If Simon can prove on a balance of probabilities a defence of diminished responsibility, he will be guilty of voluntary manslaughter rather than murder under S2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957 which provides:
‘Where a person kills or is party to a killing of another, he shall not be
convicted of murder if he was suffering from such abnormality of mind
(whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development
of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury) as
substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts and omissions
in doing or being party to a killing.’
Lord Parker CJ states, ‘‘Abnormality of mind’ is a state of mind so different from that of ordinary human beings that the reasonable man would term it abnormal. This is broad enough to cover the mind’s activities in all its aspects, not only the perception of physical acts and matters and the ability to form a rational judgement whether an act is right or wrong, but also the ability to exercise will power to control physical acts in accordance with that rational judgement.’
His Lordship also pointed out that whether the defendant was suffering from any ‘abnormality of mind’ is a question for the jury. On this question, medical evidence is of importance, but, the jury are entitled to take into consideration all the evidence including acts or statements of the defendant and his demeanour. They are not bound to accept the medical evidence, if there is other material before them which, in their judgement, conflicts with it and outweighs it. The cause of the abnormality of mind, does, however, seem to be a matter to be determined on expert evidence.
Taking all this into consideration I don’t think the jury will favour Simon under the defence of diminished responsibility as he had equipped himself with a knife before going to the meeting with the benefits officer. This shows that Simon had a pre-conceived mens rea for committing the murder.
Simon could try to plead, ‘not guilty by reason of insanity’. Manic depression is not a form of insanity. Whether a particular condition amounts to a disease of the mind within the Rules is not a medical but a legal question to be decided in accordance with the ordinary rules of interpretation. It seems that any disease, which produces a malfunctioning of the mind, is a disease of the mind, and need not be a disease of the brain. It covers any internal disorder, which results in violence and is likely to recur. The disease of the mind must have given rise to a defect of reason which had one of two consequences:
- The defendant did not know the nature and quality of his act.
- He did not know his act was wrong.
The phrase ‘defect of reason’ seems to mean that the powers of reasoning must be impaired not merely confusion or absentmindedness.
It is again upon the jury to decide whether the defendant is in fact insane. Section 1 of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991 provides that a jury shall not return a special verdict that ‘the accused is not guilty by reason of insanity’ except on the written or oral evidence of two or more registered medical practitioners of whom at least one has special experience in the field of mental disorder. The jury may have to decide between conflicting medical evidence. If there are facts or surrounding circumstances which, in the opinion of the court, justify the jury in coming to a conclusion different from that of experts, their verdict will be upheld.
Simon could attempt provocation as a defence on the basis that he had a sudden loss of self control. I believe this wouldn’t work as the prosecution would clearly point out that Simon had ‘gone equipped’ to the meeting intending to cause harm the benefits officer. Therefore it couldn’t have been a sudden loss of self control but a pre-conceived plan.
Case C
In this case, the defendant, Adam, while under the influence of LSD imagines he is in hand to hand combat with a German soldier during the First World War. In reality he has actually, unawares, strangled his girlfriend to death.
Adam may attempt to plead automatism. Automatism applies to the situation where the defendant is not legally insane but because of some external factor he is unable to control what he is doing, or as Lord Denning stated in Bratty v Attorney-General for N. Ireland [1963], where something was done by the defendant's muscles without the control of his mind, such as a spasm or a reflex action. It can then be argued that there is a lack of actus reus, as the act is not voluntary, or that there is a lack of mens rea because the defendant is not conscious of what he is doing.
Automatism is not a valid defence where there is evidence to show that the defendant was in some way at fault in bringing about the state of automatism. As Adam had consciously and deliberately taken drugs not on medical prescription, but in order to escape from reality, to ‘go on a trip’ or to become hallucinated, he cannot plead his self-induced disability as a defence.
Adam could use intoxication as a mitigating plea on the basis that after taking the drugs, he had no control over what he was doing. Nevertheless, people who voluntarily take drugs should realise the possible consequences in terms of violent behaviour and uncontrollable actions. If Adam is successful with his plea, it will bring the charge down to involuntary manslaughter.
Case D
In this case, Alison, having suffered years of physical and emotional abuse by her husband one day, calmly and calculatedly stabs him to death. She could plead a defence of provocation.
As stated in section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957, there is the requirement that the defendant must be shown to have actually lost his self-control. If there is evidence that his actions were premeditated, or that he had been able to compose himself between the provocation and the killing, then the defence cannot be used. As Devlin J states: ‘…the provocation must cause a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, rendering the accused so subject to passion as to make him or her for the moment not master of his mind.’ Where there is a gap in time between the provocation and the killing (described as ‘cooling time’) a defence of provocation cannot be used. Indeed on the relevance of battered wife syndrome to the defence of provocation, a jury may find there was a sudden loss of control triggered by a minor incident if the defendant had endured abuse over a period, on the ‘last straw’ basis.
Alison may endeavour to use a defence of necessity on the basis that it was necessary for her to kill her husband in order to stop the abuse she was receiving from him. This defence is available only if, from an objective standpoint, the accused can be said to be acting reasonably and proportionately in order to avoid a threat of death or serious injury. In this case, as with the defence of provocation, for Alison to rely on the defence of duress of circumstances, there would have to be a greater degree of directness and immediacy between the danger and the offence charged. What is required is evidence that the commission of the offence had been a spontaneous reaction to the prospect of death or serious injury. As Alison had planned the murder the above two defences will not be open to her.
Alison’s best form of defence would be diminished responsibility. Having suffered years of physical and emotional abuse it would be reasonable to believe Alison suffered from an abnormal state of mind, the ability to form a rational judgement whether an act is right or wrong, and also her mental responsibility may be substantially impaired. In her mind’s eye her actions may have been, in some way, justified. The impairment therefore need not be total, but it must be more than trivial or minimal. She may have known what she was doing, known it is wrong and have had some control, but found it substantially more difficult than a normal person would to control her actions. If successfully pleaded, the defence avoids the imposition of a mandatory life sentence and enables the court to give whatever sentence is regarded as appropriate.
Attorney General for N. Ireland v Gallagher [1963]
R v Bailey [1983], R v Lipman [1970]
