Although Holland points out that the Lome Conventions took a different approach, the statement that they substantially minimised dependency on external investment is rather contentious. Economic and political criteria coming onto the agenda in the early 1980s in spite of an initial explicit non-interventionary approach came as a surprise to policy makers of the Yaounde Conventions. The economic criteria consisted of WTO compatibility with trade schemes, structural adjustment, including fiscal balances (reducing public sector subsidies), debt sustainability and poverty reduction targets. If these criteria did not seem ambitious enough considering the lack of stable institutions in many of the ACP countries, the political criteria added during this time seemed even more optimistic. These consisted of explicit insistence on ACP adherence to human rights and democratisation policies prior to the disbursement of aid. Looking at the conditions in many of the ACP countries today, these criteria can even be labelled idealistic, as aid has been given to these countries despite the lack of human rights recognition. However, this will be discussed more extensively when assessing potential progress under Cotonou and steps taken to enable the adherence to political criteria under the later Lome Conventions.
Even though security and defence clauses weren’t expressly included in any of the early EU policy towards the ACP states, the EU has intervened in intra and inter-state conflicts within the ACP and between ACP and non-ACP states as seen in Grenada in 1983 and to a limited extent during the civil war in South Africa. Furthermore, humanitarian aid was given to victims of many conflicts in the area. The fact that the EU intervened through the disbursement of humanitarian aid, diplomatic negotiations and employment of sanctions despite the lack of explicit clauses in EU/ACP policy proves that a foreign policy paper can never cover all areas and is limited in its power to delineate all methods of change and involvement. It is also a good illustration of how external factors can have a substantial affect on the way foreign policy papers are implemented and adhered to. Nevertheless, some of the EU involvement, predominantly the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) in Somalia, actually enhanced the impact of the Lome developmental policies by strengthening existing institutions in these countries. Through the encouragement of the evolution of transitional functional authorities to provide essential services (such as health and education) and advice on constitution building around decentralised forms of governmental power, the EU hoped to contribute to stability and progress in the region. However, despite spending over 38 million ECU between 1994 and 1996, the EU Commission’s efforts were in vain.
“The Commission faced legal and institutional problems in its intervention in Somalia because, although it drew its legal competencies from the Lome Conventions, the Somali state collapsed before it could ratify the fourth Lome Convention, and EU activity therefore remained on a shaky institutional foundation.” (Smith 188)
One of the most important questions to ask here is what the alternative means of action could have been. If all these EU endeavours failed, it is hard to imagine any constructive alternative that would have a larger beneficial impact. This example highlights that despite the progression from mere financial and humanitarian aid to actual political intervention through the diplomatic modes mentioned above, stability in this underdeveloped country could not be ensured. This unsuccessful outcome, however, does not prove that the Lome Conventions or EU action not expressly included in the policy papers were inadequate. It does, on the other hand, show that even though all structural weaknesses of institutions were addressed, and even though the policy papers were revised to include more efficient means of aid, Somalia’s condition was so conflict ridden and unstable that any kind of external aid or intervention did not show any positive results. The question as to whether or not extensive policy revisions as seen in Cotonou, where weaknesses of previous policies are addressed, actually make a difference in the effectiveness of policy implementation in ‘failing states’ logically follows. (To bluntly put the question: Are well thought out policy revisions worth EU time and money if they are applied to states where outcomes continuously prove to be unfruitful?) This leads to an entirely different line of argument that falls into the domain of ethics in international relations, however, it does help the case of Lome and Cotonou in that policy papers cannot always be held accountable for failed developmental activity, especially in the conflict-ridden ACP sates.
Conflict is just one of the factors that can affect the successful implementation of developmental policy. Two of the most important obstacles to consider are the dictates of international law and the overriding protectionist ideals of the EU.
