The Fire Safety Order: Better Compliance or Just More Regulation?

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BN3470 – ‘Environmental and Safety Law’

Assignment 1

“The Fire Safety Order:

Better Compliance or Just More Regulation?”

TABLE OF CONTENTS


INTRODUCTION

The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order (referred to as the ‘FSO’) came into effect on 01 Oct 2006 (FSO, 2005).  The government’s stated intention in implementing this order was to simplify the multiplicity of fire-related legislation into a single, consistent set of regulations throughout England and Wales.  In the appendices to the FSO, some 180 pieces of local, regional and national legislation were to be repealed when the FSO was enacted.  The purpose of this assignment is to outline the main features of the FSO and to evaluate its effectiveness in promoting good fire safety practice in non-domestic premises.  However, given the large number of diverse pieces of legislation, comparisons between the FSO and previous legislative paradigms will be limited to those enforced directly by the Fire & Rescue Services in England and Wales i.e. the Fire Precautions Act 1971 (as amended) [FPA] (FPA,1971) and, latterly, the Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations 1997 (as amended) [FPWR] (FPWR,1997).

LEGISLATIVE STATUS OF THE FSO

The FSO is a piece of secondary legislation: this means that it has been implemented under the ‘umbrella’ of a piece of primary legislation i.e. an Act passed by Parliament that falls under the description of an ‘enabling Act’.  In the case of the FSO, the enabling act is the Regulatory Reform Act 2001 (as amended).  The effect of the enabling Act delegates the authority and responsibility for making regulations to one or more Ministers of the Crown and those regulations can be made or altered without the requirement for full debate in both chambers of Parliament.  If an order is to be made, a draft of the Order is to be placed before Parliament and a resolution adopting the Order passed.

This legal mechanism effectively accelerates the process of implementing or amending regulations, reduces the burden on the Parliamentary debating schedule and, therefore, streamlines the law-making process.  However, the process could be open to political abuse in that a ruling party could by-pass open debate in Parliament and implement regulations favourable to that party.  Equally, the remedy could be similarly swift if that party is deposed.  It is therefore unlikely that parties would engage in a game of party political ping-pong because of the general disrepute that would fall on the Parliamentary process.

REQUIREMENTS OF THE FSO

The FSO imposes a requirement for a ‘Responsible Person’ to be nominated for each premises (see Appendix F: Article 3).  Further, it imposes a number of duties upon the Responsible Person.  Failure to comply with the duties leaves the Responsible Person open to prosecution (see Appendix E).   The duties are defined in Articles 8-22 & 38 of the FSO and can be found at Appendix D.    

The duties are generally couched in terms of ‘reasonableness’ and are not prescriptive as to the mechanisms by which the duties are complied with.  This method is consistent with regulations issued under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (as amended) [HASAWA] in that the responsibility for compliance is placed firmly on an identified person rather than the implicit suggestion that the enforcing agencies (in this case, the Fire & Rescue Authorities) had accepted and validated compliance by means of a periodic inspection that had developed under the FPA.

Guidance documents are issued to assist Responsible Persons to comply with the FSO (see Appendix A).  The guidance documents do not have any legal force but suggest a series of integrable mechanisms considered to amount to good practice in terms of fire safety.  Adoption of the mechanisms referred to in the guidance documents is not mandatory; however, satisfactory adoption of the mechanisms is considered to show a reasonable effort to comply with the imposed duties.  Conversely, failure to adopt the mechanisms – without an effective, alternative measure being adopted in its stead – is considered to demonstrate a general failure to comply.      

PREVIOUS LEGISLATION: FIRE PRECAUTIONS ACT 1971 (AS AMENDED) AND FIRE PRECAUTIONS (WORKPLACE) REGULATIONS 1997 (AS AMENDED)

Although the FPA was drafted to take effect in a large number of premises according to their use, the application of the FPA required a Designation Order and specific regulations to be issued by the Home Secretary for each group of uses.  Regulations were imposed under Orders issued by the Home Officer in 1976 and covered hotels, guest houses, offices, shops, factories and railway premises.  Mechanisms for the exemption of premises from the requirement of having a Fire Certificate were intrinsic to the FPA (e.g. Section 9 exemptions), were made as a result of Home Office guidance (e.g. Dear Chief Officer Letters) and local interpretations of the law (e.g. exemptions of specific premises on the basis of local knowledge or arrangement).  Thus, there was a significant variation of standard of application even between neighbouring counties.  

