"...if the American people are, for the fourth time in this century, to travel the long and tortuous road of war--particularly a war which we now realize would threaten the survival of civilization--then I believe we have a right...to inquire in detail into the nature of the struggle which we may become engaged, and the alternative to such struggle."
President John F. Kennedy,1954ν
The United States began involving itself directly in the political affairs of South Vietnam, at first supporting and then contributing to the overthrow of the North regime. At first, the Americans mostly backed Washington's Vietnam policy. Government reports depicted the Viet Cong as a Communist guerrilla movement which employed terror and coercion to force the hapless peasantry of South Vietnam into submission. There was a dangerous situation developing and it was known to the US as the "domino theory" which has to do with the US policy of containment. If South Vietnam were allowed to fall to communism, so eventually would the rest of Southeast Asia or the world. The United States foreign policymakers felt threatened by this growing government and felt it was their top priority. Americans thought it was honorable to contain such a situation from happening. Other important factors that played a role in the decision to aid South Vietnam were the end of colonialism and the rise of the United States as a World power. European countries that were weakened by the war were giving in to the demands of African and Asian colonies. Also, as the victors of World War II, the idea that the United States could lose against such a small country was unthinkable.
As the war in Vietnam continued unsuccessfully for the most part and the US President Kennedy was assassinated, the conflict was escalating as President Lydon B Johnson took over the situation. He withdrew the American dependents out of South Vietnam, a sure sign that the US government expected the action in Vietnam to escalate. Johnson did not see, however, the possibility of the escalation taking place at sea. The US Navy was engaged in Operation DeSoto, an intelligence project that was to gather information on the technology of North Vietnam's radar and electronic ability. On August 2, 1964 when the US Maddox was en route to a DeSoto mission, was in international waters off two North Vietnamese islands. Three Viet Cong torpedoes attacked the Maddox. Johnson wanted to believe that it was a mistake on the part of North Vietnam, so he continued his policy of nonreprisal. It was believed that another attack took place the next day. President Johnson called off DeSoto and retaliated with an attack on Vinh, the North Vietnamese PT boat base. These incidents came to be known as the Gulf of Tonkin incidents and they raised the level of action closer to actual war. The result was the approval of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution by the Congress on August 10 which stated that the president had powers to use whatever force he deemed necessary to support South Vietnam and other allies in Southeast Asia and to decide when an area had attained "peace and security". With only two nays, the resolution sailed through Congress. Soon after, the guerilla attack on US troops was thought to be in response to the Tonkin Resolution.
The year 1966 opened with little cause for the Americans to be hopeful. Johnson was committed to continuing aid, and on January 19 he requested Congress to approve an additional $12.8 billion to finance the war in Vietnam. Known as Operation Masher (though later changed because of its ugly slang meaning), Johnson had proposed a search and destroy mission. The mission along with similar ones did not do any more damage than the American soldiers could without the missions. Johnson called in a meeting in early February with no major agenda but to prevent desperate South Vietnamese citizens from joining the Viet Cong, whom were losing troops and need the South's cooperation to succeed. As the war escalated, more and more Americans embarked on a new, dangerous experience in a land of jungles, no front lines, dysentery, and frustration.
North Vietnam may have been the only modern nation to have started such a conflict without possessing a single weapon of its own manufacture. Using only the arms provided by the Russians and Chinese, they had the upper-hand advantage. What North Vietnam did have was the one constant without which the most sophisticated weaponry is useless--men willing and able to fight and die.
The Vietcong were guerillas, and it has been said that no one has ever devised an adequate defense against guerilla warfare (the concept of hit and run attacks). They wore no uniforms (dressed as a local peasant), and blended into the landscape when their mission was completed. A typical Vietcong soldier would have on a flimsy helmet, a small sack to hold a cup of rice and a few magazines of ammunition, and a rifle. The Vietcong were skilled in camouflage and improvisation. They used tunnels to underground installations, booby traps of all kinds, sometimes even using material from American garbage heaps to create the traps. Knowing the terrain of Vietnam, Vietcong soldiers did not need the advanced weaponry to win the war. Even with the help of tanks, they would not have done any better, because the land was not suitable for them. Much of the American technology could not be used in the hills and mountains of Vietnam. Guerilla warfare made it extremely difficult to win, especially with the Vietcong's homeland advantage.
