Given the resources of the Grand Alliance, the defeat of the Axis powers was merely a matter of time. Discuss with reference to the period between 1941 and 1945.

The Allies could out produce the Axis in several key areas including manufacturing and refinery. This gave the Allies almost an unlimited amount of arms and supplies, something all the Axis powers had to take by conquering foreign lands.  The USA possessed an enormous productive capacity which enabled them to supply the material resources for their allied partners and enough to supply her own substantial forces.  The enormity of the US production can be seen from the ‘297,000 aircraft, 193,000 artillery pieces, 2.4 million army trucks and jeeps and 8800 naval vessels.’ Overy emphasises that this constituted to nearly two thirds of all allied military equipment produced during the war. Stoler goes on to say that by 1943 American aircraft production was more than twice the combined production of Germany and Japan. Apart from the USA’s economies of scale, the British bombing offensive ensured the gigantic losses of German fighter aircraft and pilots. Overy divides the war into four different zones of combat one being the bombing offensive. He argues that the Allies were successful in combatting all four zones which was determined in great measure by issues of production, scientific discovery, military reform and social enthusiasm.  In 1944, only weeks before the Normandy Invasion, the bombing offensive against Germany denied the German forces approximately half their battle front weapons and was a successful attack. Purdue argues though that the strategic bombing was not effective in destroying either the enemies morale or their productive capacity, ‘ the strategic bombing offensive cost the lives of 100,000 British, Commonwealth and American aircrew and perhaps between three quarters of a million and one million Germans. It was a major misapplication of resources.’ Stoler agrees and explains that the bombers proved to be widely inaccurate and the bombing did cause destruction and civilian deaths but it had very little impact on German industry or port facilities and no impact on civilian morale. Therefore, the US-British air offensive against German industry did not have the desired effect of wrecking enemy production of war goods.  In fact, under the direction of Albert Speer, the Germans actually increased production.

     Overy argues, if material resources were in fact what led to the Allied victory, from 1940-1942 Germany had greater industrial power than Britain and they overpowered both Britain and the Soviet Union militarily. Yet even with this military advantage Germany was unable to bring either power to defeat.  Furthermore by 1944 when the Allies were in the lead militarily, hopes for a quick victory evaporated under the impact of stiffening Axis resistance. Military victory was deferred until 1945.  

The defeat of the Axis was not just down to their military resources but it was the way in which these resources were used and organised to the Allies’ advantage. Overy points out that the Allies were more agile in adapting to changing circumstances, quickly instituting reforms that covered the organization of forces, their equipment and operational skills. These reforms achieved improvements in the qualitative performances of all Allied forces and technology in the middle years of the war, “without which later quantitative supremacy would have availed little”. While the gap between the two sides narrowed in every sphere of combat, Axis forces did little to alter the basic pattern of their military organizations and operational practice, or to reform and modernize the way they made war. They responded more slowly to the sudden swing in the balance of fighting power evident in 1943. In Germany and Japan much greater value was placed on operations and on combat than on organization and supply. They did not pull together as a coalition to defeat the powers that stood in their way. They did not work out their common priorities nor were their war plans coordinated. This enabled the Allies to turn the tide of the war and seize the initiative. Industry was central to the Allied view of warfare. Germany and Japan did not consider economics as central to the war effort, focusing on willpower, resolve, and endurance as the prime movers in war. Eventually, factory for factory, the Allies made better use of their industry than their enemies thereby winning the long war of attrition.

The Allied resources were a definite advantage in the lead up to their eventual victory yet the outcome of the war was ultimately derived by Hitler’s mistakes and was his responsibility. The invasion of Russia, the battle of Stalingrad 1942, was a decision that Hitler took which may have been the single greatest reason for the Axis defeat. Hitler’s failings and mistakes stand at the top of the list in causing the Axis defeat and can explain the outcome of the war. In 1942 Hitler believed that Russia was beaten for military reasons and he said ‘this winter Russia would probably suffer the same fate as Napoleon.’ Hitler believed that by capturing western Russia he could precipitate the collapse of its economy. Reinhardt argues that Hitler clearly misjudged Russia’s situation. He believed that the red army was in a far worse situation then the German troops and thus he arrived at an incorrect assessment of the situation. Hitler assumed that his troops would secure a rapid victory due to their superior military power, even if they were outnumbered. He wrongly thought that a combination of well trained and ideologically prepared soldiers would force Russia to surrender.  Hitler did not think the fighting would last until winter which he discounted as a strategic consideration.

