'To what extent was the Cold War a consequence of the Second World War?

University Degree Historical and Philosophical studies

‘To what extent was the Cold War a consequence of the Second World War

The Second World War “Grand Alliance” between the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain quickly disintegrated after the defeat of Germany and Japan.

Soon after 1945 a different kind of war dominated international relations. The “Cold War” between the Soviet Union and the United States, the main contenders in this new contest for world power, lasted for decades until the late 1980s. The two powers engaged in a long and bitter competition to gain global influence, economic and strategic advantage, nuclear-weapons supremacy and ideological superiority.

The two enemies never fought directly against one another - a traditional armed conflict never took place, this is the main reason for referring to this war as “cold” - nevertheless an intense armaments race started. The United States and the Soviet Union armed and supported their allies and client states, built a rival alliance network and initiated wide propaganda campaigns. To raise the hostilities there was, on the one side, Soviets’ fear of a “capitalist encirclement” and, on the opposite side, Americans’ suspicion against an “international communist conspiracy”. Each side saw the other as aggressive and intransigent. The Cold War contest rapidly became the dominant feature of international relations. In the late 1980s a revolutionary policy brought forward by the Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbaciov led to dramatic changes in Eastern Europe and Russia. Millions of people celebrated the end of the Cold War.

If it is easy to identify the period of time and the events that led to the end of the Cold War, it is instead not so clear to define its starting-point. This subject has been matter of debate between historians for many years, and various theories have originated.

Historians agree that the events of the Second World War marked a dramatic turning point in the world political system, but it would be a superficial interpretation to consider the Cold War as a consequence of the Second World War exclusively.

For those contemporaries who knew about the history of the previous decades, the escalating friction between the two powers was not unexpected. Indeed the origins of the conflict between America and Russia can be traced back as far as the 1917 at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution and the American decision to send troops in order to protect its interests in the Russian civil war. The Bolshevik government that took power in 1917 adopted a Marxist anticapitalist ideology and confiscated American-owned property. President’s Wilson’s policy of a liberal and capitalist international order seemed endangered by what he called the “poison of Bolshevism.” The communist state, with its collectivism and democratic centralism clearly represented the opposite pole of American political thinking.

Although at that time there were signs that a deep rift was appearing between east and west, we cannot affirm that the Cold War in its fullest meaning was originating now.

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Although at that time there were signs that a deep rift was appearing between east and west, we cannot affirm that the Cold War in its fullest meaning was originating now.

However any theory we consider depends upon which point of view we look at this phenomenon. In fact if the Cold War is understood to be the antagonism which existed between a collectivist, planned society and the pluralistic values of a market economy we are right in sustaining that it began in October1917. But on the other hand, if the Cold War is seen as the period during which the antagonism between Soviet Union and the United States dominated world affairs, we should affirm that it started in 1943 instead, and can therefore be considered as a consequence of the Second World War.

However, in October 1917 the suspicion of the United States towards Russia was not strong enough to make us suppose that the “Cold War” in its wider definition was beginning. Moreover the American community was confident that such an anticapitalist system of government and economy as the one introduced by the Bolsheviks could not survive very long. We also have to consider that at the time of the October Revolution the USSR did not exist. This meant that there was not the powerful Soviet state for the Americans to fear, and there was no war of propaganda or the funding of external communist movements that caused the majority of friction between the two countries later during the Cold War.

This desire for expansionism was to cause America increasing concern a few years later, when in 1922 Russia merged with five neighbouring states to form the Soviet Union. By 1936 five more states joined; this meant that in less than 15 years Russia had amassed an area the size of Europe. At this time there were increasing signs that American and Soviet relationship was becoming more and more difficult. The USSR’s expansionism was starting to threaten the rest of Europe and there was a continuing suspicion of a communist revolution in other countries.

Especially upsetting to the United States was the 1939 Nazi-Soviet pact, which stamped the Soviet Union as one of the aggressors responsible for the outbreak of the Second World War. Americans rejected the Soviet argument that Great Britain and the United States, by practicing appeasement towards Germany, had left the Soviet Union little choice but to make peace with Hitler in order to gain time to prepare for an expected German attack.

