Capital punishment as a deterrent of capital crimes in America

GCSE Religious Studies (Philosophy & Ethics)

I. Introduction

The United States has long been an exceedingly strong and guiding force in the international community. As a dedicated moral leader, the U.S. has stated its utmost support for international human rights conventions. These documents are integral to the objectives of the United Nations and its member states. Yet, despite the fact that the United Nations has stated directly, through such documents as the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, that the abolition of the death penalty contributes to the “enhancement of human dignity and progressive development of human rights”, the United States remains among the retentionist states.

In a world where human rights standards are becoming more and more accepted, what is the justification for the use of the death penalty in America? Furthermore, upon analysis of the United States’ rationalizations, are they consistent with the United States’ stated position on human rights? These questions will be answered through a careful examination of the moralistic contributions to the debate, the effectiveness and practicality of the use of the death penalty, and the United States’ agreed upon international human rights standards. Consideration will also be given to the current public opinion on the subject. Through the examination of these factors it will be shown that the use of the death penalty in America is not justifiable, nor is it in concord with our stated human rights objectives.

The Morality Argument

Many supporters of the death penalty will claim that their personal religious or moral beliefs support the use of the death penalty. As Christianity was the most clearly impacting religion on the formation of the United States, and is the most identifiable religious influence in the political institutions of America today, a careful inspection will be given to the common views attributed to it. A more secular moral approach is also relevant in this debate, though.

Common Christian Views

Jacob Vellenga points out in his essay “Christianity and the Death Penalty”, that (1) life is sacred and (2) those who violate that sacredness must pay the supreme penalty (124). The Bible states clearly that, “Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; for God made man in his own image” (Gen 9:6 RSV). This is the first Biblical reference to the “eye-for-an-eye” justice, which underlies much of the Christian support for capital punishment. The Bible later gives a more detailed indication of how murder indictments are to work. “If any one kills a person, the murderer shall be put to death on the evidence of witnesses; but no person shall be put to death on the testimony of one witness. Moreover you shall accept no ransom for the life of a murderer who is guilty of death; but he shall be put to death” (Num 30:30-32 RSV).

Vellenga’s arguments are contradicted by other interpretations of the Bible, though. There are actually quite different views on capital punishment emerging from the theological debates within Christianity. Charles Milligan brings up five commonly encountered views among Christians in his essay, “A Protestant’s View of the Death Penalty”. These perceptions are (1) immediate abolition, (2) abolition as correct, but not very important, (3) abolition as correct for ‘the Christian’ but not practical in a world of evil, (4) the death penalty as “right and necessary from a Christian point of view”, and (5) the state as the theoretically entitled to capital punishment, but compelled to seldom carry out executions. Most Protestants have called for abolition, and their reasoning belongs to a sort of situational ethics for today’s society (Milligan 175).

If the Bible is going to be used as the standard to hold the United States government accountable, this verse or that verse cannot be selectively chosen to support one’s views only. If this were the case, then why not say that wearing wool and linen together is illegal (Deut 22:11)? Or, for that matter, why are there no laws stating that a man must have children by his brother’s widow (Deut 25:5)?

The reason that these taboos and requirements of The Old Testament are rejected by American society today is because it has chosen to decide for itself what its laws will be. The laws of modern society may not be the strict application of Biblical rules, but they are definitely influenced by them and by the more broad implications they carry. This pursual of wider-ranging Biblical truths is what Milligan advocates. “It is not what the Bible says in a specific verse, but what is says to us through its total message, interpreted in terms of our own conditions, that is relevant” (177-178).

Christianity, as applied by this definition of relevance, is congruous with “compassionate concern” for the soul of the person sentenced to death. A Christian, in the Protestant perspective, should ask: how can this criminal be redeemed and restored to their natural union with righteous behavior. This is seen quite evidently in the story of Jesus and the adulterous woman, who under the commandments of Moses should be stoned to death. Jesus Proclaimed, “He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her” (Jhn 8:7). Jesus’ statement shows a compassion for the sinner, as well as a wise understanding of the needs of a sustainable society.

These arguments, though, only really apply to those who believe that society should be modeled or influenced by Christian ideals. Seeing as this is only one religion among a plethora of beliefs and ideals within the U.S. and worldwide, arguments based in non-religious morals must be examined.

