for certainty of objects applicable to fixed trusts and discretionary trusts are appropriate. The Certainty of object form one of the three requirements which must be satisfied to validate a trust. The fundamental principle is that to properly enforce a trust it must have cestque tui trust and it must be possible to establish who the beneficiaries are1. These apply to both fixed and discretionary trusts, which convey the expressed wish of a testator. In effect it is incumbent on the settlor to enable some means of ascertaining the intended beneficiary; and appropriate tests for objects would be needed to ensure the trust is properly enforced. Traditionally a general rule applied to all trusts; the trustee has a duty to administer the trust according to the trust instrument and so would need to know exactly how many beneficiaries there are, thus must draw up a 'fixed list'2. Under a fixed trust the testator would express the beneficiary to whom the trust was intended and therefore the object is often clear. However where the beneficiaries are of a wide class conceptual uncertainties commonly arise and it would therefore require interpretation. Such a situation arose in Broadway3 the trust was void for uncertainty as
Trust Law Reform Essay
Trust Law Reform Essay Current Law At present much of trust law derives from the common law. Under this a trustee is strictly liable when they act outside the terms of the trust deed or the general law, thus committing an Ultra Vires breach. This is so, even if they have acted honestly and in good faith. Proposal 1 Questionably this rule is unjustifiably strict. The Commission proposes1 that trustees should cease to be liable for this kind of breach of trust if they have "acted in good faith and taking all reasonable steps and making all reasonable enquires believed that the action was in their powers"2. This proposal aims to simplify the uncertain existing law and offers a greater level of protection to trustees acting honestly and in good faith. Nevertheless, lowering the standard of legal responsibility may have a detrimental effect on the beneficiaries. The Commission's position is that it is doubtful that it will limit the beneficiaries' right of recovery, apart from in the instance of unauthorised investment, which the commission states is unlikely to happen. Even though it is true that trustees have wide powers of investment, recent case law demonstrates that beneficiaries still have the need to claim under this ground of breach3. Proposal one also raises the issue as to what the new proposed standard of care actually is, as the wording itself is less than