Clashes between Stalin and the West first appear at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences in February and July 1946, respectively. Though the mood at Yalta was more or less cooperative, Stalin agitated matters by demanding that all German territory east of the Rivers Oder and Neisse be given to Poland (and thus remain under Soviet influence). Both Roosevelt and Churchill refused to agree to these demands. The Soviet Union responded bluntly, saying “..The Soviet Government cannot agree to the existence in Poland of a Government hostile to it.” The atmosphere at the Potsdam Conference was noticeably cooler, with Truman replacing Roosevelt as the representative from the United States. “ Truman...had been kept in complete ignorance by Roosevelt about foreign policy,” which meant that Truman was not aware of the secret assurances of security Roosevelt had made to Stalin. His policy towards Soviet Russia, then, was much more severe than that of Roosevelt. He was quoted as saying “We must stand up to the Russians...We have been too easy with them.” Both Truman and Churchill were annoyed because Germany east of the Rivers Oder and Neisse were being occupied by Russian troops and were being run by the pro-communist Polish government, who expelled over five million Germans. This went directly against the agreements made at Yalta earlier in the year. The west viewed this as an act of aggression on the part of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union responded with a statement saying that Poland borders with the Soiet Union are something that cannot be “Poland borders with the Soviet Union, what [sic] cannot be said of Great Britain or the United States.”
From this point, the Cold War truly becomes a chain reaction. In March of 1946, Churchill presented his ‘Iron Curtain' speech at Fulton, Missouri, in response to the spread of communism in Eastern Europe. He called for a western alliance to combat the threat. Stalin's response was hostile: rather than trying to negotiate a peaceful settlement, Stalin continued to tighten his grip on Eastern Europe. Communist governments were installed in every area of Eastern Europe (barring Czechoslovakia) by the end of 1947. These governments were implemented by guerrilla tactics: elections were rigged, non-communist members of the governments were expelled, with many being arrested or executed, and eventually, Stalin dissolved all non-communist political parties. Stalin began to implement a reign of terror using the Russian Army and his secret police force. Moreover, Stalin had increased his influence in the Russian zone of Germany as if it belonged to Russia. He allowed only the communist party and drained the area of its vital resources.
The West reacted. It appeared to them that Russia's attitude went against all of the promises that Stalin had made at Yalta -- namely, that Stalin would permit free elections in the eastern European states. Russia argued that it needed to maintain a sphere of influence in the area for security reasons: to this, even Churchill agreed in 1944. Further, Russia argued that the areas had never had democratic governments, and that a communist system would allow these backward countries' to progress and flourish. Stalin's policy of expansion worried the West: in response, the West introduced the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, both of which sought to arrest the spread of communism.
Stalin's aggressive tactics did not end with creating a sphere of influence. Stalin re-established Cominform in September 1947. Cominform represented a union of all of the communist states within Europe, including representatives from the French and Italian communist parties. Even within this communist structure, Stalin had to exert his influence. It was not enough for a state to be merely communist: it had to adopt the Russian-style communism. Furthermore, the states within Cominform were expected to keep trade within the Cominform member states, and were discouraged from making any contact with the Western world. Russia strengthened the ties with the Cominform countries through the Molotov plan, which offered Russian aid to the satellite states, and the establishment of Comecon, which served to coordinate the economic policies of the communist states. These actions on the part of Stalin only increased the rift between the capitalist and the communist systems, and made future compromise and negotiations more difficult.
Perhaps the most aggressive move that Stalin made, however, was the takeover of Czechoslovakia in February 1948. Several key issues arose in this conflict. First, the U.S. felt alienated when Czechoslovakia rejected Marshall Aid, which the U.S. blamed on the influence of the communist party. Second, the Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia was a communist; the President and Foreign Minister were not. Finally, the fact that the communists took power in Czechoslovakia by means of an armed coup sent waves of fear through the western world, causing the ‘iron curtain' to fall even further. The U.N. had its hands tied, because there were ‘free' elections (the candidates were all communist) and there was no proof of Russian involvement. While it cannot be proved that Stalin ordered the coup, the signals were clear: Stalin had likely encouraged the coup, and it was not coincidental that Russian troops in Austria were moved up to the Czech border. Czechoslovakia was the final east-west bridge, and with the fall of it, the ‘iron curtain' was complete.
The final hostile movement of Stalin of importance was the Berlin blockade and airlift. When Russia grew dissatisfied with the economic disparity that had developed in Berlin, it responded by closing all road, rail and canal links between West Berlin and West German. The goal was to force western powers from West Berlin by reducing it to the starvation point.
While the blame for the Cold War cannot be placed on a single man, Stalin's expansionist policy was clearly an ever-present catalyst in the war. Certain Truman was not blameless, but the U.S. was not expanding its empire -- the Soviet Union was. Whether the expansion was for self-preservation, or whether it was merely imperialistic expansion, is relatively immaterial. What Stalin's actions unarguably did was start a string of chain-reactions within the western powers, and therefore, a good deal of the blame must rest with him.
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