Capital Punishment as Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Constitutionalists argue that the death penalty violates the “cruel and unusual” clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the 1910 case, Weems v. United States, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a sentence of prison time and a requirement of the defendant to carry a chain hanging from his ankle and wrist was unconstitutionally “cruel and unusual” (Gottlieb 199). This case showed that the meaning of cruel and unusual in legal application is a dynamic meaning, which changes with the evolution of society. In 1958 the United States Supreme Court expressly ruled in Trop v. Dulles, that the term “cruel and unusual” will “draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” (Gottlieb 200). So if these terms’ meanings are based on the popular consensus, and if the public sees capital punishment as cruel and unusual, it must be stricken down by judicial action.

Trop v. Dulles also established that a comparative method would be used to determine what is “cruel”. For, if the death penalty is more cruel, as determined by popular consensus, than another form of punishment for the same crime, it is “cruel” and unwarranted. Sir William Blackstone goes further to state that necessity of a punishment “must be great and overriding” (Gottlieb 202). Montesquieu put forth the idea that the more harsh the scale of punishment in a society, the more the society is degraded by it.

Retribution Argument

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Retribution Argument

The nearly juxtaposing argument to the death penalty as “cruel and unusual” is that of exact retribution. J. Edgar Hoover states that the “cruel and unusual” or “sanctity of life” arguments come from areas of society that are insulated from the horrors of capital crime (130). This leads to the feeling, shared by many, that exact retribution must be inflicted, regardless of religious views, in order to fulfill the ideal of justice. Jacque Barzun argues that the heinousness of the crime cannot be forgotten, and furthermore, that without retribution, the sanctity of the life of the victim of capital crime is degraded (158). Not only is the sanctity of the life of the victim degraded, but some would argue that by not inflicting exact retribution society is reduced to a “state of barbarism” (Allen 138). Given well-documented injustices in the application of the death penalty (which will be addressed later in this paper), one can raise the issue of whether such a penalty can be applied in the name of "justice”. “The question becomes not ‘Who deserves to die,’ but instead, ‘Who deserves to kill?’ (Radelet 16).

The Effectiveness of Capital Punishment

To study the effectiveness of the death penalty in America, a definition of the functions of punishment must be established. Gerald Gottlieb, in his essay, “Is the Death Penalty Unconstitutional?” asserts that the functions of punishment in criminal law according to the “best modern theories” are threefold. The functions of punishment are (1) to discourage and act as a deterrent upon future criminal activity, (2) to confine the offender so that he may not harm society, and (3) to correct and rehabilitate the offender (206).

The Death Penalty as Rehabilitation

The assertion that punishment’s third possible cause is for rehabilitation of the criminal clearly does not pertain to capital punishment. Rehabilitation means that the criminal would be cured of the mental state, which causes them to commit their crime. If the purpose of the death penalty is rehabilitation, and one is cured of their desire to commit these crimes, this would mean the criminal would be able to function acceptably within society after their incarceration. Since death prevents any sort of functioning in society, rehabilitation cannot be the reason for capital punishment.

Capital Punishment as Ostricization of the Criminal

Jacque Barzun claims that the death penalty is used for another reason. “The uncontrollable brute whom I want put out of the way is not to be punished for his misdeeds, nor used as an example or a warning; he is to be killed for the protection of others, like the wolf that escaped not long ago in a Connecticut suburb” (Barzun 155). This is illustrative of Gottlieb’s second possible function of punishment. If one is to use the protection of society as the standard one must consider alternative solutions. Yet, Barzun’s logic seems to have blindly excluded the possibility that confinement, as protection of society, is suitable. “Once, however, the prisoner has been apprehended and either voluntarily submits to custody, or is effectively safeguarded against escape (maximum security confinement), the right of the state to take his life as punishment, retribution, revenge, or retaliation for previously committed offenses (no matter how numerous or heinous)…. does not exist in moral law” (McNamara 184). Again, morals are brought into play, but an important point is made: if protection of society is the standard, maximum-security confinement is sufficient.

Some say that life-sentences, as an alternative to the death penalty, is not appropriate, because a life-sentence is no longer a “life-sentence”, in that; the convicted criminal can still be paroled or pardoned. Then, it is assumed, these atrocious criminals will commit their crimes again. Yet, studies in New Jersey and California show that “those whose death sentences have been commuted, or who have been paroled from life or long-term sentences, or who have received executive pardons after conviction of capital crimes are by far the least likely to recidivate” (McNamara 192). It should be noted that recidivism rates for lesser crimes, such as burglary, robbery, and most other non-capital crimes are much higher. An expansive study covering all the released murderers in twelve states from 1900 until 1976 showed that only sixteen of the 2,646 killers released killed again. This is slightly higher than one half of one percent of murderers released (Kronenwetter 25).

