Australia’s foreign policy during the Cold War was dominated by a doctrine of ‘strategic denial,’ and was established by the Fraser government in 1976. The primary objective was to deny the Soviet Union of any influence in the region, for if they were able to exert influence over other countries, whether it be ‘economic, diplomatic, education— [it] could lead to political influence and a Soviet military base.’ This would threaten regional stability, thus Australia provided economic assistance to ensure that regional countries would not be tempted by Soviet offers of assistance.
Gordon Freeth, the Minister for External Affairs, stated, ‘Reason for concern arises when the scale or methods or objective of the promotion are calculated to jeopardise our direct national interests or to endanger the general security and stability in the region.’ One area which threatened the security of Australia by itself, was in ‘Soviet arms aid to Indonesia, including the provision of long ranger bombers, submarines and a heavy cruiser,’ for Indonesia, as a regional neighbour posed a much greater threat to Australia than the Soviet Union. For although the ‘thirteen days’ of Cuba was when the threat of a Soviet attack was at its peak, ‘the Soviet Union was becoming less cause for concern to Australia.’ During this period of bipolarity, the nation’s leaders were aware (to a certain extent) of the capabilities of their enemies. For example, the United States knew that the Soviets were providing Cuba with nuclear weaponry, yet it was a silent war, one purely of competition, and I believe that this system of bipolarity was the safest not only for Australia, but for the rest of the world. The United States knew that if they were to attack to Soviet bases then they would retaliate. America did not have the option of acting impulsively, or on a slight inkling. They were themselves against a superpower, and they were aware of their great strength, and thus were forced to be rational.
Therefore, the Soviet Union and the United States created a balance in the world, this equilibrium required them to act rationally, and to contemplate the consequences.
This theory of bipolarity ensures that no single nation has the ability to become dominant, and ensures that large scale war does not occur. Therefore, the nation states continually make new alliances, and break other alliances, and thus continually re-balancing as threats emerge against their security.
Australia’s primary interest is the maintenance of peace— local, regional and global. However, during the past decade Australia has not only had to contend with the Gulf War in 1991 and 2003, as an ally of the United States. But has also had to deal with the political uproar in places such as Indonesia, East Timor, Papua New Guinea, Fiji and the Solomon Islands, through the provision of economic, military and humanitarian aid. These events do threaten the security of Australia because they are regional, and thus have an immediate effect on Australia, for not only do they create instability in our region, but can increase the flow of refugees onto Australian shores and thus forcing our economy to accommodate them. The UN has attempted to resolve anarchy within these nation states. During the early 1990’s many of these peacekeeping missions were a success, such as the Gulf War in 1991, however the UN shifted from peace keepers into peace enforcers during missions in Somalia and Bosnia. The Gulf War in 2003 has revealed the ability of the United States and its belief of supremacy over the UN, through invading Iraq without the support of the UN. Thus revealing the unipolar system that has existed since the end of the Cold War.
Fukuyama believed that the end of the Cold War would be the end of history, in the sense that ideological challenges to liberal democratic principles were effectively dead and incapable of resurrection. However, during this post Cold War period a system of unilateralism will eventually provoke a counter coalition, because nation states are threatened by any large concentration of power, and thus in due course they will take action in order to restore a balance. Hence, not only making all countries less secure, but also decreasing the safety of Australia.
During the Cold War Australia was only in danger from the U.S.S.R or their allies if a full scale war was to occur between the Soviets and the Americans. However, there was a small probability of Australia being in grave danger — because the system of bipolarity was a check and balance on the other superpower. Yet since the Cold War, our close relationship with the hegemon, America has provided some security, for as an isolated country we know that we have a superpower who will protect us. However, this also places us at an increased risk of an attack. For as Gilpin reveals that over time
‘the differential growth in the power of various states in the system causes a
fundamental redistribution of power in the system.’
