Britain's Nuclear Deterrent. The government argues that the conditions required for complete nuclear disarmament do not yet exist. This paper will argue that these conditions already exist for the UK and will examine the threat, costs, the environmental

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Introduction

A thorough review of the United Kingdom’s (UK’s) deterrence requirements was conducted as part of the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) and concluded that ‘while large nuclear arsenals and risks of proliferation remain, our minimum deterrent remains a necessary element of our security’ (MOD, 1998). That minimum deterrent is Trident. The government argues that the conditions required for complete nuclear disarmament do not yet exist. This paper will argue that these conditions already exist for the UK and will examine the threat, costs, the environmental factors and the legality of the Trident system.

Background

The UK has been a committed nuclear power since 1945 when the first atomic bomb was produced under the Manhattan Project (Clarke, 2004). The UK nuclear weapons programme is currently based entirely on four Trident nuclear missile submarines (SSBNs) which came into service in 1994 with a projected service life of ‘up to 30 years’ (MOD, 1998), and fewer than 200 warheads.

Whilst the UK’s operational posture has changed dramatically over the last few years, enabling us to maintain our nuclear forces at reduced readiness (MOD, 1998), the government has still made it absolutely clear that it is prepared to use its nuclear deterrent as a first strike capability provided a realistic and credible threat against the UK exists. British Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon told the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence that states like Iraq ‘can be absolutely confident that in the right conditions we would be willing to use our nuclear weapons.’ (Hoon, 2002a). In response to this Geoff Hoon was questioned on British television and gave this response:

‘Let me make it clear the long standing British government policy that if our forces or if our people were threatened by weapons of mass destruction we would reserve the right to use appropriate proportionate responses which might, might, in extreme circumstances include the use of nuclear weapons’ (Hoon, 2002b).

Whereas prior to this statement most people believed that the UK’s nuclear weapons capability would only be deployed in response to a nuclear attack from a third party it was now evident that it could be used as a response to a chemical or biological attack or even the ‘threat’ of such an attack.

The UK government has said that future disarmament negotiations will include UK strategic forces when the superpower arsenals have reduced to an acceptable level. What the government has failed to state is what that level would be (Milne, 1995). The UK Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) has stated that it is maintaining a ‘capability to design a new weapon should it ever be required’ (Bromley et al, 2001) and with the expectation that the UK’s four Trident submarines will begin to be decommissioned around 2024 it makes preliminary thinking on its replacement a real possibility now.

Threat

Throughout the Cold War period nuclear weapons were held by the UK as the ultimate deterrent to aggression from other nuclear capable states. This thinking was known as ‘Mutually Assured Destruction’ (MAD) and was the basis for holding such a ‘deterrent’. The Cold War ended, however, on 11 September 1991 when Russia, Belarus and the Ukraine announced that the Soviet Union had ceased to exist (Downing,1998). Since then the threat to world security has changed dramatically and although the threat of a major strategic war has lessened, the probability of conflicts involving weapons of mass destruction has increased, with the proliferation of more nuclear capable countries and from so-called “rogue” states. It has already been seen, however, that the possession of nuclear weapons is not a deterrent to such states. Israel, known to possess a nuclear capability, was attacked by 39 Scud missiles during the first Gulf War knowing that Saddam Hussein had developed chemical warheads for the same missile. Rather than being deterred by their holdings of nuclear weapons Saddam Hussein cited this as one of his reasons for his attack (Green, 2001). Additionally not only have nuclear weapons drained funds from other defense programs, especially conventional forces, but also they have failed in their ultimate objective of maintaining Britain’s global position as a world power (Paterson, 1997).

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It could also be argued that the United States’ overwhelming nuclear superiority negates the role of such a minor player as the United Kingdom in strategic defence. The United Kingdom has a strong allegiance to the United States along with other nuclear countries such as France. Why then does it need its own deterrent when the fundamental policies behind such alliances within NATO are that an attack on one country is seen as an attack on all (NATO, 2001). Additionally the creation of a new NATO task force is nearing formation. At the June 1996 Berlin meeting the idea of establishing the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) was accepted and the Combined Joint Tasks Forces (CJTFs) further developed. This increased flexibility has also led to more cooperative arrangements with France and Partnership for Peace countries (NATO, 1996). Clarke further argues that ‘It is scarcely conceivable (even in the long term) that other known nuclear powers such as India, Pakistan, Israel or N Korea or a near nuclear power such as Iran could become a Strategic Threat to the UK Homeland’ (Clarke, 2004).

