To what extent was Wilhelmine Germany an entrenched authoritarian state?
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smasha123 (student)
To what extent was Wilhelmine Germany an entrenched authoritarian state? An ‘entrenched authoritarian state’ would suggest a Germany whose authoritarianism took precedence at the expense of its subject’s personal freedoms, but one which was also immovably deep-set and one which with all intents and purposes, could never be changed. Elements of authoritarianism are evident in terms of how German society was imbued with values of strict discipline and order and blind obedience. There are many ways in which it could be argued for and against that Wilhelmine Germany was an entrenched authoritarian state, namely the dynamics of the power of the Kaiser over the Reichstag and his chancellors, the Kaiser’s own personality and beliefs, and the challenges to the Kaiser’s rule and the rise of alternative parties. Whilst it cannot be denied that the Kaiser held absolute power and final credence over Germany, there was always obstacles which stopped him from exercising the personal rule he had always desired. This essay will conclude that Germany was ‘entrenched’ under the rule of the elites ‘behind its façade of a high-handed leadership’ from the Kaiser, and had many elements which could be considered ‘authoritarian’. There are many aspects of Wilhelmine Germany which could be used to argue that it was in fact an ‘entrenched authoritarian state’. The constitutional balance of powers can be used to substantiate this view. Rohl’s Kaiserreich theory appears to give the Kaiser nearly complete authority over German politics. The Kaiser’s constitutional powers show that he certainly had the legal authority to be an authoritarian leader – he could appoint and dismiss the chancellor, dissolve the Reichstag with the consent of the Bundesrat, direct foreign policy, and command all armed forces. In turn, the Reichstag was simply just a rubber stamp given to an institution that was manipulated by the Kaiser. It was superficially progressive in that whilst it was elected by all males over the age of 25 by secret ballot and the chancellor and state secretaries could not be members; the chancellor and imperial government were not accountable to it – any proposals discussed within the Reichstag could effectively be ignored, and the Kaiser could in turn make any changes he wanted. The Bundesrat could theoretically make constitutional changes and reject military/constitutional issues with 14 votes. However, this is evidence of the subtlety of the Kaiser’s authoritarian control. Although the Bundesrat could in theory make constitutional changes, and even during the Daily Telegraph affair when calls from the Reichstag for constitutional limitations to be placed upon the Kaiser were made, the Reichstag was ignored both times and Bulow was conveniently rid of on the rejection of his next budget. With regards to constitutional change (an important issue when discussing the entrenched nature of a governmental system), the Kaiser was very much in control. The Daily Telegraph affair supports Rohl’s Kaiserreich theory as in the interview the Kaiser gave the impression he wanted to form an alliance with Great Britain and that he directed foreign policy – this stirred the Reichstag as he didn’t consult them before involving himself in foreign policies. Rohl’s theory suggests that in an age of rapid industrialisation, urbanisation, mass politics and democratisation within Germany, aspects of pre-revolutionary, monarchical, aristocratic, and militaristic elements still existed. Simple evidence for this can be found in the line of Chancellors – all of them were Vons and
Prussian Protestant Junkers, which represents the latter description of Germany. In duality, the constitutional powers of the Kaiser came to be inundated with the less constrained powers of the King of Prussia (who exercised absolute, extra-constitutional control over the army, and had unrestricted right to appoint, promote, and dismiss all officers and officials). The Kaiser was the pivot around which decision making turned – he was determined to govern in person and to order his ministers to execute his will, with his extensive powers allowing him to sideline the Reichstag. Wilhelm II surrounded himself with sycophants whose careers were dependent ...
