In the claimant’s action for damages against the defendants, they were found to be negligent. However they were found not to be liable for the damages caused to the claimant, as they were too remote.
The defendants made no appeal against the finding of their negligence, but the claimant asked the Court of Appeal to review the judgement on her damages.
Remoteness is a doctrine long held in English law as a defence to damages claims, which seeks to limit liability as the result of an act of negligence.
McKendrick explains the justification for the doctrine as trying to prevent the unfairness of allowing a negligent party to be liable for every injury that could be linked, however tenuously to the act of negligence.
Without this rule it could be possible for a claimant to break a heel on a broken pavestone, then sue for damages if she fell the next day, blaming the fall on uncomfortable shoes she would not have been wearing had the original pair not been broken.
In answering the question of remoteness the judges followed the established rule of first set out in Hadley v Baxendale (1854), 9 Exch. 341; 23 L.J.Ex. 179. This states that for the negligent party to liable for the loss in question it must be a natural and probable consequence of the negligence, and has been affirmed many times in cases since.
The judges concurred that the answer in this case was no, the damage was not too remote.
In his reasoning Lord Morris was clear in his application of the Hadley v Baxendale test saying: “The most natural and reasonable action on the part of someone who finds herself undersignedly confined is to seek the means of escape. Those who are responsible for the unjustifiable detention can hardly, either with good grace or with sound reason, be entitled to be astute in offering criticism of the actions of the unfortunate victim.”
He proceed to explain his following of reasoning given by Field J, in Robson v North Eastern Ry. Co who said: “if a person by a negligent breach of duty expose the person towards whom the duty is contracted to obvious peril, the act of the latter in endeavouring to escape from the peril, although it may be the immediate cause of the injury, is not the less to be regarded as the wrongful act of the wrongdoer.” He continued his reference to that judgement to explain the extension of this reasoning to include grave inconvenience in the subsequent case, Adams v Lancashire and Yorkshire Ry. Co.
Adams had been cited as an authority for the Sayers case and had been relied on heavily in the original hearing, and by the defence in the appeal, but was distinguished most emphatically, in particular by Lord Evershed. He refuted the claim that in both situations the claimant had suffered a minor inconvenience, saying the inconvenience to the claimant in Sayers was in fact “appreciable, if not substantial”.
He also stated the current case was distinguished from Adams on the level of danger in which the claimant had put herself, in relation to the inconvenience she was in, describing it as “not unreasonable”.
The judges considered and rejected the claims, cited by the judge in the original case, that she was in fact in no danger at all as her incarceration occurred at an early time of day and anyway her husband knew where she was and would soon search for her due to the impending departure of the bus.
At this point it can also be noted that throughout the reasoning of all three judges they explicitly use an objective test of inconvenience and danger in establishing remoteness. They frequently refer to the feeling of a “reasonable” person in the claimant’s position, as can be seen in the quote above and in the speech of Lord Ormerod when he said “I do not think anyone could say that she had done anything unreasonable”
Having decided the fact of the liability of the defendants for the injury suffered to the claimant Lord Evershed turned to the second question of whether the claimant had in anyway added to her misfortunes by her conduct.
The way contributory negligence s considered in English Law had undergone a major change in the few years preceding this case with the introduction of the Law Reform Act (Contributory Negligence) 1945. Section 1 (1) of the act states that a claimant will have his damages reduced if he has in some way contributed to the extent of his injuries.
Previous to this any contributory negligence by the claimant in an action for damages would cause their claim to fail. This issue was not lost on Lord Evershed who indicated there might have been some doubt as to the correctness of Adams v Lancs &Yorks Ry Co. had the Act been in place at the time.
He pointed out that one of the judges, albeit in minority, had allowed the case to fail, not on remoteness, but on the issue of contributory negligence. Had the Act been in place at the time, the judge in question, Brett J would have held that the action should succeed.
In the current case the three judges held that the claimant had been, in some manner, the authoress of her own misfortune.
The judges agreed that in trying to escape the claimant had been justified, and was not acting unreasonably. They agreed that in this endeavour, it was reasonable to see if escaping over the gap in the door was possible. However it was held that in trying to climb down, resting the whole of her weight on a slender toilet roll holder, which true its nature turned round when leaned on, was not quite as reasonable.
They therefore decided that this act of foolishness should reduce the amount of damages due by one quarter.
Sayers then, is a case useful in situations in proving a claimant’s right to escape from perilous or gravely inconvenient situations by any means less perilous, and still sue for injuries sustained by that act.
However a recent decision confines this
It is also often used in situations, (such as in Basildon District Council v JE Lesser (Properties) Ltd and Others) where a claim of contributory negligence, under the 1945 act is used as a defence as an action against claims of breach of contract. In general Sayers is used to show that although the claim for damages would have been the same whether it was a breach of duty of care implied in a contract, or in tort, the effect of the Act only applies in tort.
Bibliography:
1) Sayers v Harlow v Urban District Council [1958] 2 All ER 342 [195] 1 WLR 623
Found on the Lexis database of law reports:
2) Contract Law, Ewan McKendrick, Palgrave, Hampshire UK and New York USA, 2000
Lord Evershed M.R., Sayers v Harlow UDC Court of Appeal [1958] 1 WLR 623 (Lexis pg 3).
Ewan McKendrick, Contract Law, Palgrave, Hampshire UK and New York USA, 2000 pg 415.
Sayers v Harlow v Urban District Council [1958] 2 All ER 342 [195] 1 WLR 623 (Lexis pg 7)
Robson v North Eastern Ry. Co. [1875] L.R.10 Q.B 271
Adams v Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry. Co. [1869] L.R.4 C.P. 739
Sayers v Harlow v Urban District Council [1958] 2 All ER 342 [195] 1 WLR 623 (Lexis pg 6)
Sayers v Harlow v Urban District Council [1958] 2 All ER 342 [195] 1 WLR 623 (Lexis pg 9)
[1985] 1 QB 839, [1985] 1 All ER 20, [1984] 3 WLR 812, (101 LQR 161), 8 Con LR 89 (Lexis version)