The UK nuclear weapons policy has always centred on a perceived threat from the Soviet Union and the Cold War ‘arms racing’ (Freedman, 1980). The current government has agreed that a revival of this threat is so remote that policy no longer needs to cater for this contingency thus negating the need for a deterrent. The whole raison d'être for the UK maintaining a nuclear capability has thus dissolved (Milne, 1995).

International terrorism and the proliferation of Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) represent the most direct threats to the United Kingdom’s peace and security (MOD, 2003) but a nuclear response to a terrorist WMD attack would clearly not be an appropriate response; terrorist groups would hardly be deterred by the use of nuclear deterrents. In fact such is the mentality of the suicide bomber that he would rejoice in the idea that his actions may recourse in the death of many innocent lives (Clarke, 2004).

The steps already taken by the U.N. Security Council with resolution 1540 and the Proliferation Security Initiative of the U.S. which prevent non-State actors acquiring nuclear weapons are not sufficient alone to ward off looming catastrophes. The proliferation of nuclear weapons will not be stopped whilst the most powerful nations in the world maintain that nuclear weapons are fundamental to their own security (Roche, 2005).

Costs (Financial and Political)

The estimated financial costs of Trident vary greatly between sources. The government has, some would argue cleverly, split the cost of Trident into operating costs, nuclear warhead programme costs and acquisition costs (MOD, 1998). These are shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Trident Annual Costs

This total operating cost of just over £1Bn is just under 5% of the overall defence budget. Additionally there are substantial costs relating to support forces assigned to protect Trident, including commandos, minesweepers, destroyers, Nimrod and frigates (MOD, 1993) and the “gross” cost of the nuclear deterrent was estimated at £4.6Bn.

Clearly with any equipment costs of this scale there are massive political ramifications should any decisions be made to either replace or dispose of it. If the government were to dispose of Trident then undoubtedly there would be large decommissioning costs involved. Arguably in the days of the MOD’s SMART acquisition then decommissioning costs should be considered as part of the weapon system life-cycle cost rather than a cost of disarmament (Beach et al, 2002); either way it will have to be decommissioned at some point.

A widely held view is that reasons behind keeping Trident are purely political. It is clear, however, that although all permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) currently possess a nuclear weapons capability this is not a pre-requisite (UNSC Charter, 1945). The United Kingdom is already supporting the increase of permanent members from five to ten and this would include non-nuclear states such as Germany, Japan, Brazil and possibly an African state (MOD, 2004). The author would argue that taking the initiative and leading on nuclear disarmament could enhance the standing of the UK in the International Community and further secure its permanent seat on the UNSC.

AWE employs over 3,600 personnel at Aldermaston and Burghfield and some would argue that the scrapping of Trident could have a localised detrimental effect on industry and employment. There are parallels here with the scrapping of the chemical and biological weapon development in 1956 which must be considered. Instead of making its staff redundant Porton Down re-focused the work of these facilities entirely on defensive measures, including treaty enforcement, and has made a significant contribution to reducing the international threat from chemical and biological weapons (Beach et al, 2002). In the same way the UK is in an ideal position to take the lead on nuclear disarmament, increase its own national security and be a significant contributor to reducing the global nuclear threat. AWE could continue in a way parallel to that of Porton Down after 1956. Additionally its laboratories and scientific expertise could well be maintained to enhance the UK competitiveness in government research such as material behaviour modelling, forensic seismology and nuclear verification (Beach et al, 2002).

Environmental Factors

The effects of a nuclear strike or even an accidental explosion on the environment are catastrophic (Zuckerman, 1982). Whilst the immediate effects on human life and buildings are obvious it is the short to medium term effects that will have the most damaging effect on the environment. In the aftermath of the Chernobyl nuclear power station explosion and fire in the Ukraine in 1986, radioactive rain fell over the next few days contaminating a wide arc across Northern Europe, including Scandinavia and then Scotland, Cumbria and North Wales, over 1000 miles from Chernobyl. Research on the health effects of Chernobyl is only in its infancy and it will be some time yet before the significance of these trends on humans, wildlife and the environment can be established. Increased numbers of leukemia were being detected throughout the spring of 1993 in Belarus, but not at ruinous levels (Konoplya, 1993) and a host of ostensibly unrelated diseases have seen marked rises. For example, diabetes among children was being detected as early as 10 months of age and, once again, was most prevalent in areas of high contamination.

