The failures of the Provisional Government to deal with Russia’s social and economic problems, including their inability to end the war meant they lost support amongst the peasants and the industrial workers, which ultimately contributed significantly to the success of the Bolsheviks. The government failed to carry out land redistribution following the February Revolution, consequently they became deeply resented and many peasants seized the property of local landlords. Lenin was able to capitalise on this by declaring ‘land to the peasants’, a policy, which was against their communist beliefs, but one that would gain the support of the peasantry. In addition, the Provisional Government continued the war with Germany. Russia had already lost millions in the war and morale and discontent in the army was high. Economically, it crippled Russia and caused transport chaos and ultimately shortages of food in the cities, leading to discontent. Similarly, the Kerensky Offensive and the debacle of the Milukov telegram that contradicted the statement that Russia would only fight a defensive war, further damaged the integrity of the Provisional Government and the socialist parties that supported the Provisional Government and left the Bolsheviks as the only party opposed to the War. One of the major weaknesses of the Provisional Government was its lack of credibility and authority. For the masses of Russian people the government did not bring any immediate change. They were unable to distinguish themselves from the Tsar’s government; in fact many in the government were also in the government of the Tsar including the leader Prince Lvov, Milyukov, leader of the Kadets and Kerensky, war minister. Association with the Tsar made them unpopular and distrusted from the start. The Soviets had a better claim to legitimacy as they had been formed from representatives of the workers; an idea that the Bolsheviks used as a vehicle to gain legitimate power. The weaknesses of the Provisional Government was the main reason for Bolshevik success. Their political and social failures ultimately allowed Lenin and the Bolsheviks the opportunity to gain popularity amongst the industrial and peasant classes, whilst destroying the reputation of those parties affiliated with them. Had the Provisional Government been able to end the war and re-establish command over the army, then they would have been able to restore order in Petrograd and arrest the Bolsheviks, alike what Kornilov attempted.
Another aspect contributing to the Provisional Government’s failure was the decisions made by their Prime Minister, Kerensky. The Kornilov revolt was arguably detriment to Bolshevik success. Kerensky had made an attempt to gain control over the army and appointed Kornilov as Commander in Chief to reassert discipline into the army. However, Kornilov was a right-wing officer who had never accepted the February Revolution. When the government was edging towards the imposition of martial law after the continued strikes and unrest in Petrograd, Kornilov moved to supress disturbance by moving his troops into Petrograd. Kerensky saw this as a threat and ordered his arrest. He called on all loyal citizens to take up arms to defend the city. Bolsheviks were released from prison or came out of hiding to collect the weapons issued by the Provisional Government to all who were willing to fight. However, the Bolsheviks had control over parts of the railways and workers refused to transport Kornilov’s troops to Petrograd and the weapons were not used. The Bolsheviks had been able to present themselves as defenders of Petrograd and the Revolution, thus diverting attention away from the failure of the July Days. In addition, Kerensky had armed the Bolsheviks and as a result provided them with the means by which they could gain power. The episode had similarly damaged the Provisional Government by revealing its political weakness and showing how vulnerable it was to military threat. Kerensky himself admitted that the Kornilov Affair had been ‘the prelude to the October Revolution’. By no means was the Kornilov Affair the main reason for Bolshevik success however; it provided the means by which the Bolsheviks could achieve a revolution. If the Provisional Government had been able to consolidate its party and been able to stave off Kornilov on its own then the arming of the Soviet would never have been necessary.
Key to Bolshevik success was the strength and unity of their party and similarly, the leadership of Trotsky. Whilst it was Lenin who was undoubtedly the great influence behind the October Rising, it was Trotsky who actually organised it. The key to Trotsky’s success in this was his chairmanship of the Petrograd Soviet, to which he was elected in September. In October, Trotsky set up the Military Revolutionary Committee to organise the defence of Petrograd; of which he was one of the three appointed to run it. This meant he had the only effective military force in Petrograd. Moreover, it was a legitimate force since theoretically it acted on the authority of the Soviet. When Lenin gave the order for the uprising to begin, it was Trotsky who directed the Red Guards in their seizure of key strategic points such as bridges and telegraph offices. Bolshevik membership grew from 25,000 in February to 75,000 in April; this proves that the influence and support for the party was growing stronger. Although, Trotsky’s role was important to Bolshevik success, it can be deemed a contributing factor. If it were not for the inability of provisional Government to provide its own, reliable military the MRC would have been largely ineffective. Similarly, the weaknesses of the Soviet in allowing Trotsky and the Bolsheviks to dominate can all be considered the underlying factors.
Undoubtedly Lenin’s leadership was detriment to Bolshevik success, his ability to inspire and unite the Bolsheviks created a new breed of politician: utterly self-confident, scornful of all other parties and ideas and totally loyal to their leader, without him the party may never have been able to fully capitalise on the mistakes made by the Provisional Government, under Kamenev’s leadership they may have merged with Mensheviks and been consigned to the ‘garbage heap of history’. The effect of the Kornilov Revolt and the role of Trotsky are contributing factors to the October Revolution. However, the underlying reason for the success of the Bolsheviks is the failures of the Provisional Government. Their inability to address Russia’s problems gave Lenin and the Bolsheviks the opportunity to gain the support of not only the people of Petrograd, but of Russia. Lenin’s role was a trigger factor, capitalising on the government’s mistakes and seizing the opportunity provided.