The efforts of the British government to join the EEC in the years 1961 to 1973 were mainly a result of Britains decline as a world power Assess the validity of this view.
‘The efforts of the British government to join the EEC in the years 1961 to 1973 were mainly a result of Britain’s decline as a world power’ – Assess the validity of this view.
Britain’s economic decline during the period resulted in the continuous efforts to join the prosperous EEC. Keynesian economics wasn’t an effective solution to the economic downturn, and to solve the problem, the EEC seemed like a liable solution. However, because of Anglo-American relations and the commonwealth, Macmillan’s efforts to join the EEC were halted by De Gaulle’s veto in 1963. Nonetheless, 10 years later, Edward Heath got Britain into the EEC due to his pro-European beliefs, as opposed to Macmillan and Wilson who were sceptical over Europe. Also, Britain’s decline in international power made the British public suspicious about European integration, as the historian Paul Einzig put it, “They want to remain purely British and are firmly opposed to relinquishing any essential part of their country's absolute sovereignty”, which was the reason De Gaulle vetoed Britain’s application twice.
By the end of WW2, Britain’s international prestige was high; the pound sterling was the leading international currency, with more than half the world's trade conducted in sterling. Moreover, Britain had the biggest economy of Europe and living standards were very high. With such economic prosperity, the advantages of a commonwealth and the relationship with America, Britain wasn’t interested in joining the ECSC as Churchill outlined in his 1949 Zurich speech, “We are with Europe, but not of it”. The 1956 Suez crisis was to shatter all aspects of sovereignty built up, and consequently cause the decline of Britain as a world power and cause the downturn of the economy. The decision by Abdel Nasser to nationalize the Suez Canal damaged Britain’s economic interests in the region which was a major trading route to get Middle Eastern oil to Britain. Subsequently, Nasser’s decision caused uproar in Britain shared by the public and conservatives. But Eden’s decision to secretly discuss deals with France and Israel to take back the canal was a disaster. The outcome signalled the definitive weakening of Britain’s status as a world power and was the catalyst to Macmillan speeding up the process of decolonization. The Suez crisis confirmed Britain’s decline as a world power and Macmillan’s policies revolved around restoring Britain’s prestige.