Deterrence: the Argument

Deterrence is based on one main idea. This is that those things that we love, respect or fear to the greatest degree would be the most influential determinants in our behavior. Surely, our most loved possession in this world is our own life, and when it is put into limbo we would unerringly accommodate our behavior to ensure its protection (Allen 135).

This presupposes a rationality among all people, and it also assumes a non-self-destructive orientation of the offender. This assumed non-self-destructiveness can be plainly shown to be false in our society. There was a case in which a truck driver described to police officers the reason he killed a total stranger. He said that he was “tired of living”, and in hopes of the state executing him, he took a life. In another similar case a man left his state, which did not use the death penalty, in order to commit his crime in a state that did so that he would be executed when caught (Kronenwetter 24).

J. Edgar Hoover puts forward in his writing, “Statements in Favor of the Death Penalty”, that the effectiveness of deterrence necessitates three conditions. These are (1) sure detection, (2) swift apprehension, and (3) proper punishment (130). Yet, Due to inconsistencies in the application of the death penalty, the odds that someone who commits a capital crime will be executed for it are placed at 1000 to 1, says Richard Samp, of the Washington Legal Foundation (Kronenwetter 42). This easily illustrates the lack of Hoover’s three conditions for effective deterrence. Donal McNamara points out that, “the rational criminal might very well elect to ‘play the odds’” (186).

A good example of this is the nature of premeditated murders. It is noted that most first degree murderers think that they are too clever to be caught (Kronenwetter 19). Michael Kronenwetter goes on to say that crimes such as second degree murder are crimes of passion, and that these are committed in “moments of intense rage, frustration, hatred, or fear, when killers aren’t thinking clearly of the personal consequences of what they do”. So if the consequences of the actions of a murderer are either not considered, or are regarded without the threat of sure detection, how can the death penalty deter either of these rhetoric murderers?

J. Edgar Hoover likens the death penalty to a lighthouse. He says that we hear of shipwrecks, but we do not hear of each ship that passes safely. So, without probing the mind of every potential killer, we cannot know whether the fear of state-inflicted death is a deterrent (131-132).

Deterrence: An Analysis of the Data

Empirical studies of the deterrent value of the death penalty have been wide-ranging and contradictory. A comparative study performed by Professor Thorsten Sellin compared the rates of “willful homicides” among five different groups of three states. Among each group he attempted to best control for the social organization, composition of population, economic and social conditions, etc., but at least one state in each group used the death penalty. His study “showed unambiguously that the average annual rate of homicide in these states for the years 1940 to 1955 bore no relationship to whether or not the death penalty was the maximum penalty for murder” (Hood 127). Similar studies carried out between 1919 and 1969 reinforce this examination. Criticisms of Sellin are prevalent on the basis that social conditions are just too complicated to conduct comparative studies. Yet, more intricate studies are still unable to debunk Sellin’s findings (Hood 128).

A criminological study of the entire United States shows that homicides dramatically increased from 4.8 per 100,000 in 1960 to 10.2 per 100,000 in 1980, and then back down to 8.6 per 100,000 in 1986 (Hood 126). This, taken with the fact that the death penalty was abolished from 1968-1977, shows that regardless of the practice of capital punishment, homicide rates fluctuate for many reasons.

A state-by-state approach, considering abolition and reinstatement of the death penalty, shows that capital crime rates are unaffected by either (McNamara 190). In fact, the four states with the most executions (Texas, Florida, Georgia, and Virginia) are consistently among the states with the highest murder rates (Kronenwetter 21). Furthermore, from 1980 to 1985 homicide rates in Florida fell 21%, 25% in Georgia, and 26% in New York. Florida and Georgia used the death penalty at this time, but New York did not.

There are, though, studies that show the death penalty as more of a deterrent. If one looks at the execution rates from the late 50’s until the early 60’s they are between 40 and 65 per year. They murder rates from these years is also fairly consistent; from 8,060 to 9,140 per year. Then in 1968 the death penalty was abolished. Between the years of 168 and 1977 murders reached an all time high of 20,600 in 1974 (Kronenwetter 21-22). Another noteworthy study was performed by the LAPD in the early 1970’s. They interviewed 99 criminals who did not carry lethal weapons during their crimes. Of these nearly half said that a fear of the death penalty is what prompted them to not carry one (Kronenwetter 20).