If issued, the Fire Certificate was addressed to the occupier of the premises with the owner cited on the front sheet.  An example of a Fire Certificate issued in North Wales can be found at Appendix G.  Assuming that the occupier was the operator of the business or a nominated agent of the owner, this arrangement (in theory) nominated 2 layers of management that could be held accountable for any failure to comply with the terms of the Fire Certificate.  There has been a somewhat contradictory history of case law regarding the FPA.  On one hand, there have been cases where operational managers have successfully argued that they were insufficiently empowered to have influence over the operation of the premises to be capable of ensuring compliance with the FPA ([R v Boal - [1992] 3 All ER 177 & Woodhouse v Walsall Metropolitan Borough Council - [1994] 1 BCLC 435) and cases where the owners of a building have been held to be too far removed from the operation of a particular business site to ensure the same compliance (DTZ Debenham Thorpe Ltd v Shropshire CC  - [1998] EHLR 93); however, other cases ([R. v. Prince Minaz Nasser], [COLIN B. McCLORY (Procurator Fiscal, Portree) Appellant against KENNETH ALASDAIR MacKINNON Respondent – [1996] S.C.C.R. 367) clearly demonstrate that the managers cannot distance themselves from responsibility if they continue to have, and intend to maintain, a controlling interest in the business based at the premises.

In terms of the FPA, a number of duties were specified in Schedule 4 of the Fire Certificate and, for training of staff, further specified in Schedule 5 (see Appendix G).  However, unless dangerous substances were present, these were fairly specific in nature and were readily complied with without consideration of the hazards in the premises as a whole.  Indeed, depending upon the competence of the Fire Safety Officer compiling the Fire Certificate, it was possible to run a premises in a dangerous manner while still complying with all the requirements of the Certificate.  

Furthermore, the Fire Certificate was a ‘snapshot’ of the conditions required at the time the Certificate was issued: the Act did not allow for automatic updating of fire protection measures as the legal requirements changed.  The only avenues Fire Services had available to update Certificates were when:

a.        The use of the premises changed and the new use required a higher         level of fire protection;

b.        The conditions within the premises changed and imperilled the existing fire         protection measures;

c.        A Certificate was voluntarily surrendered and a new one subsequently         requested.

Although this was the case for the majority of the FPA’s existence, from 1997, it was permissible to change the requirements of a Fire Certificate according to the findings of a Fire Risk Assessment (FRA) conducted in compliance with the FPWR; however, the Government’s suggestion that the implementation of the FPWR was a matter for individual Fire Services (via the Home Office guidance issued by the ‘Dear Chief Officer Letters’ mechanism) meant that there was a wide variation across the country as to whether FRAs were taken account of in Fire Certificates – or even required to be prepared by occupiers of premises to which Certificates had been issued.

A major disadvantage of the FPA was the number of premises to which it do not apply. Although hotels and boarding houses and associated staff accommodation were designated in FPA Circular No. 1 (see Appendix C: FPAC 1), Circulars 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 21 each contained further variations and applications (or, more commonly, disapplications) to the originally intended list of premises uses (see Appendix C: FPACs  2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10 & 21) prior to the introduction of the FPWR in 1997.  This long list of disapplications from the FPA often included elements of judgement as to the primary use of the premises, who (if anyone) was deemed to work there and whether these persons, if deemed to be at work, were covered by familial exclusions.  

Furthermore, the definition of an ‘hotel’ was dependent upon the provision of food rather than the provision of sleeping accommodation.  This definition derives from the Hotel Proprietors’ Act 1956 that defines an hotel as “an establishment held out by the proprietor as offering food, drink and, if so required, sleeping accommodation, without special contract, to any traveller presenting himself who appears able and willing to pay reasonable sum for the services and facilities provided and who is in a fit state to be received." (HPA, 1956)   Therefore, establishments that accepted advanced bookings for sleeping accommodation and food from a pre-determined section of the population were also exempted.

The FPWR sought to address many of these exclusions by placing a duty on employers to protect their employees; however, in the first draft, unpaid or voluntary workers were not deemed to be ‘at work’ and therefore not covered by the regulations.  Furthermore, although other ‘relevant persons’ were to be considered, the degree of consideration and therefore the level of protective measures was often moot.  However, although the FPWR continued to evolve from its enactment, it was effectively considered by many enforcing Fire Authorities as an addendum to the FPA and therefore secondary to it.  In reality, the FPWR could have been an effective means of ensuring greater workplace safety had it been properly and consistently applied across England and Wales.  

COMPARISON BETWEEN THE FPA, FPWR AND THE FSO

The great strength of the FSO is that it applies to “any place” rather than to “a workplace”.  This is subject to a number of exclusions - the bulk of which have been present in fire legislation for a number of decades and are defined in Article 6 of the FSO (see Appendix F); however, the number of excluded premises has diminished and is at a minimum in the FSO.  Furthermore, there is a direct duty on a nominated ‘responsible person’ who, by definition, has a significant level of control over the premises in question.  The failure to nominate a ‘responsible person’ is in, and of, itself is an offence; however, if a failure to nominate is discovered, the arguments in R. v Baol and DTZ Debenham Thorpe Ltd v Shropshire CC are likely to be revisited.  

