The Organization and Tactics learned and applied during Post Russo-Jap War of 1904

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By Henri Robben

NOTE: This is essay is written in letter form, and I am writing it as if I were a Command & Staff Officer assigned to the German Kaiser in early 1900s, and was to report on the emerging power of the Czar's (Russian) Imperial Army following the Russo-Japanese War of 1904.

Russian Imperial Army:

The Organization and Tactics learned and applied during

Post Russo-Jap War of 1904

Letter Begins:

Your Excellence,

As we stand at the brink of war with one of our oldest adversaries, it is with the utmost urgency that I insure you have the latest military goings-on from Moscow. Without a doubt, the Russian military has been busy since the Russo-Japanese War and has geared its entire method strategy and method off the threat of our very own Triple Alliance. For the most part, these new reforms are bringing some much needed changes to an already powerful enemy, and although there are still shortcomings, I feel it necessary to brief you on five of the most pressing improvements of their forces.

A complete restructuring of their Corps organization stands at the forefront of the reforms, and is two-fold--it addresses the realignment of the corps into Military Districts and the actual make-up of the Russian Army Corps. Although it has maintained a "four-sided" structure that will impair the overall effectiveness of command and control, it has also simplified the overall control aspect. In regards to this new composition of forces, Sukhomlinov has borrowed from the Young Turks Palitsyn-Alekseev, whom you will recall based their strategy and tactics off both a Clausewitz approach and our very own doctrine. For starters, Sukhomlinov has redistributed the Russian corps so that no one district contained the majority of the corps--and this territorial stationing of troops closer to home, coupled with the reorganization of the corps has improved both the training, moral, and the cost-effectiveness of said corps. Essentially, the new Russian corps, the backbone of its military fighting force, now consists of the following: in support; Sapper Battalion, complete with telegraph and telephone section (showing the Russians are finally integrating more technology into their army), and aviation assets; Fire Support includes Howitzer Division with twelve 122 MM guns and Cossack Recon assets; and the main force, is two infantry divisions--rounded out with a complete combined arms mentality of recon assets, internal artillery assets, sappers, and infantry regiments backed with four two-gun machine gun sections.

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Another new reform to be weary of reverts back to the restructuring that was addressed before: "secret cadres." These cadres are in fact officers and men that train I peacetime with regular field formations, but during wartime, would actually be cross-mobilized to form completely new cadres of reserve units. These secret cadres form the framework of an additional 560 battalions in the Russian Army (35 divisions), and as of now, actually make up one-third of their field armies.

Additionally, the new reforms that is quite alarming is the transition of the Russian mindset from a simple defense-in-depth to ...

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