“Global trade liberalisation, already under way under GATT, consolidated by the creation of the WTO in 1995, and hastened by huge developments in communications technology, had a deep impact on developing countries..deepening the divide between the industrialised countries and the developing world. The failed WTO talks in December 1999 were a timely reminder of this divide, played out in the disputes over labour and environmental standards, and over the protection of US and European textile and agricultural sectors.” (Forwood 424)
So, although the paragraph above seems to place the blame on the side of conflict ridden countries that are therefore virtually impossible to help (irrespective of competent policy), the other side of the argument is equally important. With the rapidly growing liberalisation of the global market, it is difficult for policies such as Lome and Cotonou to create an environment in which the establishment and enlargement of crude burgeoning markets is possible. However, without this essential foundation, the prospect of an end to conflict and poverty by augmenting trade seems very far removed. To kick-start The ACP economies through trade the EU first directed their attention to agricultural exports such as sugar, bananas, rum, beef and veal. The aptly named ‘banana wars’ are a concrete illustration of how the EU’s efforts to sustain preferential trade agreements with the ACP states under Lome and Cotonou failed as these agreements were in direct opposition to the WTO mandates.
“Witness the gradual dismantling of the EU’s long-standing preferential trade arrangements with the ACP, epitomised by the banana wars, where the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel held that the AEU’s arrangements for allowing preferential access to bananas from non-traditional suppliers in ACP countries were illegal.” (Wallace 408)
The fact that GATT now controls global trade liberalisation has forced the EU to restructure its policies towards the ACP states at the cost of continual progress in the region. Many of the unconditional aid clauses had to be broken down and stricter regulations have been put on exports. Goods that are not fully manufactured in ACP countries, for example, are subject to increasingly higher tariffs, which make EU goods much more desirable for wholesale and purchase within the EU. (An example of how GATT regulations in combination with EU protectionism of agricultural and internally manufactured goods make it a loose-loose situation for developing countries.) These modifications are still under way with Cotonou and accommodating all the EU member states’ views on how to implement changes is proving to be another obstacle in the way of effective development.
One can see through this example that the majority of structural changes made in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement have been in response to the implications of international trade liberalisation, rather than to address weaknesses in the predeceasing Lome Conventions. Two of the most important programmes under the Lome Conventions had been STABEX and SYSMIN, both of which were in charge of allocating aid to specific sectors (much of which was given in the form of outright grants). Initially, under the first Lome Convention, STABEX focused on support for transport and communication, rural production, education and training, health, water, urban infrastructure, housing, trade promotion, industrialisation, emergency aid and subsidies to provide stability in export earnings. This was eventually downsized and under the following Lome Conventions priority was given to rural production. The second Lome Convention heralded the establishment of a System for the Promotion of Mineral Production and Exports (SYSMIN). Both of these programmes continued to function throughout the fourth Lome Treaty with additional emphasis given to regional, social and cultural co-operation and supported by multilateral aid agencies such as the World Bank. ACP countries benefited greatly from these two bodies during the Lome Treaties, receiving 4, 089 million ECU under STABEX, and 483 million ECU under SYSMIN with an additional 480 million ECU given in form of an outright grant. Of these loans, only EIB loans and risk capital needed to be repaid. Under Cotonou, these two bodies were dropped in favour of a more general aid scheme that many ACP countries felt did not prove to be as much of an insurance.
“Another major change from Lome to Cotonou was the move away from specific instruments to compensate ACP states for instability in export earnings..to a more general facility which would provide assistance only if macroeconomic stability was threatened. Both STABEX and SYMIN had been highly valued by ACP states because they brought an element of predictability and security to export earnings..” (Smith 193)
As a consequence of the dissolution of STABEX and SYSMIN, there has been great controversy over future developmental proceedings among EU member states. The objective of ACP agreement compatibility with the WTO was shared by all, but there were disagreements on how this was to be achieved. The German government felt that the only way forwards was to normalise EU relations with ACP states to ensure equality between these and other Least Developed Countries (LDCs) not included in previous policies. Similarly, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands were primarily concerned with safeguarding the interests of the LDCs and “were reluctant to perpetuate the colonial heritage of a few EU member states,” (Forwood) calling for the inclusion of the nine non-ACP LDCs into the ACP. France, on the other hand, with its strong historical ties to various ACP states was reluctant to minimise special trade agreements, as this would contribute to losses in agricultural revenue. Ultimately, the decision was made to replace overall ACP preferential trade agreements with several free trade agreements between the EU and regional ACP groupings under the new policy name of Regional Economic Partnership Agreements or REPAs. Although this serves the purpose of enhancing local and regional competition and shows the potential of aiding the more economically successful ACPs, the remaining countries face a situation that seems substantially worse than those secured under the Lome Treaties as they run the risk of being marginalised further. In addition to these disadvantages, exact criteria of REPAs remain uncertain and many of the stronger ACP states are also wary to negotiate REPAs in light of the unpredictability of the multilateral trading framework.
