There is no such thing as an ideal electoral system. Discuss.

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Illiberal democracies do not steal elections but rather manipulate the result meaning that there cannot be an ideal electoral system for an illiberal democracy (Mackenzie. 1958: 98). In this essay I will concentrate on democratic democracies. Debate has been going on for centuries with disputes on all aspects of the voting system including the ballot, the constituency and the formula. There is a large range of possible combinations which ultimately means trade-offs are guaranteed when finding an electoral system that achieves what is required of it. Elections perform multiple roles including: providing a means of representation; electing assemblies; electing Chief Executives and providing legitimacy (Hague et al. 2006: 193). This essay will have three parts, the ballot, the constituency and the formula, explaining the pro’s and con’s of the major systems. As there are such diverse societies in world cultures it is impossible to create one ideal electoral system

The Dominant debate around the formula is between plurality and proportional representation (PR). The basic argument in favour of plurality rule is that it produces one-party majority government, whereas PR is advocated because it produces broad and fair representation. Although most coalition governments in PR systems are reasonably stable, one-party majority governments are believed to be more stable, which is perceived to enhance political stability (Laver and Schofield: 1990, Chapter 6).

Another argument for one-party government is accountability. Accountability comes with an election that has “direct and immediate effect on the formation of government” (Powell: 1989: 72-74). It is easier for the electorate to change the personnel in government as they replace them with a new government at the next election. In contrast, PR systems mean government futures are not entirely in the hands of the electorate. A party may lose the popular vote but still stay in power by being part of a coalition. The fact an ‘unpopular’ party can be involved in government is one of the main arguments for one-party majority governments formed being more accountable than their coalition counterparts.

The arguments in favour of PR are fairness and representativeness. By definition PR is fair as it allows each party to be represented in proportion to votes won. Although seat allocation in the legislature is fair, the allocation of seats in the cabinet may not be. For example, the largest party has the potential to have no cabinet members if there is a coalition between smaller parties. Nevertheless, it cannot be disputed that PR inevitably leads to a fairer representation than plurality rule.

PR allows a wider range of views and beliefs to be expressed in both the legislature and government. PR gives a louder voice to minorities than in plurality systems where parties make promises purely to gain enough votes to win. For areas where there are deep ethnic or linguistic cleavages there are no doubts that PR is a better option as all groups are represented in the legislature. The choice between PR and plurality undoubtedly depends on what is more important: accountability and stability, or fairness and responsiveness. However, different systems are more suitable in different environments. Plurality systems work ...

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There is a third option that needs discussion; majority rule. The majority principle is at the very heart of democracy (Spitz. 1984: 122). In a direct democracy the majority wins, and in representative democracy, most decisions are made by legislatures through the majority rule. It is logical to assign the same principle in electing representatives. Majority rule offers a reasonable degree of both responsiveness and accountability. It allows the presence of many parties, fewer than PR, but more than plurality systems. This makes coalition governments common, but the process of coalition building is more open than under PR. Coalitions are commonly formed pre-elections and will be stronger due to the electoral cost of abandoning governmental partners. This allows the electorate more direct influence in the coalition formed, making it more accountable than PR but less so under plurality systems. The majority rule should therefore be implemented where a mixture of responsiveness and accountability is required. However, this system has the greatest possibility for inequality between number of votes and seats won can occur.

The main debate in the constituency deals with the virtues and vices of single and multi-member districts. This overlaps with the debate between PR and plurality systems as the former entail multimember districts whereas the latter, with majority systems, usually have single-member districts (Blais et al. 1996: 84).

Supporters of the single-member districts claim the single member type allows closer relationships with representatives and therefore maximises accountability for an individual area to promote their interests (Baker. 1986: 124). For example an MP from a rural constituency will be accountable for promoting rural interests, whereas an MP from an industrial area will promote urban interests.

Drawbacks to single-member districts are that they constantly have to be changed to maintain populations of relative equal size. Here gerrymandering is possible where constituencies are made to the governments benefit. Multi-member constituencies need not be the same size. They can be made to correspond to sociological or administrative boundaries, permitting more congruent for voters (Blais et al. 1990: 121). This means the constituency boundaries can remain intact even when population changes, as it is possible to change the number of members elected in the constituency.

The advantage of multi-member constituencies is they allow a better representation of minority groups. There is much evidence for women being better represented in multi-member constituencies because parties strive for an overall balance (Welch et al. 1990: 265). However, groups that are focused in one area; in the USA for example, blacks and Hispanics do better under in single-member districts (Davidson et al. 1994: 65). The choice between single and multi-member constituencies is one of competing values, mainly the advantage of having accountable individual representatives versus the benefits of having a more representative legislature.

The debate over voting procedures takes different forms in plurality, majority and PR systems. The more information the ballot reveals about voter’s preferences, the more accurate the representation of preferences are likely to be (Laurence et al. 1996: 78). A system that enables the electorate to express degrees of preferences is preferable to one that does not. However, the system has to be simple enough for all voters to use.

In a single-member plurality system, voters usually select the candidate they prefer, other possibilities include ranking of candidates they approve, advocated by Brams and Fishborn (1982). Ranking provides greater flexibility in expressing preferences, as one is not restricted to a single candidate, whilst limiting complexity. Crucially, it makes it impossible for extremists to sneak a win when against two moderate candidates as it ensures victory for the candidate with the greatest overall support (Brams et al. 1988, 277-278).

The main objection to approval voting is that it may increase the number of parties and reduce the likelihood of a one-party majority government, because in a plurality system voters are likely to vote for a candidate they feel may win rather than their preferred choice. This is known as strategic voting, and is less likely under preferred voting (Stefan et al. 1993: 210). This is because the voter can put their preferred choice as number one, and the candidate they believe more likely to win as number two. This disadvantage isn’t relevant if multi-party governments are preferable.

Under majority rule a candidate must acquire more than 50% of the vote to win, but does not always happen. To choose a winner multiple ballots or ranking systems may be used, known as the alternative vote (Gallagher et al. 2006: 186). The alternative vote costs less to do and gives more information about voter’s preferences. The two ballot argument allows voters to reconsider their vote and to compare more systematically the two or three “serious” candidates for the seat.

The single transferable vote allows voters to rank order candidates, thus granting them maximum freedom to express their preferences, providing richer information about voter’s preferences (Blais et al. 1996: 65). However, it can only be applied if there are few members in each constituency to be elected. It also encourages competition for the same seats by members of the same party, hindering party cohesion (Katz. 1980: 34). This option is only appealing when a modest degree of proportionality and relatively un-cohesive parties are acceptable. The more importance given to individual candidates, the less appealing list PR becomes. The assumption is that representatives will follow public opinion as they will not be re-elected if they do not. This argues against the belief that those elected will not represent the interests of the electorate due to reduced direct accountability.

In judgement, different electoral systems are right according to different situations and societies. Where there are two main parties plural systems are best as they bring more accountability and passing legislation is not about the lowest common denominator in terms of agreement over a Bill. There is no ‘ideal’ system due to diversity in the world. However, for Britain, there needs to be a mixed system with more PR so that each party receives a fair share of the legislative power from the percentage of votes won. This is currently lacking as we have a two party plurality system for a three party reality, which lacks fair representation for the third party.

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