These studies, like any other empirical analysis, are highly dependent on the methodological approach to it. Therefore, these are quite difficult to take as fact or even as highly consequential. But, if we look at these studies as individual attempts at determining effectiveness, and try to take a larger look at them as a whole we see definite trends. Comparative studies tend to show that there is not a relationship between the practice of capital punishment and homicide rates (Hood 166). Yet, more sophisticated studies employing econometric theories state that there is a “trade-off” of anywhere between seven and twenty-four fewer homicides per execution.

Overall, virtually all of the deterrence studies done in the past 25 years have failed to support the hypothesis that the death penalty is a more effective deterrent to criminal homicides than long imprisonment. As two of this country's most experienced deterrence researchers conclude after their review of recent scholarship, "The available evidence remains 'clear and abundant' that, as practiced in the United States, capital punishment is not more effective than imprisonment in deterring murder" (Bailey & Peterson 155).

The Practicality of Enforcing Capital Punishment

Another key debate is over the practicality of applying the death penalty. To verify its effectiveness, a guideline must be established. So the question must be asked; is our legal system able to apply capital punishment in a fair, costly, or even an accurate manner?

First, many of the legal scholars who have dedicated themselves to this subject criticize the actual definitions of capital murders in statutes designed to restrict and guide discretion in the application of the death penalty as “subjective and unreliable” (Hood 165). Despite “mandatory provisions” in many jurisdictions, they are often disregarded. The example of the District of Columbia is suitable for this instance; they indicted 125 people for first degree murder from 1953-1959, yet only one was executed, despite their “mandatory provision” (McNamara 186).

Opponents and supporters of the death penalty both admit to the arbitrary and capricious nature of its application in America. Many claim this as their main reason for non-support of capital punishment. Within one jurisdiction, people who commit similar, or almost identical crimes receive either the death penalty or prison terms extremely randomly. An appropriate example is that of Charles Brooks. He was executed for murder in Texas in 1982. Yet, his accomplice only had 40 years in prison sentenced to him, despite the fact that it had never been established who actually killed the victim (Kronenwetter 41).

Some supporters of the death penalty will often claim that the arbitrariness of its application actually undermine its deterrent value, because it is not applied to more capital criminals. They argue that America should execute all, if not more of those convicted of capital crimes. Opponents, though, point out that if America were to execute all those on death row, it would be more killing than Khomeini’s occupation of Iran (Kronenwetter 42).

The issue of the fairness of the application of the death penalty is a hotly debated one. It is the reason that capital punishment was abolished from 1968 until 1977. “The death penalty is all but totally reserved for those members of society who are already the weakest and most disadvantaged: the social outcasts, the unpopular minorities, and the poor” (Kronenwetter 36). Edward Allen brings up the issue of the rich and powerful often escaping justice. He admits that bribery, social position, or political pull will frequently affect the administration of justice (138). An experienced lawyer with a good record improves the chances for a defendant not getting the death penalty at every stage of the prosecution (Kronenwetter 36). It is not difficult to assume that poor and lower class defendants simply cannot afford good lawyers. A poor defendant in Louisiana was assigned an attorney who was working on 300 other cases at the same time. He spent only eight hours working on the case (Kronenwetter 37). It is not surprising that this man was executed.

From 1930 until 1972, more than half of all death row convicts were black (Kronenwetter 37). This does not translate to the fact that little more than 10% of American society is black. Analysis shows that whether or not a man dies for his crimes, is not dependent on the “gravity of his crime”, or on the number of such crimes or victims, and neither on his “present or prospective danger to society”. What was found to be determinant was the jurisdiction in which the crime was committed, the race of the defendant, their financial position, their sex, and the character or characteristics of their victim.

Professor David C. Baldus made extensive research in more than 2,000 murders in Georgia. His study showed that, even when allowing for 230 separate nonracial factors, “death was imposed in 34 percent of those involving white victims, but only 14 percent of those in which the victims were black- a disparity of more than 2 to 1. If the other, nonracial factors were ignored, the difference was 11 to 1” (Kronenwetter 38).

