In understanding or allowing ourselves a better perspective and grasp on things we need to consider the question of ‘cause and effect’ Let us consider, through the perspective of Hume, what is usually meant by saying, “A causes B?” Hume suggests that the most important perspective that needs to be considered is necessary connection.
Necessary connection suggests that the common concept of causality is that the cause and the effect are necessarily connected- that is that if the cause occurs, the effect must occur as well; the effect cannot but occur. (David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section 7)
Hume suggests that this perception of Necessary connection is wrong and states the following:
“In considering the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connection; any quality which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find, that the one does actually, in fact follow the other. Consequently, there is not, in any single, particular instance of cause and effect, anything which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connection.” (David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section 7)
Hume further strengthens his claim by exerting that there are no objects which by the mere survey, without consulting experience, we can determine to be the cause of any other, and no objects, which we can certainly determine in the same manner not to be the causes. (David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section 7)
In this suggestion by Hume surely there is the possibility, or the birth of a possibility of indeterminism? If cause A cannot guarantee that it will cause B to occur but rather that it is likely, but not absolutely concrete that B will follow, surely then this provides the opportunity in which indeterminism has the possibility of flourishing? Consider the following example created by a contemporary Humean:
“It once happened that while the screen of a motion picture theater showed the blasting of lumber, a slight earthquake shook the theater. The spectators had a momentary feeling that the explosion on the screen caused the shaking of the theater” (Hans Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy, 157-158)
Since repetition is the only factor that distinguishes the casual law from a mere coincidence, then casual relation is embedded in constant repetition. In clarifying this, we need to understand that all that is meant by causal relation is that if the theater would always shake when an explosion were screened, then it would have a causal relationship. All that is needed for this relationship is a mere constant repetition between two factors.
In understanding this we can relate it to indeterminism. If, as we have already proven, one event doesn’t cause another and it is dependent on constant repetition, then the repetition found in event A leading to or resulting in event B, without causing it; then we have the capability to suggest that within that constant repetition we can justly say it is possible, though improbable for a random event to occur? All that is being said is that it is casually possible, through constant repetition that the occurrence of a random event, other than the event that would normally occur, could occur. In light of our new discovery, constant repetition, it suggests that if there were a scenario, yet undiscovered to humankind, in which one event, through constant repetition, followed from another, without causing it; then it could be possible that occasionally a third random event could occur, as long as it is was constantly repeated.
This allegation strongly refutes determinism by suggesting that within a deterministic environment there is the possibility of a random, uncaused event to occur. To strengthen this claim it is important for us to consider the causal principle and a further possibility in accordance to it as to whether all events have a cause. The suggestion within the causal principle states that everything that happens is due to prior causes in the world. (Freedom And Necessity, 146) However there is a suggestion that because we only know a tiny fragment of what is occurring in the world, an even smaller understanding of the past and no understanding of the future whatsoever, then how can we decisively conclude that all events have a cause? Consider the following illustration:
“If a bag contains a million marbles and you’ve examined only six of them, all black, and you’re asked, “Are all of them black?” Freedom And Necessity, 146)
Surely the answer to this question would be no? Surely it is impossible, given the current understanding of the state of affairs to assume that all events have a cause? It is possible that we cannot assume that there are events that don’t have a cause, but it is a possibility that there might be. Furthermore finding a cause provides further evidence for the causal principle, but failing to find a cause does not seem to disconfirm it. Surely this is a warped empirical law that doesn’t have the capacity to be disproved? It might be claimed that if we don’t find a cause we just haven’t searched enough. My question is when do we establish that we have searched enough? When we find it? Surely then there is never the opportunity in which we can say that we have search extensively and yet haven’t found a cause? This then distinguishes that the casual principle is warped and unjust.
Lastly in relation to the casual principle, consider the following example:
“If there are two clocks, which as far as you can tell are identical in every detail, next to each other in the same room, with the same temperature and atmospheric conditions, but you discover after a time that one of them is running just a bit fast although the other still keeps perfect time.” (Freedom And Necessity, 148)
In this situation wouldn’t you conclude that there was (had to be?) a difference in one or more of the conditions, to account for the difference in keeping time? How would one respond to a suggestion that maybe there wasn’t a difference in the conditions? For an indeterminist to prove that the causes were the same, he would have to show that the prior state of the whole universe was exactly the same in the two cases (Freedom And Necessity, 149), only then would he have proved that different effects could result from identical causes. Only then would he have the capability in making such a claim. This is obviously a ridiculous and an extremely unjust demand, revealing the lunacy and severe misguided interpretation involved in determinism.
In concluding it is clear to say that hard determinism is refuted by indeterminism, through the extension of Hume’s causal theory, as well as the lunacy embedded within the causal principle.
Work Cited
David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section 7
Hans Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy, 157-158
Freedom And Necessity, 146-149.
