the Second World War. The notable exception to this rule being Suez, which helps to
underline how any other policy would be misguided. Gilbert points out that it is
wrong to blame the National Government, though mainly Chamberlain, for the policy
of appeasement as it was merely the continuation of a long-term policy. It was an
attempt to prevent the mistakes of the past, the First World War, being repeated again.
Appeasement would help to correct the mistakes of the Treaty of Versailles, notably
legitimate German grievances. It was hoped that through this peace could be achieved
in Europe. It is pointed out that it was only through the “aggressive, irresponsible
behaviour” that appeasement failed, not through the British government. Gilbert also
recognises the “morality” in appeasement, suggesting that it was moral as the
government had gone through all avenues to attain peace before going to war.
Gilbert’s The Roots of Appeasement is an example of how the view of Cato’s
Guilty Men was finally being challenged by the mid 1960s. This orthodox view had
stated that appeasement was the invention of the Chamberlain government, not a
long-term policy, and that it was misguided. Gilbert’s previous examination of
Chamberlain’s foreign policy, with Gott, had been largely negative and in the same
vein as Cato. Although now Gilbert, and similarly Robbin’s with his Munich 1938,
thought it necessary to reassess the whole policy of appeasement (although this was
nothing new as Medlicott had done this in the 1950s). Significantly, Gilbert, unlike
his predecessors, like Cato or Rowse, due to his youth could look at the 1930s in
purely historical terms. Through this he was not emotionally caught up in the events
and his motives were less personal, giving him a clearer view and better critical
vision.