After the United States themselves entered the Second World War in December 1941 they formed a “Grand Alliance” with the Soviet Union and Great Britain. Always very tense, this coalition of convenience for national survival was held together by the common objective of defeating the Axis. In fact only together the two powers would have defeated Germany. But there were other reasons why the United States and the Soviet Union should have been willing to co-operate both during and after the war. After the end of the hostilities the USSR would have needed American capital and goods, and this in turn would have resolved the problem of over-production in American economy. Neither power wanted to became involved in future wars, so there was a considerable American understanding for the Soviet determination not to tolerate anti-Soviet regimes in Eastern Europe.

Despite these reasons for co-operation, the years of war created a situation of mutual mistrust and recrimination greater than ever before. In particular the question of a second front in Europe was to oppose the Allies during the war. The powers differed frequently over the timing for the opening of a western front and numerous American promises, followed by delays, angered Moscow. In one of his first messages to Churchill, on 18 July 1941, Stalin asked the British to launch a second front in France and another in the Arctic. This action would have taken some of the burden off the Red Army, and also would have reduced Stalin’s suspiciousness by showing a more direct participation of the Western Powers in the war. In 1942 Roosevelt promised Molotov to open a second front in Europe. The British favoured an invasion of North Africa instead, and in the end Churchill and Roosevelt agreed that the first Allied invasion would have taken place in North Africa. Obviously this decision increased Soviet suspicions about Anglo-American motives, and certainly contributed to the Cold War antagonism that would have become clear and visible during the post-war years.

Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill met at several wartime conferences to discuss military strategies and to plan the post-war era. The so-called “Big Three” had met for the first time in November 1943 at the Teheran Conference to decide a territorial settlement in Eastern Europe. But the post-war arrangements for this region ended to be the main source of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Roosevelt was very keen that self-determination and the principles of the Atlantic Charter should have been applied there, and the region integrated into the grand design of a universal market economy. The co-operation of the Soviet Union was considered as vital, but Roosevelt wrongly took for granted that free elections in eastern Europe and the formation of government which would have maintained friendly relations with the Soviet Union were compatible goals. The American President aimed to both democratic regimes in the region and Soviet friendship, but the events of the post-war era showed how utopic his Wilsonian principles were.

Another important factor in the exacerbation of Soviet-American relations was the conflict over Germany. Although the United States and the Soviet Union had a mutual interest in solving the German question, no agreement was reached during the war years.

The main reason for this failure was that before 1945 the Roosevelt administration, like the Soviet, had no clear conception of what was to happen to Germany after the war.

In February 1945, when the Red Army was still fighting through Eastern Europe into Germany, the three leaders met again at the Yalta Conference to attempt an agreement on the outlines for peace that would follow their victory over Germany and Japan.

Yalta was hailed as a diplomatic triumph for an alliance that confidently anticipated military victory; however, the lack of trust among the Allies was still evident since the time of the first Soviet-American hostilities during the Bolshevik Revolution.

As the Yalta Conference was the first real meeting that highlighted disagreements and differences that the west and the USSR had, it can be considered as the first major test of the Grand Alliance. However, in February 1945 the fundamental differences between the Allies were postponed in order to concentrate on the common objective of defeating Germany and Japan. These frictions between the Allies became considerably clearer several months after the Yalta conference when the next meeting was held at Postdam to discuss the four-power occupation of the German territories. But the aims outlined at the conference failed to be specific enough to be applied uniformly across the four zones of occupation. This was because the Allies could not agree to implement a common policy across the whole country apart from the decision to keep Germany under military occupation. As the Grand Alliance began to disintegrate in front of a growing antagonism, the German issue became a symbol of the cold diplomatic war arising between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The defeat of Germany and Japan left a vacuum in central Europe and the Far East. This meant that a new international order had to come into being and that the Soviet Union and the United States had in their hands the opportunity to re-shape the political configuration of the globe. The greater strength of the American political and economic system, compared to the Soviet, permitted the United States to play a major role and to have wider opportunities to change the post-war world. This in turn led the Soviet Union to see US policy as an aggressive capitalist expansionism that could have hardened its own attitude in its sphere of influence. The formation of blocs became more and more pronounced.

In my opinion the Cold War can not be considered as a consequence of the Second World War exclusively. Certainly the world conflict has been the major ground where the United States and the Soviet Union confronted their reciprocal differences; however this phenomenon should be seen as the result of a long process of antagonism already started at the beginning of the century. The Cold War has been a reaction to the diffidence and mistrust of two opposite and irreconcilable ideological camps, and the Second World War has been the theatre where the two powers’ differences played an important role in demonstrating that there would have been no chance to believe in a peaceful diplomatic postwar.