In the FSO, as with the FPWR, the execution of the direct duty to relevant persons is to depend upon the completion of a Fire Risk Assessment (FRA) undertaken by the Responsible Person and his (legally) nominated assistants.  Again, the failure conduct, and act upon, an FRA constitutes and offence as does the failure to make reasonable provision for the safety of persons in the building.  However, as stated above, the FPWR was primarily intended to maintain the safety of employees with others being only an indirect consideration.  In the FSO, all persons legally on the premises are owed a direct duty of care: this should force a widening of the scope occupier’s FRA.  

The manner in which enforcement is undertaken is also, to a large extent simplified.  As with other Health and Safety regulations, the FSO relies upon both a direct intervention (Prohibition Notice) the case of urgent circumstances likely to cause serious injury or death (see Appendix F: Articles 29-31); alternatively, the issue of an Enforcement Notice in less urgent cases is available.  In the first instance and in case of persons deemed to have responsibility for a premises, the enforcing authority must identify the alleged failures to comply with the duties listed in Articles 8 – 22 and 38 (Appendix E: Article  34[1]a).  In the second, if an appeal is not lodged within 21 days of the issue of the Notice, the offence will be simply the failure to comply with the requirements in the Notice (Appendix E: Article  34[1]d).  The defence of due diligence and reasonable practicability remains as in other H&S regulations.

In most enforcement circumstances relating to workplaces, nothing fundamentally has changed in the method of enforcement from the FPA as modified by the FPWR compared to the FSO.  Indeed, the most significant change in the method of enforcement is the introduction of the Alterations Notice that requires the occupier to inform the enforcing authority of any material change of conditions within the premises.  However, in respect of designated premises – particularly, hotels and guest houses, the enforcement process has been significantly improved and simplified because occupiers of premises can no longer rely on an outdated fire certificate to avoid updating safety systems.  Similarly, provided that enforcers are demonstrably reasonable, requirement of improvements is no longer reliant on the personal persuasiveness of an individual Fire Safety Officer.

CONCLUSION

Given the simplification of the various fire-related laws and regulations into a single set of regulations, the likelihood of a more general understanding among those affected by the regulations and among those enforcing them is greatly increased.  It is therefore probable that the compliance with the regulations will be similarly increased because the courses of resolution in court are less likely to be complicated by technicalities of little or no merit.

Unlike the FPA, the FSO implies a constant process of safety review and, where necessary, managerial and technical improvement.  The FPA allowed an effective stagnation of fire protection measures provided that there was no material change within the premises.  This stagnation was clearly not in the best interests of either the guests/customers or the employees of the premises.  The removal was what was effectively ‘legal sanction’ to decline to improve safety facilities will, over a period of time, bring fire protection measures and, more particularly, management of fire procedures, up to a modern standard.  This will still be done largely by persuasion and education; however, Government guidance to the Fire & Rescue Services does suggest a more active involvement in the legal aspects of enforcement.    

The unequivocal adoption of an H&S style of regulation for Fire Safety emphasises the responsibility of the occupier and/or the responsible person.  The nomination of a single person ‘crystallises’ the ‘Ground Zero’ for any enforcement action and makes preparation of the FRA and adherence to any consequent policies and procedures a matter of personal consequence.  This alone should ensure a higher level of compliance especially in Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs).

Whether, in larger organisations, the same can be said is a moot point.  If an individual is constrained by policies formulated by higher levels of management and that do not lend themselves to safe fire protection policies, the nominated responsible person may be in a position to claim they are insufficiently empowered  to fulfil their obligations as in R. v Boal.  Whether this defence will remain valid has, clearly, yet to be tested; however, it is unlikely that the principle underlying the defence will be rendered invalid simply by a development of another generation of regulations consistent with those already in force.  This, in turn, may perpetuate the legal lottery of deciding whether the ‘guiding mind’ of the organisation can be sufficiently closely linked to operational control of the specific premises to justify a prosecution.

However, it is probable that the overall effect of the FSO is likely to enhance the general level of safety because there are few SMEs that will be willing to risk losing an initial prosecution.  Whether a further consequence of the FSO is an increase in the number of appeals because of the apparent clarity of the case against a defendant remains to be seen.  

References

(FSO, 2005)                        Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order

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                                The Stationary Office Books, Jun 2005

                                London

                                ISBN: 978-0110729459

(FPWR, 1997)                        Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations

                                 The Stationary Office Books, Oct 1997

                                London

                                ISBN: 978-0110647388

 (FPA, 1971)                        Fire Precautions Act

                                The Stationary Office Books, Jun 1971

                                London

                                ISBN: 978-0105440710

 (HPA, 1956)                        Hotel Proprietors’ Act

                                Definition of an hotel from the Glossary to the Act

                                HMSO, 1956

                                http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/bens/ben03.htm

                                Accessed on 01/01/2007


APPENDIX A

Guides Issued to Assist Compliance with the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005.

From: http://www.communities.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1162101

Accessed on 01/01/2007

Entry Level Guide - A short guide to making your premises safe from fire

Guide 1 ...

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