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Prussian Protestant Junkers, which represents the latter description of Germany. In duality, the constitutional powers of the Kaiser came to be inundated with the less constrained powers of the King of Prussia (who exercised absolute, extra-constitutional control over the army, and had unrestricted right to appoint, promote, and dismiss all officers and officials). The Kaiser was the pivot around which decision making turned – he was determined to govern in person and to order his ministers to execute his will, with his extensive powers allowing him to sideline the Reichstag. Wilhelm II surrounded himself with sycophants whose careers were dependent on maintaining the Kaiser’s favour, and so therefore they never opposed the Kaiser’s will meaning there was no counterweight to the erratic and sudden initiatives of the sovereign. Bismarck had faced many challenges from the socialists and liberals whilst trying to maintain Germany’s political establishments. He dealt with this opposition by using divide and rule – he split the liberals focused on nationalism from the liberals who aimed for constitutional reforms, which weakened the movement from the liberals. The dividing of these parties helped to maintain the authoritarian state, and to eliminate demands for social reform, Bismarck passed the anti-socialist laws of 1878-1890. The Kaiser often also took it upon himself to make decisions of a great magnitude, such as the push for Weltpolitik. The ends to which his cabinet was willing to go to in order to achieve his goal, such as using inheritance tax and a rise in VAT, suggests that be it due to patriotism or due to the real belief that the Kaiser meant the best for Germany, the people of Germany actually supported his decisions and were willing to put personal differences and opinions aside if it would bring about what the Kaiser desired. However, the Kaiser’s over reliance of Weltpolitik being the answer for Germany undoubtedly stopped his rule from becoming an entrenched autonomy, as there would always be substantial opposition who could veto his proposals. Nonetheless, it was the Kaiser’s advisors who were flattering him into believing that he was making the decisions. Wilhelm II was also erratic and suffered from a delusion of his own power, ‘There is only one ruler in the Reich and I am he’, and he was megalomaniacal, lazy and lacked the necessary understanding of critical issues to have any real involvement in decision making – for example, he had never even read the German constitution. This view of the Kaiser suggests that either the state was centred around a very questionable figure, or that the Kaiser didn’t have authoritarian control. It is the latter which lends itself to the interpretation that it was in fact the elites who ran Germany. Wehler’s Elitist theory offers the alternate argument that Germany was ‘authoritarian’ by suggesting that it was elites such as the army and judiciary who controlled German politics, rather than the Kaiser. The theory focuses on the policy of concentration/Sammlungspolitik which suggests there was an alliance of conservative interests in the Reich. It could be argued that the Kaiser was a ‘shadow emperor’, and that in reality it was the nature of Germany that was at fault since the constitution was flawed which limited the powers of the Chancellor and Reichstag. The Kaiser cannot be pinned down as the centre of power simply because there were five other groups wanting power – the Junkers, the officer class of the army, the civil service, members of the diplomatic service, and the judiciary. It was these groups who exerted a major influence over German affairs – they were able to exercise power as they were Prussians in positions of power within a Prussian based constitution. The traditional elite were becoming challenged by the new elite industrialist bankers and rising upper middle class. Wehler’s theory suggests there was a bringing together of these two dominant social elites, and so it was the elites pulling the strings rather than the Kaiser. The elites disregarded democracy and socialism and portrayed them as unpatriotic enemies of the Reich. The Kaiser was simply a figurehead for authoritarian rule of the landed aristocracy, Junkers, army, judiciary, and civil servants. An example of this is that something which seems like a positive democratic measure – that the Bundesrat could veto legislation with 14 votes – actually meant that the traditionalist conservative opinion was protected since Prussia, with its traditionalist Junker leaders, had 17 seats in the Bundesrat. The status of the army also substantiates Wehler’s view. Their status had been raised massively by the Unification Wars (Denmark in 1864, Austria in 1866, and France in 1870), and they were essentially Prussian. The oath of loyalty which officers took was of loyalty to the Kaiser rather than the state, and the military elite had great social status. The army were virtually independent of the Reichstag and were not constrained by annual approval since the military budget had a five year grant and so senior officials could do as they pleased. The army officers were conservative and unsympathetic to democracy, remaining a conservative right wing force which glorified its traditional values and resisted political modernisation. They were a strong political force, exemplified by the fact that the Schlieffen plan was largely left unquestioned, the army bill’s rejection caused the dissolution of the Reichstag, and that senior army officials practically ousted the Kaiser and Chancellor during World War I. As the Kaiser was the supreme commander of the armed forces, the Kaiser and the army can be seen as strongly interlinked, and in a way the immense power of the Kaiser was largely used for the protection of the army and similar institutions. The fact that senior members of the army were also the Kaiser’s advisors, combined with the knowledge of the Kaiser’s personality, strongly suggests that the army had a great amount of control over Reich politics, perhaps even to the extent of authoritarian control. Another justification for the view that Germany was ran by the elites can be seen when considering the treatment of Caprivi by Wilhelm II and his advisors. His commercial treaties which led to tariff reduction, although economically was very sensible, was actually seen as a great threat by Junkers such as those of the Agrarian League, who advised the Kaiser against socialism. They pushed the Kaiser to demand Caprivi to draw up new anti-socialist legislation, and when he declined to do so it led to his resignation. This shows that although the Kaiser could choose his chancellor, the elites played a large role in influencing his decisions. The fact that the power of the elites extended this far makes it reasonable to call it ‘authoritarian’ power. Another aspect of the elites which must be questioned when considering the extent their authoritarian rule, which is does appear they had, is the extent to which it was really ‘entrenched’. An example from a much later period can be taken to show that this was the case. Under the constitution of the Weimar Republic, the judiciary were given independence, which was utilised by