A further theory justifying the citizen’s obligation to obey the law is through his consent. This is quite difficult to establish as we have never signed any such document to agree to any such obligation. Locke has argued that mere residence in a country, for whatever length of time, constitutes implicit consent to its law. In contrast, Plamentaz attributes political obligation to when a person freely votes or abstains from voting. By abstaining from casting a vote in general elections, he argues, the citizen is recognising the authority of whoever wins the said election.
The theory of consent can be challenged, specifically on Plamentaz’s understanding, by the expectation that those who are ineligible to vote must have very little or even no obligation to obey in comparison to eligible persons, eliminating the possibility of a general theory of political obligation.
Utilitarianism is a further theory that justifies the existence of the obligation to obey the law by appealing to the favourable consequences of obeying the law and the negative implications of disobeying the law.
Utilitarian’s argue that the government of a state is necessary to protect society from great evil; consequences of general disobedience would be disastrous, and so each person subject to the law has an obligation to obey it; obedience being more advantageous to society than disobedience. In Brandt’s theory the obligation to obey the law can only exist within a society if there is general acceptance of the rule ‘obey the law’, this resulting in better consequences than if some alternative rule were accepted.
Whether obedience is more beneficial for a social group depends on the circumstances. More specifically, act-utilitarianism fails to advance a general theory of political obligation and is unable to account for the stringency of such obligations. Critics of this theory have presented that various other factors rather than purely the consequences of disobedience should be used in assessing the rightness of actions.
Ronald Dworkin sets up the following problem in looking at associative obligations as an alternative to the other theories, with specific reference to consent and fair play: a political authority, or state, is in the business of ensuring compliance with its commands by means of the official use of coercive power. A state is morally legitimate only if it is justified in using coercion as a means of ensuring compliance with its laws. But, Dworkin insists, the use of such coercion is justified only if there is a general moral obligation to obey the law. Thus any argument for the legitimacy of the state must demonstrate the existence of a general obligation to obey the law.
Dworkin’s appeal to associative ties, however, is inadequate to justify the political obligation, with his community of principle not being an exemplar of a genuine community. Associative ties are also simply just feelings and so cannot physically generate such moral obligations as Dworkin claims.
Raz has observed that “no master argument can prove the non-existence of such a moral obligation to obey the law, all that can be done is to illustrate the kind of difficulties such an argument has to overcome.”
Conflict between autonomy and authority
Authority is the right to command, and the right to be obeyed. Authority resides in persons; they possess it by virtue of who they are and not by what they command, and the duty to obey is a duty owed to them. Such an authority is generally granted to those who occupy official positions, more specifically relevant here is the position of the state.
Obedience to the authority of the state is not a matter of doing what someone tells you to do, but a matter of doing what he tells you to do because he tells you to do it. Legitimate authority thus concerns the grounds and sources of moral obligation. The idea of authority put forward by those believing in political obligation is that, as long as men believe in the authority of states, it can be concluded that they possess the concept of de jure authority.
John Locke has held that the supreme authority of the just state extends only to those matters which it is proper for a state to control. The state is, to be sure, the highest authority, but its right to command is less than absolute. One of the questions which political philosophy must answer is whether there is any limit to the range of affairs over which a just state has authority, which will be discussed later in relation to the possible conflict authority of the state has with the autonomy of the individual citizen.
It may be that the government has commanded its subjects to do what in fact they already have an independent obligation to do; or it may be that the evil consequences of defiance far outweigh the indignity of submission. A government's commands may promise beneficent effects, either intentionally or not. For these reasons a man may be right to comply with the commands of the government under whose authority he finds himself. This does not, however, settle the question of legitimate authority, which is the matter of the right to command, and of the correlative obligation to obey the person who issues the command.
Autonomy, in complete contrast, is the view that those who possess both free will and reason have an obligation to take responsibility for their actions. Taking responsibility involves attempting to determine what one ought to do and derives from the fact that we have capacity to reason.
This autonomy is clearly not compatible with the theory of political obligation and the concept of authority, which has been discussed above. It is for this conflict that men can forfeit their autonomy and decide to obey the commands of another without making any attempt to determine for himself whether what is commanded is good. The main issue at hand is that even after he has subjected himself to the will of another, an individual remains responsible for what he does, regardless of whether he can be said to have sacrificed his autonomy.
It has been suggested, by Wolff, that every man who possesses both free will and reason has an obligation to take responsibility for his actions, even though he may not be actively engaged in deliberation about how he ought to act. A declaration of his willingness to take responsibility for the consequences of his actions acknowledges the existence of the obligation.
He may listen to the advice of others, but he determines for himself whether it is good advice. He may learn from others about his moral obligations, but hearing from them arguments whose validity he recognizes even though he did not think of them himself.