 The battle of Stalingrad in August 1942 saw about 330,000 German troops storm the city. One Luftwaffe attack alone killed 40,000 civilians in the city. Yet the Soviets dug in and countered the German offensive, stalking the Germans in the city's rubble. By January 1943, a mere 12,000 Germans lived to surrender to Soviet forces, and the German forces trapped in Stalingrad surrendered on 02 February 1943. Subsequently, the Soviet's scored another victory during the largest tank battle in history -- the July 12, 1943, Battle of Kursk that involved a total of 1,200 tanks. Thus the failure of the German Army was nothing short of a disaster. A complete army group was lost at Stalingrad and 91,000 Germans were taken prisoner. With such a massive loss of manpower and equipment, the Germans simply did not have enough manpower to cope with the Russian advance to Germany when it came. Furthermore, Japan and Italy chose not to aid Germany in an attempt to crush Soviet power and instead focused on their own narrow gains thus possibly missing out on the chance to change the world order decisively. The Germans were never able to recover from the losses they sustained in this battle. The loss of men, tanks, planes, bullets, and guns severely weakened both armies, but since the Germans were fighting a two front war, their disaster had far more devastating consequences.

Overy on the other hand questions the credibility of whether the German defeat was a result of the ‘two front war.’ He believes that there is no link between military defeat and fighting a war on two fronts. The USA fought a war on three fronts and all those fronts competed with each other for resources and weaponry. For much of the First World War Germany survived fighting a war on two fronts and paradoxically was defeated by Russia in a one front war in 1918.

  The failure to capture the oil fields which Reinhardt explains was ‘the only way to alleviate the oil crisis in Germany in the event of a long war was to utilize Russian oil for the benefit of the Reich.’ Thus the failure to capture the oil fields cut off the Axis powers from any hope of finding a large enough fuel source to continue an effective war- essentially sealing their fate. Reinhart goes on to explain that the world political scene in 1942 which was marked by the failure of operation ‘Barbarossa,’ and by the inability of German industry to adapt to the requirements of a long war, now ruled out plans for attaining a ‘world power status.’ Hitler had spread himself too thin and the German economic potential and manpower were overburdened and could not meet the requirements of a long war on two fronts. Hitler had clearly failed.      

Arguably, Overy believes it was not the mistakes of the Axis that led to allied victory but ‘on a very great improvement in the military effectiveness of the Allied forces.’  He also acknowledges that victory was won by a very narrow margin and that the element of chance was an important variable. “If war had not started until the mid-1940s Germany might well have proved unstoppable” Purdue on the other hand believes that the Axis mistakes were significant in causing their own defeat but the Allies ability to capitalise on these mistakes cannot be neglected. It was a combination of Axis mistakes and allied strengths that led to allied victory in 1945. Additionally, Overy claims that maintaining high morale was conducive to winning the war. While the Axis population were disunited and unsure of their cause the Allies were certain of theirs and because of it fought harder and better. They turned the moral energies of their people into an effective will to win. ‘The moral forces at work on the Allied side kept people fighting in a common cause; but as the war went on Axis populations suffered a growing demoralisation, a collapse of consensus.’

By 1945 the allied armies closed in on Germany from all directions. There was no possible way the Axis powers could still win the war.  Germany was forced to surrender and they signed the German Instrument of Surrender which was the  that established the  ending . The US dropped the atomic bombs on Japan which resulted in the swift surrender of the Japanese forces. The Axis never came close to matching American output and, in a tacit admission of their material inferiority, typically relied increasingly on will power and individual heroism as the allegedly more important factors that would bring the Allies to their knees .All this is meant to stress the significance of 1941 for the future of Europe and indeed the rest of the world. Hitler came very close to defeating Stalin that summer. The tide then turned and the Second World War was won by the Allies in the East with enormous sacrifices on the part of the Russian army and population. Material resources were key in winning the war against the Axis powers but Hitler’s biggest mistake, the invasion of Russia, was when he  interfered with the military conduct of the invasion from the beginning, and the unprecedented Nazi brutality that aimed to decimate and enslave them, left the tough Russian people with no other choice but to fight their toughest war, and utilize their endless resources much better than ever, and by doing so Hitler lost his last remaining options and his chance of winning the war.

Bibiliography:

Overy, Richard, Why the Allies Won The War (London, 1995)

Purdue, A.W, The Second World War, 1999

Weinberg, Gerhard L, Germany Hitler and World War 2, 1995

Stoler, Mark A, Allies in War, 2005

Reinhardt, Klaus, Moscow, The Turning Point, 1992

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