Further evidence to indicate that soldiers (lions) weren’t led by generals (donkeys) is the fact that the soldiers never panicked during the battle despite the increasing number of casualties day by day. This piece of evidence, selected from a video clip related to the Battle of the Somme, gives people the feeling that generals were very supportive during the war and kept the soldiers’ emotions positive. This would have been very important when troops see men being killed before their eyes.
The British Generals also came up with some excellent ideas and battle plans which suggest that they definitely wanted to give their soldiers the best chance of being successful in the battle. For example the ‘Bight and Hold’ technique from General Rawlinson shows that some generals had the initiative to think of battle plans to improve and reduce casualty numbers in the British divisions. In addition, General Edmund Allenby noticed problems with the battle plan - he thought that the British troops would be open to German artillery fire. He also spotted a one mile gap between two divisions.
Despite receiving such advice the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) commander, General Douglas Haig, chose to ignore it which was extremely unwise. As a consequence, casualties increased significantly.
General Haig - What went wrong?
General Haig (shown above in the picture) was originally pressured to bring forward the attack date from August in order to relieve the heavy casualties in Verdun, Southern France. The Germans had been bombarding this area since early in the year so it was thought that by committing significant British forces on the Battle of the Somme; the allies’ forces would divert troops from Verdun. Therefore there would be a reduced rate of casualties in other affected areas further south.
General Haig’s plan at the beginning of the Battle of the Somme was to use artillery fire (like bomb shells) and completely destroy the German trenches. Once the trenches were destroyed, the British soldiers would walk over no man’s land and meet little resistance. However, the shells that were fired at the enemy trenches were of very poor condition therefore the bombardment failed to destroy either the barbed wire or the concrete bunkers protecting the allies’ soldiers.
Consequently, the Germans were able to exploit their great tactical positions on higher ground when the British and French troops attacked at 7:30 am on Saturday 1st July 1916. In a way, the British artillery fire acted as an alarm bell for the German soldiers because they were extremely experienced and fully trained. The knowledgeable allies had made concrete dugouts, which were several metres deep and supplied them with the space for beds and a comfortable, safe living environment for those inside.
General Haig was blamed by several people for the thousands of casualties suffered by the BEF because he seemed to think that barbed wire would be destroyed by explosives and that it was a good idea to send soldiers walking over no man’s land with unloaded rifles. Altogether on the first day as a result of poor tactical decisions made mainly by General Haig, the BEF suffered 67,000 casualties, making it the worst day in the history of the British Army.
However, Haig was not discouraged by these heavy losses on the first day and ordered General Rawlinson to continue making attacks on the German front-line. As the days developed, General Haig believed that the Germans were close to the point of exhaustion and continued to order further attacks, expecting each one to achieve the necessary breakthrough in the allies’ front-line. Although small victories were achieved, these land gains couldn’t be successfully followed up. Historians claim that the BEF commander should have learned from the astonishing statistics on the first day of the battle and should have adjusted his tactics but he failed to do so.
Conclusion
There is an even number of points providing evidence from both sides of the argument. The evidence suggesting that the generals were good and took an active role in the Battle of the Somme isn’t particularly strong. As a result of my research, I feel that the generals didn’t really consider the troops’ safety when forming their battle plans. A different point of view is that on the first day of the battle, the Germans caught the British troops by surprise, suggesting why there were some many casualties on that day.
On the other hand, I feel that the cost in human terms (with nearly 150,000 allied men being killed) was too high for relatively little gain in land (seven miles). As mentioned earlier in the essay, it is still remembered today purely due to the number of casualties suffered by the British and French troops, especially on the first day of the battle. In my opinion it is clearly evident that a group of people were to blame for the disaster. From my research, I have found that the generals in charge of the British army were at fault for the huge numbers of casualties during the Battle of the Somme, particularly BEF commander General Douglas Haig, who ignored advice from everybody; soldiers and other generals which could have increased their territorial gains and reduced the casualties.
In conclusion, my opinion is that the stronger evidence persuades me to agree with the original statement made by Max Hoffman describing the British Infantry as “Lions led by Donkeys”.
