Hitler was a good leader who commanded respect. He was a great public speaker who could move his audience. He was in the army during the First World War and shared the German people’s hatred of the Treaty of Versailles.
Germany tried to pay the reparations by printing more money but when that failed, America gave them loans to ease the economic problems. At the time of the loans, America was financially secure but in 1929 the Wall Street Crash sent America into depression causing them to recall their loans. Having to repay the money put Germany into greater financial difficulty and they had to try unpopular economic policies. The Nazis, now more organized and efficient, were ready for this opportunity to gain power and made promises of jobs and bread.
Von Papen was Chancellor and when he lost the support of Von Schleicher it became easy for Hitler to take over. Von Papen secretly agreed to work with Hitler and when Hindenburg wanted Von Papen back as Chancellor, he suggested Hitler with himself as vice-Chancellor. Hitler was appointed giving the Nazis control.
The weaknesses of the Republic and the strength of the Nazis led to Hitler to becoming Chancellor. He was a ruthless leader and the party became far more organized learning that it could only gain control through democratic means. The Nazis promised the people exactly what they wanted and tried to please everyone.
If the Allied Power, who had improved the Treaty of Versailles on a humiliated Germany, had taken a more professional view in 1919 the resentment felt by Germans would have been avoided. This hostility to the treaty was an important factor in Hitler’s rise to power. In addition, the Republic should not have used proportional representation but used ‘first past the post’ which makes it much harder for extreme parties to gain any control. Also, the rise of the Nazis might have been prevented if the ban on Hitler had been kept when he was let out of prison.
Noakes and Pridham have called the August-December period of 1932 ‘the crisis months’ in the ‘Nazis struggle for power’. However, there are also many other contributing factors prior to this which are very much concerned with Hitler’s final seizure of power in January 1933. History has proved that dramatic change comes only through both strong revolutionaries, and more importantly, weak or unpopular existing rulers. So how far was Hitler and his party responsible for their rise to power, and how much of the blame must be put on the leaders of the Weimar Republic? This essay aims to identify the key factors in Hitler’s rise to power, both in his own successes and in the government’s short-comings, and why they were important to it.
The election of May 1928 had resulted in unexpected defeat for the NSDAP – 100,000 fewer votes than in 1924 and only 12 seats. Now the strategy had to change. Hitler called for ‘a switch in priorities from the cities to the countryside’ (Bullock). In the autumn of 1928, the party assumed its first role in national politics with its campaign against the Young Plan in alliance with Hugenburg and the DNVP. The depression was beginning to add to the growing ‘crisis of the bourgeois parties’ and Hitler saw that this was his chance. Nazi appeals for unity and authority in the state proved successful in the unnecessary election unwisely called by Bruning, the new chancellor, in September 1930. The Nazis gained 18.6& of the popular vote, securing 107 seats and becoming the second largest party in the Reichstag.
Hitler’s party had made its breakthrough into national politics; now he had to find a way to convert popular support into a national Socialist government led by himself. As Bullock suggests, he could use his popular support to press for inclusion in the government and the threat of the SA violence if he was excluded. Hitler acted shreudly, leaving all his options open (a Reichstag majority, a coup, Authoritarian Rule by Article 48) while steadily pursuing his goal and using his remarkable ability to retain the confidence of his often restive supporters with the help of the growing ‘Hitler myth’, which served as a substitute for a detailed programme.
At this time, Hitler was supported by four significant factors. Firstly, there was the intensification of the depression, and secondly, the result of this was an increasing support for radical left and radical right parties from the electorate. Thirdly, there was the Reichswehr’s dislike of the Republic, caused primarily by Hindenburg’s pursuit of political stability in order to advance rearmament. Finally, the people had a massive disapproval for the prominence of presidential rather than parliamentary government. Whilst Hitler may have failed to win the Presidency in April 1932, his vote in the second ballot was as high as 13.4 million – it would seem that a large percentage of the population had realised that desperate times call for desperate measures, and with unemployment consistently rising, perhaps Hitler’s eventual role was, by this stage, an inevitability. Furthermore, the election in June made the NSDAP the largest party in the Reichstag with 13, 745,00 votes and 230 seats – in four ‘depressing’ years the party had gained 13.5 million votes.
Where had this new support for national Socialism come from? Most historians afree that it was largely from the middle class (the Mittelstand) which may be subdivided into the old Mittelstand (artisans, small retailers, peasant farmers) and the new (white-collar workers, teachers, civil servants(somewhat surprising seeing as this group incorporated the best part of Germany’s academic body)). Many of the former, who became the core of the Nazi support, had joined the movement before 1929; the latter ‘helped to boost the Nazi vote . . . to 13.5 million in 1932’ (Lee). Blue-collar workers remained remarkably loyal to the SDP and the KDP because of their membership of the trade unions; the upper classes were sometimes attracted by Hitler’s anti-communist stance, but the chief support from the wealthy came after Hitler was appointed Chancellor. ‘To some extent the appeal of Nazism transcended class barriers altogether’ (Lee): Protestants, women, the young were all attracted by 1932. But in spite of the vast increase in their vote, the Nazis still lacked a majority which could give them the automatic right to power.
