The decision that politics were of primary concern and Germany’s forceful attempts to annex Austria led to a revision in thinking. This was stage three of appeasement; the decision to rearm and accept that economic interdependency was impossible. During this time Chamberlain still sought to follow appeasement and diplomacy in Europe, steering clear of entering into bloc alliances and a commitment to enter into war over anything other than Britain’s primary interests. Throughout these three stages of appeasement there were key tenets which underlay thinking. The desire to avoid war was the most obvious and its most obvious expression came in the third stage, when war actually seemed most likely, and it came in the shape of a noncommittal policy. Noncommittal was very much Chamberlain’s tool in the diplomatic sphere, as he sought to play off rivalries. He refused to give France certain assurances over British military intervention, despite Blum’s praise of his firm stance. He refused to intervene in Spain, and he even refused to insure that British merchant ships had a safe passage into the blockaded port of Bilbao.
Having laid out the themes of appeasement undertaken by Chamberlain we must assert that the primary thrust of this policy was his own. Chamberlain suffered from an invincible faith in his own abilities and a desire to retain the premiership through a primary role in the safe passage of Britain through this time of crisis. Thus the policy of appeasement, and all its tenets, were the policy of Chamberlain- no better indication of this can be given than the resignation of Eden over disagreement in foreign policy with Chamberlain, despite their agreement in principle over its main issues. This provides us with the basis for deciding whether there were any alternatives to appeasement- were there any alternatives to Chamberlain? The most obvious vehicle for answering this counterfactually is to use Churchill. We shall, although not immediately, examine whether Churchill could have become Prime Minister and thereafter whether his policies could have been effected. However we must ask if Churchill’s policies were an alternative to Chamberlain’s?
Churchill, like Chamberlain, was an advocate of appeasement. Churchill’s appeasement though was directed in different ways. The idea of a grand alliance was foremost in his mind. It was an attempt to join anti-Nazi forces together, an attempt to stem the flow of concessions towards Germany, an attempt to create a united front around the League of Nations principles. It seems though that these League of Nation principles which Churchill espoused have not been fully defined. He called for a determined policy to block German aims around a united Europe, around a popular front. But was Churchill’s popular front possible? If so, it was to be based around Liberal and Labour forces in England; Churchill’s meeting on the French Riviera with Lloyd George highlights his attempts at a cross party coalition. This though was impossible; any chance of a conversion back to Liberal politics was not only farcical given Churchill’s past but also given the weak position of Liberal politicians. The Labour Party was required to give impetus to Churchill’s cross-party and even non-party alliance. However, Labour was not amenable to his Spanish policy. Churchill seems to have fallen short in his understanding of the Spanish civil war, deeming the crisis there as a battle between communist and fascist forces. While Chamberlain was equally unsure what stance to take, Churchill’ s fear of communist government forces and his consequent failure to make a clear stance lost him much Labour Party support. This isolated him from Labour Party support, which saw fit to back the ‘communist’ government, especially thanks to the work of Cripps, who drew great attention among the Labour Party to the Spanish problem. This was the first of Churchill’s problems in gaining enough domestic political backing- he was trying to gain the support of Conservative forces as a member of that party, yet he was unlikely to do so given Chamberlain’s strong position; while he also found himself isolated from the bulk of the Labour Party over his simplistic and anti-government position in Spain.
Churchill may have isolated political backing in regards to the Spanish question; he may have sealed more support over rearmament. A demand for strength and early rearmament to uphold the principles of the League of Nations gained Churchill some notable support. Moreover in his meetings with French policy makers as war loomed, he gained their confidence over rearmament and a grand alliance. This would suggest that the possibility of an alliance bloc in Europe, of anti-fascist forces, may have been more likely given Britain’s rearmament. But while rearmament may have been possible on a diplomatic front, it was less than likely at home. Chamberlain knew well that his hands were tied; by the late 1930s, he could only secure at best from industry a promise that large profits would not be accumulated in return for his own promise of non-intervention in industry. Not only was industry unlikely to accept intervention, the trade unions were unlikely to tolerate the arbitrary movement of the work force. Britain faced a shortage of skilled workers, especially in the armaments industry, and any plans to rapidly increase the rate of rearmament would have included compulsory movement of the workforce. Chamberlain noted that the unions found this unacceptable. The public at large were also against large scale rearmament, whereby inflation may have been a result. This was seen as too heavy a political price to pay for rearmament and this notion was mirrored by treasury committees set up as early as 1935 to deal with defence spending. Hankey, co-ordinating the treasury committees, oversaw programmes such as ‘defence deficiency’ of 1934 and the rearmament programme of 1935. Peden notes that part of the aim of these committees was to “at the earliest stage of planning… remind defence departments that the resources of the Exchequer were not inexhaustible.”