Posen asserts that in the Post Cold War the most likely challenges to American supremacy are Japan, China, Germany and re-armed Russia. However, for the time being, Australia remains relatively safe from these countries. Rather, Australia is more at risk from underground factions in the Middle East, yet ironically, our relationship with America in the ‘war on terror’ has not reduced the terrorist threat to Australians, but rather increased it. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation has confirmed that Australia’s profile as a terrorist target has increased since September 11, 2001, and furthermore, our continuing involvement in United States military attacks will continue to increase the risk. The media through agenda setting has created a constant fear of terror, and the Bali bombings in 2002, brought the fear of terrorism much closer to home due to the death of many Australians.
Nuclear proliferation is similarly a constant threat, for although America and the Soviet Union are reducing their nuclear arsenals and the threat of a global nuclear war is much diminished, more countries are producing nuclear weapons than during the Cold War. Thus, the possibility of these ‘weapons of mass destruction’ coming into the hands of terrorist factions is increasing, the intelligence organisations do not know if some states or factions do have these weapons.
In conclusion, Australia is not as safe a nation as it was during the Cold War. For the system of bipolarity ensured a balance of power, the state actors were forced to contemplate the consequences, they were against a superpower which was just as powerful. Hence, as Australia ‘faces nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism,’ Australia is not as secure as it was during the Cold War, and this is furthermore increased due to Australia’s close relationship with America. Thus, since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, Australia is not as safe, for inevitably other nation states will challenge the supremacy of the United States, in an attempt to rebalance global power and therefore, we remain in a period of uncertainty and insecurity.
Reference List
- Australian Security Intelligence Organisation website –http://www.asio.gov.au/Review/comp.htm
-
Boyle, P.J and Angel, J.R, Diplomacy in the Marketplace: Australia in World Affairs 1981-1990, Longman Chesire, Melbourne, 1992
-
Kelly, Paul, The End of Certainty, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1994
-
Layne, Chris, ‘The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,’ International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4, (Spring 1993)
-
Firth, Stewart, Australia in International Politics: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy, Allen & Unwin 1999
-
Fukuyama, F, The End of History and the Last Man, Glencoe, IL: Free Press and Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1992
-
Gilpin, R, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, 1981
-
Millar, T.B, Australia in Peace and War, Australian National University Press 1991
-
Muraview, Alexey D, Australia’s Security in the 21st Century, University of Queensland Press, 2001
-
Posen, B.R & Ross, A.L, Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy, International Security, Vol.21, No.3 (Winter 1996/97)
-
Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of international politics, McGraw-Hill; New York 1979.
Elizabeth Herbert – 40328104
Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of international politics, McGraw-Hill; New York 1979.
Layne, Chris, ‘The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,’ International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4, (Spring 1993) pp.5-51
Domino Theory Principle, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954.
Boyle, P.J and Angel, J.R, Diplomacy in the Marketplace: Australia in World Affairs 1981-1990, Longman Chesire, Melbourne, 1992. p. 226
Millar, T.B, Australia in Peace and War, Australian National University Press 1991, p. 312
Kelly, Paul, The End of Certainty, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1994
In most circumstances. Waltz, Kenneth, op cit (n 1)
Muraview, Alexey D, Australia’s Security in the 21st Century, University of Queensland
Press, 2001
Firth, Stewart, Australia in International Politics: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy, Allen & Unwin 1999
Fukuyama, F, The End of History and the Last Man, Glencoe, IL: Free Press and Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1992
possibly they will have a different ideology to that of America. Waltz, Kenneth, op cit (n 1)
Layne, Chris, op cit (n 2)
Gilpin, R, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 13
Posen, B.R & Ross, A.L, Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy, International Security, Vol.21, No.3 (Winter 1996/97) p. 5-53
ASIO website –http://www.asio.gov.au/Review/comp.htm
Firth, Stewart, op cit (n 13)
Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Canberra, 1996, p. 7 in Firth, Stewart, op cit (n 13)