Whilst nuclear weapons exist there will always be a risk of accidents. There have been several nuclear powered and/or armed submarines that have sunk, mainly in deep water. The Russian nuclear submarine, Kursk, sunk in relatively shallower water, 300 meters down in the Barents Sea. Although it may seem safer to leave the Kursk where it is for fear of breaking it up attempting to lift it this may be a very blinkered and short-sighted view. The corrosive effect of sea water on steel will ensure that sooner or later it will leak (CND, 2001).

There have been numerous other accidents such as the power surge which happened at the nuclear reactor experimental station at Deep River, six miles from Canada's initial atomic plant at Chalk River on 12 December 1952. It took two years just to clean up the radioactive water that had spilled into the building’s basement (Silver, 1987).

Legality

The UK is legally committed to eliminate its nuclear arsenal under Article V1 of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Again in the 2000 NPT Review Conference Britain agreed to make an “unequivocal commitment” to accomplish the elimination of all nuclear weapons. Currently the government is yet to take any significant action since signing up to this treaty which is being viewed as hypocritical by most non-nuclear states (CND, 2003).

On 8th July 1996 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) gave an advisory opinion on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons (ICJ, 1996).

The court concluded that, ‘the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.’ and that ‘states must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between military and civilian targets’.

The ICJ also outlined the sources of international law as they relate to nuclear weapons. It is apparent that nuclear weapons would generally breach all of the following (Zelter, 1999):

Declaration of St. Petersburg, 1868 because unnecessary suffering would be caused and there would be no avoidance or minimising of incidental loss of civilian life;
Hague Convention, 1907 because unnecessary suffering would be caused and there would be no guarantee of the inviolability of neutral nations;
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 because long-lasting radioactive contamination would interfere with innocent people's right to life and health;
Geneva Conventions, 1949 because protection of the wounded, sick, the infirm, expectant mothers, civilian hospitals and health workers would not be ensured;
The Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 1977 because there would be massive incidental losses of civilian lives and widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment.

Any use of Trident’s formidable firepower would result in massive casualties in a wide area (Zuckerman, 1982) hence rendering its use illegal.

In 1998 the Trident Ploughshares campaign was established with an aim of disarming the UK Trident nuclear weapons system in a non-violent, open, peaceful, safe and fully accountable manner. They have already achieved notable successes in court both in and out of Scotland with acquittals of individuals accused of criminal damage on nuclear facilities on the basis that there was no criminal intent, just the belief that the UK was acting in contradiction to International Law (Zelter, 1999).

Conclusion

Throughout this paper it is evident that there is no longer a requirement for the UK to possess an independent nuclear deterrent. The current and perceived future threats to the UK mainland are such that a nuclear deterrent would be of limited use and as such the vast financial outlay of over £1Bn annually cannot be justified. This money could well be better used to fund a much needed enhanced capability for expeditionary warfare which is better suited to today’s asymmetric threat and provide more of a deterrent than Trident ever could.

Whilst there may be short term localised economic and political losses by scrapping Trident, in the longer term this can be reversed. The UK could regain its pre-eminence as a leader in conventional technology by focussing its efforts elsewhere utilising both the staff, expertise and laboratories from AWE.

There are inherent dangers in holding any nuclear capability and the effects on the environment would be catastrophic should something go wrong. Nuclear weapons are a danger to possess. As well as the possibility of accidents there is a possibility that they could attract pre-emptive strikes at times of great international tension (Beach et al, 2002).

Finally, should the UK ever use its current nuclear deterrent it is probable that all personnel involved would be tried as war criminals – its use would be illegal in almost all circumstances. The Nuremberg Principles are fundamental to the reputation of the Royal Navy as upholders of the law and would equally apply to civil servants. Nuremberg Principle IV states: "The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible for him." (Green, 1997).

Although a decision on whether to replace Trident is not needed now it will be needed during this new parliament. However, from leaked reports it does seem more likely that the UK will be looking for a replacement for Trident, costing in the region of £15 Bn. It seems that the main political reasoning behind this are twofold; firstly countries such as Iran and North Korea who may be close to developing a nuclear capability pose a new threat which the government feels which must be deterred by our own nuclear capability. Secondly if the UK were to disarm, leaving the nuclear power club, then it is feared that Britain’s international standing and influence would diminish (Baldwin et al, 2005). In reality, however, the UK keeping its nuclear arsenal has the effect of legitimising nuclear weapons to other, potential, nuclear countries. It is now time to consider conventional options and take the lead in nuclear disarmament to show the world it is the only way forward.

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