- No such obligation to obey the law exists
Anarchism refers to several theories that share an opposition to hierarchy and authority. In Wolff’s view moral autonomy is a value that should be realised to the greatest possible extent, because it is closely tied to human dignity. The close proximity between the two means that we are not allowed to wilfully relinquish our autonomy on a regular basis. This leads to an argument against the acceptance of authority: no recognition of authority is morally admissible. From this, it is suggested that there can be no political obligation, as it is the obligation to obey the laws for the mere reason that they are laws, which contradicts autonomy and entails an unquestioned acceptance of the authority: this cannot be tolerated from an anarchist’s perspective.
Since man's responsibility for his actions is a consequence of his capacity for choice, it is clear to the anarchist that he cannot give it up or put it aside. He can refuse to acknowledge it, however, either deliberately or by simply failing to recognize his moral condition. In as much as moral autonomy is simply the condition of taking full responsibility for one's actions, it follows that men can forfeit their autonomy at their own will.
Even after he has subjected himself to the will of another, in particular the will and authority of the state, an individual remains responsible for what he does regardless. But by refusing to engage in moral deliberation, by accepting the commands of the others as final, he forfeits his respective autonomy.
Rousseau takes the contrasting view that a man cannot become a slave even through his own choice and so always fails in forfeiting his autonomy as, for the autonomous man, there is no such thing as a command. In so far as a man fulfils his obligation to make himself the author of his decision, he will resist the states’ claim to have authority over him; he will deny that he has a duty to obey the laws of the state simply because they are the laws.
Woolf further asserts that no such legitimate practical authority can exist since its claim to provide exclusionary reasons for action for its subjects is ultimately inconsistent with “all men’s continuing obligation to achieve the highest degree of autonomy possible.”
He adopts the Kantian conception of man’s autonomy as “a combination of freedom and responsibility” which involves only his submission to laws that one has made for oneself which ought to mean he “will never view the commands of the state as legitimate, as having binding moral force.
Most justify and explain the dominant belief in the existence of such a duty of obedience, but anarchists insist that all citizens of all states lack even a narrow moral duty to obey the law. The mere fact that an action is legally required or that a stable government holds power within a reasonably just state is insufficient to establish a moral presumption in favour of legal compliance.
The defining mark of the state is authority, the right to rule. If all men have a continuing obligation to achieve the highest degree of autonomy possible, then there would appear to be no state whose subjects have a moral obligation to obey its commands. Hence, the concept of a de jure legitimate state would appear to be empty, and philosophical anarchism would seem to be the only reasonable political belief by these standards.
It is Smith’s view that acts which are otherwise wrong are not made more so by being illegal; some acts are inherently morally wrong. Smith has gone on to suggest that if we abandon the prima facie obligation to obey the law, we could look more closely at the character of acts performed in the course of civil disobedience. It is his assertion that there is not one theory for the political obligation to obey the law that can be upheld.
Taking responsibility for one's actions means making the final decisions about what one should do. For the autonomous man, there is no such thing, strictly speaking, as a command. It is from this premise that it can be argued that no such autonomous man exists when the command is obeyed.
- There is an obligation to obey the law: true autonomy does not exist
A completely different argument, in criticism of anarchism, is that, although there is a clear conflict between autonomy and authority, all that exists is the authority of the state and our forced political obligation to obey the state; true autonomy not being capable of existing in such circumstances.
The true state has ultimate authority over all matters whatsoever that occur within its venue. Rousseau, for example, asserted that the social contract by which a just political community is formed "gives to the body politic absolute command over the members of which it is formed; and it is this power, when directed by the general will, that bears ... the name of 'sovereignty.' "
There are many forms and degrees of forfeiture of autonomy. A man can give up his independence of judgment with regard to a single question, or in respect of a single type of question. He may submit himself to all commands save for some specified acts which he refuses to perform, such as murder.
In politics, as in life generally, men frequently forfeit their autonomy. Most men, as we have already noted, feel so strongly the force of tradition that they accept unthinkingly the claims to authority which are made by their nominal rulers, forcing their supposed claim to autonomy into submission. It is the rare individual in the history of the human race who rises even to the level of questioning the right of his masters to command and the duty of himself and his fellows to obey: the indicator of revolution. Once the dangerous question has been started, however, a variety of arguments can be brought forward to demonstrate the authority of the rulers. Among the most ancient is Plato's assertion that men should submit to the authority of those with superior knowledge and wisdom. A more relative, modern standpoint demonstrates that it is the educated portion of a democratic population that is more likely to be politically active, and that it is just as well that the significant majority of the populace consists of the more ill-informed segment of the electorate that continue to remain passive, since its entrance into the political arena only supports the efforts of the extremists. It is this that demonstrates the stance that it is in fact autonomous beings that do not truly exist; authority being the more dominant factor within our society, both politically and philosophically.
Authority is particularly granted to those who occupy official positions that appear authoritative in the minds of the majority of the citizens of the state because they are denied by certain sorts of bureaucratic regulations having the virtues of publicity and predictability. We have become conditioned to respond to the visible signs of officiality, such as forms and badges. Sometimes we may have clearly in mind the justification for a legalistic claim to authority, as when we comply with a command because it comes from an elected official. The mere sight of an authoritative uniform is enough to make us feel that the man inside it has a right to be obeyed, resulting in the forfeiture of our free will and reason.