The climactic year of the war was 1968, the year of the Tet Offensive. The Army Republic of North Vietnam planned to attack on the day of Tet, a holiday so meaningful to the Vietnamese that very few believed even the communists would violate it. The Vietcong believed that such an attack would make South Vietnam overturn their Saigon government and against Americans, which is the exact opposite of what happened instead. A premature attack on six towns, although surprising, was a failure.
As the war was winding down, Johnson's unsuccessful term was coming to an end. Nixon was a favorable candidate who eventually won the election of 1968, was known for being a tough anticommunist. South Vietnam hoped that a Nixon victory would mean a stiffening of US policy in Vietnam. Nixon promised a de-escalation and had done so, bringing home thousands by the end of the year. Still, there needed to be a complete end to the war, and since Americans had no chance winning, they would have to settle for honorably stepping out of the war.
Different than all the other presidential policies, Nixon's policy was to strengthen the South Vietnamese army so that those troops can gradually replace Americas. Nixon explained that such a policy would eventually allow the US to pull its troops out of Vietnam without having to concede to the Communists. Here he explains his policy compared to previous presidents in a speech delivered through television.
"...In response to the requestor the government of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover. In 1962, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to Vietnam as combat advisors. In 1965, President Johnson sent American combat forces to South Vietnam... For these reasons, I rejected the recommendation that I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all our forces. I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and the battlefront..."
--President Richard M. Nixon, 1969
This policy of Vietnamization was another major failure. It was hopeless to train the South Vietnamese because it would have required a complete turnaround of the national orientation of the Southern citizens. Time was also lacking to carry out such a tedious goal.
The famous Ho Chi Minh Trail was a primary route for moving North Vietnamese supplies into South Vietnam. The trail's history as a line of communication (LOC) dates back to World War II, when Vietminh bands trekked the same jungle paths. This LOC was developed from the existing footpaths into a highly organized infiltration route for men and supplies. In 1971 operation Lam Son 719 was designed to cute the Ho Chi Minh Trail and knock out communist bass in southern Laos. There were many problems though with the mission. There was a Cooper Church Ammendment which forbade American ground troops to invade Laos or Cambodia, so the US Air Force would have to carry out the mission. Tactical surprise was lost when the Vietnamese troops found out about the US mission. The bases were not taken and the Ho Chi Minh Trail was back in business within a week.
It seemed as if morale had completely died out and nothing was possible anymore. Out of frustration and desperation, Americans were evacuated out of Vietnam and by 1973, all troops had left South Vietnam. On June 13 of that year, a new accord was signed by the United States, North and South Vietnam, and the National Liberation Front strengthened the treaty of January 27.
The war ended with North Vietnam sweeping through the South. But what caused US policy to fail? It is still argued today why out of all the policies within presidential administrations, not one was successful enough to defeat Vietnam. Was is pride, the failure of the US to declare war in the beginning, poor strategy, or underestimating the enemy that caused the failure? Arguments can be given for all sides.
The Cold war came to Vietnam at the end of January 1950. The coming of the Cold War to Vietnam would had a powerful influence on Vietnamese-American relations and the making of post colonial Vietnam; shaping the division of Vietnam into north and south; the increasing centrality of Vietnam for US policy makers in the 60s and 70s, and other influences.
Otto Von Bismarck once said "Woe to the statesman whose reasons for entering a war do not appear as plausible at its end as at its beginning". Although this may be true, the war showed the US the limits of military power. After the war, many claimed the US developed the "Vietnam syndrome", as they were afraid to intervene any other foreign conflicts. Over the years, people have tried to understand the "truth" of the Vietnam War and we have definitely come back strong, recovering from the most devastating experience in the twentieth century.
Bibliography
Bender, David & Dudley William. The Vietnam War Opposing Viewpoints: 2nd Edition. San Diego, Ca: Greenhaven Press, 1990
Bradley, Mark Phillip. Imagining Vietnam and America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam. London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000
Goldstein, Donald & Dillon Katherine. The Vietnam War: The Story and Photographs. London: Brassey's, 1997
McNamara, Robert S. In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. New York: Times Books, 1995
Nixon, Richard M. No More Vietnams. New York: Arbor House, 1985
Vo Nguyen Giap. People's War, People's Army: The Viet Cong Insurrection Manual for Undeveloped Countries. New York Fredrich Praefer, 1962
