The Franco-Prussian war in particular allowed Bismarck to achieve his foreign policy aim of isolating France. Due to France having no allies and a badly organised army, the war did not go so well for them and after only six months the war ended following the fall of Paris. Consequently they lost Alsace-Lorraine, 5000 million francs, and their reputation as a major military power in Europe. This led to the isolation of France within European affairs due to their weakness and instability. The German prime minister attempted to isolate France once again during the War in Sight Crisis in 1875 by publishing an article called ‘Is war in sight?’ which promoted public anxiety with regards to France’s rapid recovery from the Franco-Prussian war and their rearmament. Although this encouraged dislike and suspicion towards France because of their continuous threat of war; Bismarck’s plan to totally isolate this country was not achieved because following the German article being published, France secured promises of help from Britain and Russia who were two of the most influential Great Powers against Germany.
However one aim which Bismarck did not achieve at all was his policy of maintaining European peace which would have secured the Empire and its commercial prosperity. At the congress of Berlin in 1878, many of the individual Balkan states such as Bulgaria, Tunisia and Bosnia were divided up and given to other European countries who had more stability. At the time, this presented Germany as the negotiator for European affairs because they temporarily solved the Balkan problem and convinced the Ottoman Empire that they needed to reform, which prevented it from collapsing. However these were all short-term solutions and eventually the Ottoman Empire collapsed, and European peace declined. Bismarck also failed to achieve his foreign policy of maintaining European peace during the Franco-Prussian war in 1870-71. By putting the Prussian King forward for the Spanish throne, Bismarck deliberately provoked France who later declared war on Germany in July 1870. Although European peace was limited during and after this event, Bismarck achieved one of his most important aims of unifying Germany which led them to become a major power in Europe.
Additionally, Bismarck also wanted to avoid having to choose between Austria-Hungary and Russia who had continuous disputes over the Balkan issue. The Dreikaiserbund allowed him to do this because by creating an alliance which consisted of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia, Bismarck was able to fight against socialism at the same time as preventing a war breaking out between Austria-Hungary and Russia; and therefore the Balkan threat was greatly reduced. However, following the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Austria-Hungary and Russia felt that they were not being supported enough because during the distribution of the Balkan states, Russia was only given one part of Bulgaria and other minor territories; Britain also gained the right to send warships into the Black Sea which was Russia’s vital trade route and Austria only gained Bosnia - this stopped Russia from becoming overly powerful. Consequently both Austria-Hungary were dissatisfied and felt bitter towards Germany, claiming that Bismarck did not take their side adequately. This was a turning point for the German Prime Minister because both of his allies were feeling hostile towards him but because he was so determined to ensure that the Great Powers would turn to Germany for support and not form anti-German alliances, Bismarck chose to form an alliance solely with Russia. Hence, Bismarck failed to achieve his foreign policy aim of not choosing between Austria-Hungary and Russia.
Bismarck’s final foreign policy aim was to ensure that in any grouping of the five main Great Powers, Germany was in a majority of three to two. He certainly achieved this in the Dreikaiserbund where he had an alliance with both Austria-Hungary and Russia, however within this, there was only an agreement between them to fight against socialism; there was no promise of a defensive alliance. Therefore there was not a secure alliance between them and as Germany showed following the congress of Berlin when they developed an alliance just with Russia, it could easily fall apart if there was hostility between the countries. Also, after the War in Sight Crisis, Britain and Russia said that they would help France by supporting them against Germany; although this wasn’t officially an alliance, Germany found themselves in a three to two minority which went against Bismarck’s aims for Germany and was a threat to their success as a Great Power.
Overall, it could be argued that Bismarck only fully achieved one of his foreign policy aims between 1870 and 1878 of avoiding a war on two fronts. As for isolating France, not choosing between Austria-Hungary and Russia and ensuring that Germany remained in a three to two majority alliance, although Bismarck began to achieve this particularly in the Dreikaiserbund and the Franco-Prussian war, they were only short-term solutions and consequently the aims were contradicted very soon after being achieved by either Germany itself or any of the other European Great Powers. And Bismarck’s attempt to maintain European peace was not achieved at all due to the continuous disputes over the Balkans and during the Franco-Prussian war; therefore it can be concluded that Bismarck’s foreign policy aims were only achieved temporarily.