Our blind acceptance of authority can be further illustrated by the Milgram experiment: a study focussed on the obedience of authority. The experiment was initially created to explain some of the concentration camp horrors of World War II, where war-criminals claimed that they were merely following orders and could not be held responsible for their actions. The experiment involved the subject, known as the teacher, giving a stranger, known as the learner, a series of electric shocks, with the experimenter providing prompts in order to reassure the subject that they had to continue for the sake of the experiment and that if any damage was done, it would be the experimenter’s responsibility. Milgram's study discovered people are much more obedient than might be imagined. He was shocked to find that those who questioned authority were in the minority, with sixty-five percent of the subjects being willing to progress to the maximum voltage level, continuing to obey the authority of the experimenter, administering all the shocks even with the learner screaming in agony, begging to stop and eventually falling silent. These weren't specially selected sadists; these were ordinary people who had volunteered for a psychology study that were willing to obey authority at any cost, forfeiting their personal autonomy.
Conclusion
It has been shown that the statement that every person who possesses both free will and reason has an obligation to take responsibility for her actions and that this obligation is not compatible with the recognition of political obligation can be supported by anarchism and the criticism of the theories for political obligation that no such obligation can exist, our autonomy prevailing in the conflict.
In contrast, the obligation to obey the law could prevail over autonomy, as true autonomy cannot exist. This is supported by the fact that, although the arguments for political obligation have their flaws, due to the volume of such theories and the fact that we do have to obey the law, that these prevail. This has also been demonstrated through the use of the Milgram experiment, where there was a clear obedience to authority at any cost.
What can be inferred from the existence of de facto states is that men believe in the existence of legitimate authority, for a de facto state is simply a state whose subjects believe it to be legitimate: they may be wrong. Indeed, all beliefs in authority may be wrong- there may not be a single state which has ever had a right to be obeyed. It might even be impossible for such a state to exist; that is the question that must try to be settled. But so long as men believe in the authority of states, we can rightfully conclude that they possess the concept of legitimate authority, eradicating any possibility of true autonomous beings in the conflict.
Bibliography
Books
R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Fontana, London, 1986) pp. 186-216.
J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government (The Free Press, 1970).
J. Plamentaz, Man and Society (Longman, 1965) pp. 238-39.
J. Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford University Press, 1979)
J. Rousseau, The Social Contract (Cosimo Classics, 2008).
A. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton University Press, 1981) pp.164-169.
M. Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’, The Vocation Lectures (Hackett Pub Co, 2004)
P. Wolff, (Harper & Row, New York 1970)
Journal Articles
R. Brandt, ‘Utility and the Obligation to Obey the Law’, Law and Philosophy [1964] pp. 43-55.
Hart, ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’, 64 Phil. Rev. 185 [1955]
G. Klosko, ‘Political Obligation and Gratitude’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 [1989] pp. 352-358
G. Klosko, ‘The Moral Force of Political Obligation’, American Political Science Review, 84 (1990), pp. 1235-1250.
J. Rawls, ‘Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play’, in S. Hook, Law and Philosophy [1964] pp. 3-18
M. Smith ‘Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?’, Yale Law Journal 82 [1973]
A. Walker, ‘Political Obligation and the Argument from Gratitude’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 17 [1988] pp. 191-211.
A. Walker, ‘Political Obligation and the Argument from Gratitude’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 17 [1988] pp. 191-211.
A. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton University Press, 1981) pp.164-169.
G. Klosko, ‘Political Obligation and Gratitude’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 [1989] pp. 352-358.
M. Smith ‘Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?’, Yale Law Journal 82 [1973].
Hart, ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’, 64 Phil. Rev. 185 [1955].
J. Rawls, ‘Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play’, Law and Philosophy [1964] pp. 3-18.
J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government (The Free Press, 1970) (cited hereafter as ‘Two Treatises of Government’)
J. Plamentaz, Man and Society (Longman, 1965) pp. 238-39.
R. Brandt, ‘Utility and the Obligation to Obey the Law’, Law and Philosophy [1964] pp. 43-55.
G. Klosko, ‘The Moral Force of Political Obligation’, American Political Science Review, 84 (1990), pp. 1235-1250.
R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Fontana, London, 1986) pp. 186-216.
J. Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford University Press, 1979).
P. Wolff, (Harper & Row, New York 1970) (cited hereafter as ‘In Defense of Anarchism’).
Two Treatises of Government, n.7 above.
In Defense of Anarchism, n.13 above.
In Defense of Anarchism, n.13 above.
J. Rousseau, The Social Contract (Cosimo Classics, 2008) (cited hereafter as ‘The Social Contract’).
In Defense of Anarchism, n.13 above.
M. Smith ‘Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?’, Yale Law Journal 82 [1973].
The Social Contract, n.17 above.
In Defense of Anarchism, n.13 above
M. Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’, The Vocation Lectures (Hackett Pub Co, 2004)