Churchill’s attempts to rearm thus may not have been possible given the domestic economic and social situation; Britain was not ready to plunge into another domestic crisis, having just got through the problems of the early 1930s. Though Churchill’s hands may have been tied over the domestic crisis, could he have done more in Europe? This demands us to look at what Chamberlain was trying to achieve; clearly he was trying to secure lasting peace, and through this his own majority in parliament. Chamberlain’s policy in European negotiations was one of delay and non-commitment; he accepted German expansion, tried to placate Mussolini to help gain cordial relations with Germany and insisted on calming French action and rhetoric. Would Churchill’s policy have differed?
The Hoare-Laval pact over the Abyssinia crisis not only lost the government face at home, it also undermined the League of Nations principles. We can assume that Churchill, a strong advocate of the league and of collective security, would not have legitimised Italy’s actions in such a way. Again Churchill may have differed in his handling of the Spanish civil war; at the very least he might have been spurred into action over the threat of destruction of British merchant vessels. These two cases may have led Churchill to take a firmer line in Europe than Chamberlain, but would he have been willing to risk war over Abyssinia or Spain? Almost certainly not; this leads us to see that even if Churchill had taken a firmer line, the substance of his policy may have been quite similar to that of Chamberlain, who also sought to avoid the escalation of secondary problems into war. Would Churchill have been driven to war over the Rhineland, or the Sudetenland, or Austria? Again, while he may have been tougher on Germany than Chamberlain, Churchill would not have been in a position to go to war by 1937. Domestic considerations shaped Chamberlain’s foreign policy and we can assume the same for Churchill; despite his vociferous appeals, and his ability to stir up the war-time society and economy, up until the annexation of Austria it still seemed like war was less than likely and certainly less than popular in Britain.
Churchill may have reacted differently to events on the continent, although we have perhaps seen that his policy could be little different to Chamberlain’s in substance, but could he have prevented the escalation of events? This is a reflection not only of Churchill’s ability to form a grand alliance and whether it could have worked as a deterrent, but also over Hitler’s concern for intervention from other nations. Ultimately, Hitler risked war against Europe and accepted Japan’s appeal to declare war on the US after Pearl Harbour. He rejected proposals to economic and diplomatic interdependency, refused to accept that the redress of the treaties he had been allowed in the mid-30s was enough. The rapid build up of arms in Germany and the shift to a war economy may not have necessitated war, but it certainly highlighted Hitler’s intent. It seems in this light that the policy of grand alliance was possible, but it would have done little to alter the course of European diplomacy and the eventual course to war.
This last example shows us that little could be done to effect any change in the course to war. Although Britain did not want to go to war, all realised that it was likely by 1938; rearmament and delay tactics were espoused from all camps, including Churchill. This seems the only likely policy given that Britain had a ‘defence deficiency’ which could not be overcome until Britain’s economy had recovered from the early 30s and Britain’s public had forgotten them. Public opinion may not have set policy, but it set the arena for the minds which had to discuss it; Chamberlain and Churchill both had to cope with the fact that the public wanted to avoid war, and certainly wanted to avoid war over the relatively obscure crises such as the Sudetenland or Spanish civil war. German expansion was seen as just by public and politicians; redress of the Treaty of Versailles was understood and was unlikely to be stopped. Later infringements may have been dealt with more harshly by Churchill, but he could have done little to alter Hitler’s course towards European expansion. A grand alliance seems the most viable alternative to appeasement, but it would have meant little difference in the outcome of policy. Attempts to rearm or even to fight Germany earlier, to avoid a large scale war, were impossible given Britain’s economic problems and the desire to avoid war in all sections of society. Churchill then, perhaps the only alternative to Chamberlain as leader of the Conservatives, lacked the backing from his party to gain the premiership and lacked the backing of industry and public to effect any change which would have led to a stronger military strategy.