During the ‘crisis months’ which followed, the refusal of Hindenburg and von Papen to offer anything more than the Vice-Chancellorship on 13 August was to put great strain on party loyalties. Somehow Hitler was able to preserve the policy of legality, in the face of its apparent failure, even after the resignation of Gregor Strasser which badly dented party morale. The fighting of yet another election in November, when the NSDAP vote dropped by two million and the KPD vote increased significantly, was a further blow. It is hardly surprising to read Goebbels reflection at Christmas of ‘this year has brought us everlasting bad luck.’
However, it would seem that the tide was turning. The new Chancellor, Schleicher, had failed to gain the mass support which he had promised Hindenburg, with his policy based on backing from the trade unions and the ‘moderate’ Nazis under Strasser. Von Papen was determined to bring him down and was now ready to see Hitler as Chancellor. They reached an agreement on 4 January, but it took almost another month of tortuous negotiations before Hindenburg’s suspicion of the ‘Bavarian corporal’ could be overcome, Hugenburg’s economic conditions satisfied and the Reichswehr’s support ensured by the appontment of the pro-Nazi von Blomberg as the Minister of Defence.
Such a remarkable reversal of fortune as brought Hitler to the Chancellorship on 30 January 1933 caused Goebbels to confide in his diary that ‘it all seems like a fairy story’. In conclusion though, it was in fact the result of ‘ambitious and misguided men [who] sought to make history’ and were confident, like von Papen, that Hitler would be ‘no danger at all’. Nor must Hitler’s own contribution be forgotten: the steadfast adherence to the policy of legality, the extraordinary control over the unruly party, the insistence on the Chancellorship, and the selling of the idea that - in the words of a nazi slogan – ‘National Socialism is the opposite of what exists today.’
When the Weimar constitution was enacted, there were several flaws. These flaws eventually led to the rise of Hitler, and the downfall of Germany. After World War II, the constitutions of West Germany, and France were more successful. They had very strong points and allowed for stable governments The Weimar constitution was written under the guidance of Max Weber. He was a socialist, and tried to give the constitution all of the best aspects of the American constitution(*1). it wasn’t solely the miswriting of the constitution that caused Hitler to come to power. It had a lot to do with a division of East and West Germany. The Easterners had created war-anxiety (*10), but the Westerners accepted peace (*11). The East, filled with a caste system, hated the West for being so liberal. Uniting these two opposites under such tension was bound to cause disaster. The ruling class in the East hated the West for being liberal and lacking spirituality (*12). Civilization pulled Germany towards the West, but culture to the East. As Germany pulled to he West, it failed, but it prospered as it went to the East (*13). The Easterners had always ruled Germany, and they were responsible for the war anxiety. But they blamed the Westerners for accepting peace. So, in the eyes of the Easterners, the Westerners became responsible for all the post WW I misfortunes (*15). Also, the people never believed that Hitler would gain such popularity. Both the Left and the Right completely underestimated Hitler (*16). They believed that his only strength was as a great orator. They wanted to exploit this as much possible in order to increase their own party’s strength (*17). But Hitler had other plans. As stated in Mein Kampf, he believed that he would become a popular politician (*18). In the fourth chapter, he stated that it was time to take over the East (*19). But Hitler’s popularity grew. As the left began to surge, the Nazi Party began getting more votes. At first, his support from the student academic population grew, but it was followed by an overall increase (*20). By 1929, it was obvious that the party system was failing (*21). He used his oratorical gifts to get Bruning out of power. He used sly and cunning techniques to take over the Prussian government. Hitler’s approval rating doubled and he received 37.2% of the vote (*23). Eventually he became a chancellor, and the two other Nazis in parliament also held important positions. They now had the ability to use Article 48 (*24). On that date, Germany couldn’t turn back. Within a week, Hitler issued a decree that allowed the government to ban public meetings and newspapers. This was to break up any non-Nazi organization (*25). He then enacted the “Emergency Decree,” which gave the Nazis permission to ban freedom. This gave Hitler everything he needed to make a totalitarian state (*26). But these lasted only until 1945. Hitler then brought in the Enabling Act, which gave the administration the right to legislate and change laws. It also transferred the power from the president to the chancellor (*27). Now we see how Hitler was able to come into power using the Weimar Constitution. Article 48 was a big flaw, which guided him right into power.