To what extent was Britain's navy responsible for the changing fortunes of foreign and imperial policy 1776-1815

The constant shifting of alliances and conflict of interest between the allies is partly responsible for the changing fortunes of Britain’s foreign and imperial policy. At the beginning of the wars Austria and Russia were more interested in Poland than in the war in the West so that Britain found it very hard to secure any real help from them and was York was forced to flee the United Provinces. The Allies because of their defeats on land against Napoleon kept signing peace treaties with him which left Britain more than once on her own. In 1795, Prussia signed an alliance with France, and even in 1799 when the Allies showed signs of having the upper hand Prussia refused to join the allies and stayed neutral. Later on in the war Austria was also causing problems because they refused to pay back an old loan. The result was chaos and an ineffective use of Britain’s troops as Christie suggests « substantial bodies of troops spent weeks and months moving around Europe... seeking to attempt blows first at one place and then another, arriving only after the possibility of success was extinguished ». The weakness of her allies was shown was again when as a result of the peace of Luneville in 1800 which marked the defeat of Austria; Russia, Prussia, and Denmark signed peace treaties with Napoleon which isolated Britain.

The aggressiveness and genius of Napoleon considerably influenced the war and therefor Britain’s foreign and imperial policy. The shifting of alliances which made the war go on for a lot longer and unbalanced Britain was a result of Napoleon’s victories against Prussia, Russia and Austria at battles such as Marengo or Austerlitz where although greatly outnumbered Napoleon was able to outmanoeuvre his opponents. His aggressive approach at peace treaties such as Amiens in1802 where he demanded complete British capitulation was also an important factor. As was his refusal to make any deals, so that in 1805 if he wished he could have kept all his acquisitions if he accepted to abandon any further plans of conquest.

For obvious reasons the effectiveness of the army was to play an important part in the changing fortunes of foreign and imperial policy. At the start of the war as Christie suggests « the army operated in ineffective driplets », it was very badly organised at home and they only had an army of 50000 of which less than 7000 were native English available to fight in Europe.

A very important factor is the reforms passed by York’s administration which made it possible 5 to 10 years later for Britain to launch an offensive against Napoleon through Portugal. These reforms improved the clothing, pay and rations however home defence was still assured by untrained regiments so that they counted on the navy to prevent an invasion. The British army was so disappointing in the first stages of the war that the during the peace talks of Amiens, Britain was ready to recognise French control of Holland and of parts of the West Indies (which Britain had conquered in the previous 5 years).

However by the second half of the war York’s and other reforms (1801 staff college, 1802 royal military college) meant that the army was starting to look good: there was a regular army of 130 000 and because of the Army of reserves Act, Britain was now effectively protected, and the future was bright with a an Act that was to levy en masse 380 000 men in Britain. The result of these reforms were first felt in 1812 and 1813 with Wellington’s victories at Badajos and Vitoria so that Christie suggests because of these battles « the groundwork was laid for a grand European alliance ...and the last phase of the Napoleonic war ».

The dominance of the seas secured by Britain’s navy during this period meant that Britain was able to colonise the world with a free hand and effectively became the first superpower and remained the most powerful nation on earth for a century.