When looking at causation, the Thin Skull Rule should also be considered. This rule states that ‘you must take your victim as you find them’. For example, if you strike someone in the face, only intending to hurt them, but instead they die due to a physical condition or abnormality they have, you are still responsible for their death. An example case of this is Blaue (1975), where the defendant stabbed a Jehovah’s Witness, who refused to have a blood transfusion that would save her life, and thus was guilty of murder. One of the problems in causation is whether this rule should exist. Some have said that you shouldn’t be responsible for causing the death of someone if you did not know that they had a mental or physical abnormality/condition that would result in them dying when you only intended for them to or thought they would suffer serious injury, as with the knowledge of that mental or physical condition, it is possible that the act might not have been committed in the first place. However, a defendant can simply claim that they did not know about a mental or physical condition that the victim had, even if they did. A defendant could also get a more lenient sentence than is usual for killing someone simply because they did not know about a mental or physical condition, and thus the Thin Skull Rule is used to ensure that criminals are convicted for the correct crimes and so that people cannot simply claim they did not know about a the victim’s deficiency. However, there is a problem with the Thin Skull Rule as to what exactly is a mental or physical abnormality. For example, in Blaue, the victim refusing a blood transfusion on religious grounds was enough to make the defendant liable for her death through the Thin Skull Rule. However, should religious grounds be enough to make the defendant liable for the consequence and not just the act committed? Here, the case of Deer could be relevant, as the defendant was still guilty even though the victim’s acts could have saved their life. The courts interpret these cases so as to have the defendant liable, even though the victim should have a duty to look after themselves, and religious grounds should certainly not be a reasonable enough reason to justify making the defendant liable for death when it was through the victim’s actions that death occurred. In Deer, the defendant should only have been guilty for the initial injuries, as the victim should not have made the wounds worse and sought medical treatment to save their own life.
A chain of causation can be broken by an intervening act. An intervening act can be; an act of a third party, the victim’s own act or a natural but unpredictable event. An intervening act is defined as an act that sufficiently separates the defendant’s conduct from the consequence. However, there are some acts, such as medical treatment that are unlikely to break the chain of causation. This is to stop doctors or surgeons from not performing operations that could render them criminally liable if they make a mistake. This was proven in the cases of Smith (1959) and Cheshire (1991). In Smith, two soldiers were fighting and one was wounded. He was taken to a medical centre and given artificial respiration, but this only made the wound worse, and then the victim died. It was ruled that the defendant’s act was an ‘operating and substantial cause of death’ and thus was guilty of murder. The phrase ‘operating’ is used here as the wound was still there when the victim died. However, in Cheshire, the victim was shot and the wound had healed up before he died. The victim had died from complications due to the tracheotomy he had received, however, the defendant was still liable for his death, as it was a ‘significant’ cause of death. The victim would still have died if the incompetent medical treatment had not occurred.
Medical treatment can still be an intervening act if it was obvious that there was a total lack of competence on the doctor’s or surgeon’s behalf. This was shown in the case of Jordan, where the victim was stabbed and taken to hospital, then given an antibiotic. It was then discovered that the victim was allergic to the antibiotic, however, a different doctor still ordered the victim to be given a large dose of the same antibiotic. Clearly the doctor was negligent of the fact that he was allergic, and this act was considered to be independent enough of the defendant’s acts to be an intervening act. Also in this case, it was established that if medical treatment is ‘palpably wrong’, then there is an intervening act that breaks the chain of causation. Whereas in the previous two cases the victim would still have died if the incompetent medical treatment had not occurred, in this case the victim may well have survived, even if medical treatment was below standard.
In the case of Malcharek, the courts showed that common sense is key to deciding the outcome of cases. In this case, the victim was stabbed and left in life support, considered to be ‘brain dead’. The life support was then switched off, as she was not self-sufficient. The defendant was still guilty of murder, even though it was not his act that technically caused the victim’s death. Whilst the defendant’s act was not the factual cause, he was still guilty as it was his act that placed the victim in a brain dead state, which resulted in her life support being turned off and her death. This case shows how the courts look at the root cause of the events that caused the crime, and how the law can be flexible to enough to not allow criminals to escape liability due to a simple technicality.
To determine whether the victim’s own act breaks the chain of causation, the courts use the ‘Daftness Test’. This tests whether the victim’s conduct was reasonable or unreasonable. This is another example of how the courts factor in common sense when determining criminal liability. Two example cases of this are Roberts and Williams & Davis. In Roberts, the victim jumped from a car to escape the defendant’s sexual advances. This was ruled reasonable, as the defendant’s sexual advances posed enough of a risk to the victim to warrant her causing injury to herself to escape, and thus was guilty of the injuries caused. However, in Williams & Davis, the victim jumped out of a car and died to escape from having his wallet stolen. This was considered unreasonable conduct and thus the defendant was not guilty of his death, as there was an intervening act. Another case where the defendant(s) was guilty of the injuries of a victim is the case of Marjoram, where the victim jumped out of a window to escape a group of people threatening him verbally and kicking his door. The general rule for the Daftness Test it that the victim’s act must be proportionate to the threat in order for there not to be an intervening act. Again, the courts do not let small technicalities get in the way of applying justice, as victims who take drastic action in the face of a very small threat cannot simply prove their offender to be guilty simply because they threatened them. However, the courts should also take note of the threat that the defendant commissioned and punish accordingly. For example, whereas a defendant will not be liable for injuries caused by the victim jumping out of a window simply because the defendant shouted abuse at the victim, the courts should still treat the abuse as a separate crime, and in this case, the defendant would be convicted of common assault, as he placed the victim in a state of fear.
To conclude, the courts can interpret the law effectively in a majority of cases to ensure justice is upheld. This is shown in cases of Smith, Cheshire, Jordan and Pagett, where all who were liable were very much guilty in the eyes of morality and common sense. There are also sufficient tests in place, such as the ‘but for’ test and the ‘Daftness Test’, that look at the actions of both the defendant and the victim to judge where liability lies and if the victim acted unreasonably, or if a consequence would have occurred even if the defendant did not commit the act. However, there are also cases where defendants are made liable for crimes they shouldn’t be, shown in the cases of Blaue and Deer. It is quite obvious the courts are attempting to make defendants liable in the name of safety, as the courts could be criticised by people of certain beliefs if they let people ‘get away’ with certain crimes, even if the defendant’s incompetence resulted in the consequence. So though the courts are capable of interpreting the law in order to make the correct people liable, it could be said they are too aggressive in convicting, and do not consider intervening acts as considerably as they should.
by
jmpcolleygmailcom (student)