to give Adolf Hitler a lenient jail sentence and can be seen to have had a substantial effect upon the future of Germany. This shows how the prevalence and power of the elites continued, as did their right wing influence. There is also an entirely different interpretation, in which Germany was not authoritarian, or at least was not entrenched. Eley and Blackbourn’s ‘History from Below’ theory argues that Wehler exaggerates the power and most importantly, the purpose of unity amongst the elites, and that popular political movements were actually heard by members of the government. The obvious example of this would be legislation passed by Caprivi such as the prohibition of Sunday work, making the employment of children under 13 forbidden, and the setting up of industrial courts to arbitrate disputes. This is best viewed in the light of the rise of the Socialist Democratic Party after the lapse of anti-socialist laws, which shows that the government did respond to the calls of the people in some ways. The fact that Caprivi was practically forced to resign over such laws, his hand having been forced by the political manoeuvrings of the elites who so influenced the Kaiser, illustrates how apparent positive changes were quickly repressed. Only with the growing strength of the SPD was there an influence outside of the traditional conservative power areas of Germany. By 1912, the SPD were the largest individual party in Germany, and support for them continued to grow – they had 35% of the Reichstag vote in 1912 compared to 10% in 1887. The reason for the growth and subsequently the potential damage this could do to the Kaiser’s authoritarian rule was influenced by many factors. Firstly, some people started to see through the Kaiser’s ineptitude and dependency on his chancellors to devise and implement policies. The Kaiser had never been known as one for strict political adherence or knowledge, which was accentuated with his damaging policies against the working class (his rise in VAT to fund Weltpolitik). This in turn led to dissatisfaction amongst the working class and trade unionists who turned to politics and managed to gain limited power in the Reichstag in order to block any damaging legislation being passed. By 1912, never again would the conservatives have the majority in the Reichstag. The Kaiser’s inability to bring together major parties such as the Conservatives, Social Democrat’s, and Catholic Centre Party only added to his problems and made it appear as though the Kaiser didn’t have full control of political policy, as he was ostensibly unable to move taxation forward in order to reach of his goal of Weltpolitik and personal rule. Therefore, mass political movements were consistently growing throughout the period of Wilhelmine Germany, and did in fact have an influence over politics, and as such, if Germany was to some extent authoritarian, this authoritarianism was by no means entrenched. One other interpretation is held by the structuralist historian AJP Taylor, who argued that Germany’s domestic instability led to a solution in war. He believed that there was a power vacuum in Wilhelmine Germany because there was so much infighting present, and as a result there was no leadership – this created a crisis of political instability. The 1st Morocco Crisis in 1905-6 exemplified the belief that nobody was in control and the accountability of the Kaiser and the army were questionable. The Kaiser was allowed to just randomly turn up in Morocco and was openly allowed to hold an international conference in order to try and widen the dispute and test the loyalties between nations. This was not conducive to effective foreign policy and beggars the question of who was really in control of foreign policy – arguably nobody was. On the eve of war Bethmann-Hollweg was caught between a rising socialist tide, entrenched conservatives, and a capricious unstable Kaiser. The socialists were dominating the Reichstag and there were fears of a socialist revolution. This majority of socialists could reject pro-conservative policies, which eroded the power of the Kaiser and the conservatives – so in essence nobody was actually leading, the socialists were simply manipulating the Reichstag by what little means they had but it wasn’t sufficient for the complete rule of those lower down the class hierarchy. The events of 1906-1909 had reduced the Bismarckian constitution to chaos: the Daily Telegraph affair had ended the authoritarian power of the Kaiser and the dissolution of the Bulow bloc had ended the independence of the Chancellor – there was nobody left to speak with a semblance of authority. Whilst the office and title of ‘Chancellor’ remained, it was not the chancellorship of Bismarck’s conception – the chancellor was reduced to merely a superior clerk. After the fall of Bulow, a consistent government of the Reich was impossible. There was an interregnum in Germany but nobody attempting to set a course or drive it along. The Prussian conservatives had been strong enough to prevent the advance of Weltpolitik, and the Middle class had failed politically but threw all of their energy into the march of economic power – all that remained of the Bismarckian structure was the army. However, army leaders were resolute against political interference in military matters and were without political sense or ability and so were aloof in worldly affairs. Pressure groups also exerted a disproportionate amount of political influence, for example the Navy League had 2 million votes and the Agrarian League 333,000 – this shows instability because of the inability of the political structures in place (the Reichstag) to be independent, and instead was at the mercy of pressure groups. To conclude, the Kaiser had immense authority over German politics but very little real power. His constitutional privileges were used for the protection of established imperial elites, which only appear sometimes to show him as a sole authoritarian leader on the account that he had the same interests as other elite members of society. Although some progressive legislation was enacted in this period, this can be seen as having been permitted because it did not harm the elites. Examples from later in Germany’s history show that the elites managed to maintain their critical influence over the direction of German politics, confirming that their authoritarian rule was ‘entrenched’ and ‘authoritarian’. A combination of internal and external influences on the Kaiser, as well as his own ineptitude to deal with social and political pressure and choice meant that only in his head would he have ever been able to have complete authoritarian, semi-absolutist rule over Germany. His personal problems and personality defects and the external influence of left wing, social democrats’ revolutionary beliefs (the Marxist faction) were all contributory to the Kaiser being entrenched de jure only - in de facto terms, he was never strong, intelligent or able enough to command completely authoritarian rule. Therefore, the balance of power rested with the forces of conservatism, although their right to govern did come under threat at times from the forces of change. Sasha Groves
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smasha123 (student)
