The importance of Germany as both a strategic location and its military and economic strength essentially prevented the possibility of a single administration over its territories. Nevertheless, the initial occupation saw Stalin willing to cooperate with the West and to establish the Communist party as an important but not dominating role. Yet with the poor results of the Communists in Hungary, Stalin realized that only a union between the Social Democrats and the Communists in Germany could enable the rise of a Soviet-friendly German government. Realizing that the German SPD would not do so voluntarily, Stalin attempted to create a United Socialist Communist Party to administer the entirety of Germany, which heightened the Western suspicion over Soviet intentions. This only worsened when the reparations clause negotiated in Potsdam broke down, as there was a scarcity of resources to supply the German refugees expelled from the East. The US attempted to get the French and Soviets to treat Germany as a single economic entity, to which the Soviets replied by increasing their dominance in the East German economy. With Bizonia created from the US and British occupation sectors, it was clear that the economic necessities of Germany were the Western Allies top priority. In the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in March 1947, the Russians made an effort to destroy Bizonia, by demanding that a central German administration under the four-power control should be set up. Yet British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin realized that this would only delay the economic recovery of Bizonia and maneuvered the Americans to accept that political unity in Germany could only be realized after economic recovery.
This new fundamental rift between the Americans and Soviets was not exclusively ideological; rather it more than anything, it was a practical discord over the future of a dual-aligned Europe. Britain, with prolonged war, had lost its influence upon the Mediterranean states by 1947, and the strength of Communist parties in Italy and France were increasing as Germany was stuck in economic paralysis. Firmly believing that poverty was the stepping stone to Communism, Truman proclaimed his famous doctrine, pledging to prevent the “subjugation of free peoples” everywhere. Indeed the crux of American foreign policy of the early Cold War was born here: Truman’s goal was not to undermine the Soviet Union, but to contain it by establishing a chain of democratic (and US-aligned) states. The viable result of the Doctrine in post-war Europe was manifested in the form of the Marshall Plan, which aimed to provide aid to Europe in order to foster the aforementioned “economic integration”. By keeping the stomachs of the impoverished Europeans full, Truman hoped any attempts to revert to the radical left would be dissuaded. Stalin however, immediately saw through the plan as a means to undermine Soviet influence in Europe, and effectively forbade Soviet-occupied Eastern European states to accept any aid from the United States. Some historians judge Truman’s declaration an act of forceful will in the part of the US, furthering the rift in the disagreement already weakened through a spiteful Potsdam agreement.
In contrast to this Western belief, Stalin was more concerned with the political structure of European states rather than their economic conditions. Thus he was quick to consolidate his power over the Eastern bloc, with the COMINFORM established by June 1948 to impose identical economic, military and social policies in East Europe. In Poland, socialist leaders were replaced with a more Moscow-oriented government, with similar movements in other Eastern states. Yet the most alarming change to the Western perspective was the Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia in February, actively supported by Stalin, which effectively incorporated the state into Soviet hands. The alarmed US Congress reacted by approving the $12.5 billion dollars destined towards the Marshall Plan. Essentially this example can be seen as a Soviet-provoked form of aggression that exacerbated the tension between the two former allies.
On February 9 1946, addressing his government in the Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow, Stalin proclaimed that the presence of capitalism and imperialism in the world made future wars inevitable. Alarmed by such a statement that sounded like a declaration of war, George Kennan sent his famous long telegram to Washington, warning the US that Soviet intentions were to expand their influence into Europe even risking war in the process. A month later on March 5, Winston Churchill made his “Iron Curtain” speech, in a much more belligerent tone than ever before. The reaction of the Soviets was an assertion of US aggression, further deepening the rift between the two blocs. This interesting series of reactions foster the historical notion that the gradual dissension between the two sides was not merely the fault of one or the other: rather the entire scheme of post-war discord was a result of the misunderstanding and lack of cooperation. While neither side was ever willing to go to war with one another, it was the dogmatic judgment on both sides due to an ideological factor that caused Soviet-American relations to rapidly depreciate.
By the end of 1947, it was almost unequivocally clear that the Grand Alliance was in its last stages. With no fascist threat to bond the Soviets and the Western Allies, the relationship between the two blocs rapidly disintegrated with Stalin determined to carve East Europe into satellite states under his iron fist. Similarly, the Western Allies were essentially concerned with ensuring that Communism did not spread further West, and through the Truman Doctrine of containment as well as the Marshall Plan, enormous economic aid was provided to nations such as Greece, Turkey, Italy, France and Britain. Inevitably these diverging interests soon melted into confrontation, clearly highlighted by Soviet-American tensions over the German question. The breakup of the London Conference of Foreign Ministers in December of 1947 marked the ultimate end of four-Power cooperation, with only the alternatives of a Western alliance as options. Indeed in a bit more than two years after defeating Germany and Japan, the once-powerful alignment broken apart amidst bitter recriminations, with Churchill’s Iron Curtain firmly descended upon the river Elbe, where the Allies had once shook hands.