“To all but the most optimistic, Cotonou heralds the de facto break up of the ACP group as divisions emerge between countries able to negotiate REPAs, and others having to opt for alternative arrangements..In order to be compatible with the WTO, the Economic Partnership Agreements must meet the conditions of GATT..yet the application of GATT rules depends in turn on what other WTO members are willing to accept.” (Forwood 439)
In light of the complications and intricacies involved in negotiating members states, ACP and LDC interests, it becomes increasingly more apparent that the Cotonou Partnership Agreement will have to be flexible enough to incorporate various different developmental schemes to find a compromise that will benefit most of these actors. The task becomes even more difficult as WTO mandates become even more liberalised.
Another issue that also needs to be addressed when assessing the probability of success under the Cotonou Agreement is the fact that other EU developmental policies are simultaneously being implemented around the world. Not only is potential prosperity in development being limited by the internal and regional political instability in the ACP, by EU protectionism and by global market liberalisation, it runs the risk of losing momentum as EU priorities shift to other developmental projects. If one were to look at this trend cynically, one could say that, due to the rapid dismantling of preferential trade agreements by the WTO, the EU is loosing its strong and single grip over ACP markets and therefore shifting its focus to newly accessed Central and Eastern European countries. These states, in conjunction with select countries in Asia seem to have more potential for economic growth and, especially the new EU members will be more inclined to deal predominantly with the EU.
“EU interregional policy has been successful in that it has been able..to retain privileged political and economic access to ACP states..It remains to be seen, however, because of the Union’s clear and increasing priority to Eastern and Central Europe..if the relationship will remain important for both partners during the 20-year span of the new Cotonou Agreement.” (Smith 197)
The Association of South-East Asian Nations ASEAN comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia have seen ongoing trade and development programmes since the 1980s. China and Hong Kong have also been on the EU developmental agenda for over twenty years and are becoming of greater importance to the EU as competition continuously increases with the US. Attention has also been directed to southern Asia and will soon be receiving more EU financial aid once various political and social criteria have been met. The only way that these policies will stop detracting from the developmental programmes of the ACP is if trade liberalisation and co-operation between countries in this region increases. However, it seems that EU and other external aid is needed first to assist in the establishment of institutions in order to create a foundation for such regional interaction. (This analysis is perfectly illustrated when looking at the structure of the Lome Conventions towards the ACP states.) It has been proven that developmental policies undertaken with ASEAN and ACP are not compatible with each other because, up until recently, preferential trade agreements have made up the core of these policies. Naturally, this leads to a logical contradiction and results in the negligence of either ACP or ASEAN:
“The Union..actively discriminated against key ASEAN exports through preferential tariffs offered to ACP states, for example coca and palm oil, and also obstructed access for those agricultural commodities that were directly competitive with EU products such as rice, sugar and tapioca.” (Smith 205)
(Through this example, one can again see the problems caused by EU protectionism and how this negates the purpose of the developmental policies they are promoting.) Conclusively, developmental policies are becoming increasingly difficult to implement due to the main factors explored. However, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement seems to be a positive way forward as it has proven to be flexible enough to tailor-make developmental schemes according to which type of ACP being dealt with. Furthermore, the inclusion of political, social and economic criteria under the Lome Conventions has laid a stable foundation for progress in inter and intra regional co-operation as it has minimised (but not eradicated) ACP dependency and has enabled local authorities and businesses to work with the new resources provided. The eventual termination of any preferential trade agreements with all ACP and LDC states will be a difficult task and will include certain developmental set backs. However, based on the outlines of the Commission’s Green Paper, the structural modifications made to the Cotonou Agreement seem to adequately prepare both the EU and the ACP states to face this inevitability.