Another issue that is encompassed by the debate over practicality is that of the possibility of making mistakes. When an innocent person is executed, how can that be justified? In 1987 Hugo Adam Bedau and Michael L. Radelet released an analysis, which identified 350 people that they believed were wrongly convicted of capital crimes from 1900 until 1987 (Kronenwetter 46). The opposition to capital punishment does not raise this argument in order to condemn our courts or judiciary, but instead to call attention to the fallibility of human judgment. As Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas said: “our system of criminal justice does not work with the efficiency of a machine- errors are made, and innocent as well as guilty people are sometimes punished…. The sad truth is that a cog in the machine often slips; memories fail; mistaken identifications are made; those who wield the power of life and death itself- the police officer, the witness, the prosecutor, the juror, and even the judge become overzealous”.

Retentionists maintain that there are legal safeguards built into the system to ensure that the innocent are not executed. The most important of these safeguards is the right to make habeas corpus appeals to the federal courts. Yet it has become more and more difficult over recent years for those convicted of capital crimes to get a chance at a new trial. Appeals that are made “improperly”, too late, or just too often are frequently denied for review by the Courts (Kronenwetter 48). This coupled with the Court’s decision to deny poor death row inmates free legal assistance shows how the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment have been undercut by the need for judicial expediency (Kronenwetter 48).

The case of Leonel Herrera comes to mind when attempting to illustrate the rashness applied by the Supreme Court. In January 1993 the Court ruled by a vote of 6 to 3 to not block the execution of Leonel Herrera, despite new evidence that someone other than Herrera had committed the murder he had of which he had been convicted. This decision so infuriated Justice Harry Blackmun that he spoke from the bench to underline his dissent. “Execution of a person who can show that he is innocent, comes perilously close to simple murder” (Kronenwetter 49).

A further query into the practicality of applying the death penalty comes to the issue of cost. It seems almost sickening to put a price on a human life. Still, if there is going to be this discussion, a scrutinizing and discerning perception must be made. Some retentionists say that to impose the death penalty is a cost efficient way to deal with convicts. Nonetheless, Donal McNamara points out the costs of a “long-drawn-out jury selection, extended trials and retrials, appeals, extra security, maintenance of expensive, seldom-used death houses, support of the felon’s family, etc. are heavy” (193). It has been claimed by a one-time administrator of the California prisons that the actual cost of execution and all the subsequent costs are considerably more that the cost of keeping them in prison for the rest of their life (Kronenwetter 29). For example, Florida recently had to cut its Department of Corrections budget by $45 million, despite the fact that they spent more than $57 million enforcing the death penalty in recent years (Kronenwetter 29).

Protecting the Rights of the Mentally Ill and the Young

According to our own standards, a defendant, whether mentally ill at the time of the alleged crime, or at the time set for execution should not be executed. Yet this has been invalidated many times by our legal system. Amnesty International says that three people that any layman would consider “raving lunatics” have been executed in the 1980’s alone (Kronenwetter 55). Michael Kronenwetter brings up the case of Morris Mason. Despite the fact that he had been diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic three different times, by three different state mental institutions, he was executed in 1985. This is not to mention that he was also severely mentally retarded (56). Another useful example is one death row inmate who was so mentally retarded that he put aside the dessert included with his last meal so that he could eat it later (Kronenwetter 58).

Another important note is that the United States still executes minors and criminals who committed their crimes as minors. The only countries that still retain this practice are Iran, Iraq, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and the United States (Kronenwetter 56). It is interesting to see the United States grouped with these nations on such a matter of human rights and political ideology. Since 1972, more than 90 young people received the death penalty for crimes committed before they were 18. Organizations such as the American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry, the Child Welfare League of America, the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates, and the National PTA have asserted that (1) “adolescents are not fully responsible for their actions”, and (2) “they are peculiarly subject to reform and rehabilitation” (Kronenwetter 57).

Capital Punishment as a Violation of Human Rights Agreements

This brings up possibly the most important point. That is that the United States, by executing these youths, violates at least two international agreements: The International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights. Although not ratified by the United States, these documents have been adopted by the UN General Assembly. Another disregarded statute is the Resolution 1984/50 of the UN Economic and Social Council. This states that “Persons below 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime shall not be sentence to death.” The United States, however, continues to practice the death penalty in cases involving those who committed crimes while under the age of 18. How can the America legal system justify this use of the death penalty when committing itself to human rights on paper, then disregarding these agreements when it sees fit?

Some claim that the United States not only violates these agreements, but also others. Article 3 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and the security of the person.” There seems to be no clearer way to assert that capital punishment is not congruous with The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Resolution 1984/50 of the UN Economic and Social Council also enumerates that capital punishment cannot be imposed unless there is “no room for an alternative explanation of the facts,” or without “adequate legal assistance at all stages of the proceedings.” Article 4 of The American Convention on Human Rights says, “Every person condemned to death shall have the right to apply for amnesty, pardon, or commutation of sentence, which may be granted in all cases. Capital punishment shall not be imposed while such a petition is pending decision by the competent authority.” The United States, as a signatory to this document, endeavors to show a dedication to the principles spelled out within it. Yet, one does not have to look too hard to find an instance where the aspects of this document dealing with capital punishment are clearly breached by the United States.

Public Opinion

All of the complex issues that are brought up in the debate over the death penalty seem to show that the death penalty is not logically justifiable considering all of these facets together. But one undeniable determinant in America’s policy in the subject, and in any subject, really, is public opinion. America claims to be a democracy, so the feelings of the people must be represented in the government. Nevertheless, the common problem that faces any public opinion poll is that of the syntax and linguistics of the questions being asked. It is well known that similar questions, worded slightly differently, will prompt different answers. This taken into account, one must consider many different questions and polls in order to get a larger, more comprehensive view of public opinion on a subject.

When the question is asked, “are you in favor of the death penalty for a person convicted of murder?”, the current public opinion is at the lowest support rate in nineteen years. A Gallup Poll, released in February of 2000, determined that when asked this question, 66% of Americans are in support of the death penalty. From 1987 until 1995 support rates floated around 80% (DPIC). This support indicator shows that on the simple question of black-or-white support, a majority of Americans do. This seems to be one of the strongest lines of reasoning for the defense of the death penalty, and rightfully so. The American legal system should reflect the attitudes of the public. But with further questioning it is apparent that this issue is not so black-or-white.

A Time Magazine poll, carried out in 1997, found that 60% of Americans do not believe vengeance is a legitimate reason for putting a murderer to death and that 52% of do not believe the death penalty deters people from committing crime, up from 31% in 1985 and 41% in 1991. According to the study carried out by Peter D. Hart Research Associates, 72% of Americans favored suspension of the death penalty until questions about its fairness can be studied, up from 64% in August 2000. A CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll shows that 80% believe an innocent person has been executed in the United States in the past five years. According to a national Newsweek poll, 82% think states should make it easier for death row inmates to introduce new evidence that may prove their innocence, even if it might result in delays in the death penalty process (DPIC).

So what does this slightly more intricate rambling of numbers mean? It shows that Americans, in general, support the death penalty as an applicable form of punishment, when asked the simple question of, “are you in favor of the death penalty for a person convicted of murder?” But, when asked the tough questions, it is revealed that Americans are becoming increasingly aware of the problems in administering the death penalty in a fair and accurate manner. These numbers also indicate that the majority of Americans also do not accept the premise of vengeance or retribution as grounds for execution of criminals. Finally, this illustrates that a majority of Americans are in support of review of and reform within the institutions of the death penalty in America.

Conclusion

So, it has been shown that there is not substantial evidence that links capital punishment as to a deterrent of capital crimes in America. It has been proven that innocent people have been killed by the state. It has been made evident that capital punishment is given out in an arbitrary and capricious manner, rooted in the fact that the death penalty has long been an instrument of class control and racism. Capital punishment is costly and it violates America’s own agreed upon standards for the protection of human rights. Public opinion polls indicate that the American public supports reform of the capital punishment conventions. So what are the possible alternatives to capital punishment?

Lewis E. Lawes, as Warden of Sing Sing Prison in 1929 made a proposition for legal reform, which is still valid today. He stated that a comprehensive alternative to the death penalty for first degree murderers includes: (1) Life imprisonment, (2) no time allowance for commutation, or compensation until commuted to a definite term, (3) at least twenty year of actual time for current death row inmates, (4) appeals based upon post hoc evidence or executive clemency, (5) eligibility for pardon or parole only after at least 20 years, and (6) a substantial percent of the earnings of the prisoner go the dependants of those killed (Bedau 228).

Hopefully this research paper has provided an ample discussion of the reasoning, or lack thereof, for America’s choice to retain the death penalty. The only hope for the future is that Americans will become educated on the issue, so that a fact-based decision on this subject can be made. The words of Justice McKenna, which advocate our self-determinism as a people, should not be soon forgotten: “Legislation…should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore, a principle to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions…the future is their care, and provision for events of good and bad tendencies of which no prophecy can be made. In the application of a Constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but of what may be…”