However the Emperor was mistaken his estimation of Sardinia's ambition, the strength of Italian Nationalism and of the attitudes of the other powers. These misjudgements, whilst France still won an important victory over Austria in 1859, meant that Napoleon achieved few of his objectives. In diplomatic circles he only gained the support of Russia in his attempts to isolate Austria. Russia, just as France hated the Vienna settlement, wanted revision of the 1856 Treaty Of Paris, especially the Black Sea neutralisation clauses, which whilst not included in the Franco-Russian treaty of March 3rd 1859, Napoleon was prepared to abrogate in principle, despite insisting on their inclusion in 1856. All that was achieved from Russia, however, was "benevolent neutrality".
The Tory government in Britain was pro-Germanic in outlook (through the preference of the queen). But even the Whig opposition (which better represented public opinion) did not translate pro-Italian sympathy into pro-French support. Palmerston had always mistrusted the French and whilst the proposed creation of a strong Italian state from Piedmont to Venetia would satisfy Whig ambitions to remove Austria from Italy, there was suspicion that France intended to use the new state as a French puppet. What the British did offer was mediation that would remove any casus belli and possibly wreck the entire plan. Furthermore the Prussians were not, as Napoleon may have hoped, yet so determined to overtake Austria predominance in Germany that they were prepared to conspire against them in Italy.
Napoleon did things in the wrong order. He should have made diplomatic gestures to the other great powers to see if the plan to isolate Austria was feasible before committing himself to Sardinia's cause. As soon as Cavour knew that he had French promises to assist him in expanding his country, Sardinia were desperate for the war to begin and frowned upon any act of caution by the French. As soon as Austria's aggressive folly brought the opportunity in April 1859, Napoleon's hands were tied and he would have to see through his commitments without any guarantees of how Prussia would react.
Napoleon further misjudged the Sardinians' military strength. The force provided by Piedmont did not match that promised at Plombières and the brunt of the fighting at the two battles Magenta (June 4) and Solferino (June 24) was borne by the French. Although France won both battles, these were bloody and indecisive. The Austrians retreated to the Quadrilateral Fortresses where they could have remained for a long siege. With the Prussian mobilisation (June 24) Napoleon's decision to negotiate with Austria in July, was wise since to prevent war on the Rhine it would be preferable to have "peace at almost any price".
At Villafranca, 11 July 1859, Napoleon once more angered Italian nationalists. He had abandoned their cause before freeing them from Austrian control "from the Alps to the Adriatic". Austria still had Venetia, and this was to obsess Napoleon until it was annexed to the Kingdom of Italy in 1866. Meanwhile, France had gained nothing. French public opinion was opposed to the war that was widely considered expensive and worthless and Napoleon could not have carried his campaign further since he was freely recognised that "I am the master of everything in France except public opinion". The revolutions in central Italy were unforeseen and destroyed the dream that Napoleon could control the new Italy. His campaign had reawakened nationalist "forces whose power he had underestimated and which he was unable to control". This cooled his relations with Russia and the Prussian threat had forced his campaign to a sudden halt.
Whilst the war of 1859 did not satisfy French aims it was not a total failure. Whilst the battles were indecisive, the victories over Austria had at least brought about the cession of Lombardy, which the Austrians never regained. This represented a major shift in the European balance in France's favour, achieved without conflict with the old Quadruple Alliance. Prussia had only appeared once Austria defeated and so France had been able to pursue a quick, relatively successful campaign and to gain the negotiating advantage. However, the war concerned the other Great Powers and the Prussian mobilisation reminded Napoleon that her 1815 opponents "could contain France in the future as they had done in the past". It is noteworthy that Napoleon never sent an army into Italy again to enforce his vision of a confederation. It must be remembered, however, that Austria lost most out of 1859 and that the French did achieve something, if only "half a victory".
Plombières had dictated that France should receive Nice and Savoy in return for her help against Austria but the signing of Villafranca while Austria still had Venetia annulled this. Through diplomacy in 1860 with Cavour Napoleon achieved his prize after all in return for agreement to the Piedmontese annexations of Emilia and Tuscany. This was a much greater mistake than the decision to go to war with Austria. Expansion of French territory had only been a secondary concern at Plombières. Previously Napoleon could always claim to be championing the cause of the Italians against Austrian aggression. By vying for the territorial advantage later, Napoleon appeared as an expansionist . There was some nationalistic excuse for occupying Savoy but certainly not Nice; and the territories gave France control of two mountain passes into Italy.
The move immediately lost Napoleon the goodwill of the British who had themselves proposed a congress on the future of central Italy based on plebiscites and a complete French withdrawal. The occupation further angered the Prussians who saw the move as French aggrandisement and a possible precedent to attempted expansion in the North.
The agreement with Sardinia of 1 March 1860, also achieved little for France. With Austria expelled as far as Mantua and with an allied Piedmont in between, there was little benefit in the strategic advantage of Nice and Savoy. Yet the Sardinian annexations went far beyond Napoleon's vision, especially with regard to Tuscany. Napoleon had wanted a strong Sardinia as a buffer against Austria but not a united Italy, as seemed increasingly possible, which "would represent too great a barrier" since France would be unable to control her. In February 1860 France proposed that Tuscany be governed separately as a vicariat, possibly under Prince Jerome. French powers were limited to prevent the Sardinian annexations but Napoleon's determination to get Savoy and Nice as some compensation for his efforts on behalf of Sardinian aggrandisement gained him little and cost him the trust of all of Europe.
The difficulty of Napoleon's Roman position were again highlighted in August 1862. Napoleon, perhaps recognising that he could not stop further Italian expansion without either undermining his liberal principles or bringing the Holy Alliance against him did nothing to prevent Garibaldi's progress through Naples. The Northern Powers would not stomach further French gains and Napoleon would not wish to work with conservative power to attack the Italians. Least of all he did not want to be forced into protecting the Neapolitan regime in the same way as he had become locked in Rome. Although this highlighted how the Italian question had gone beyond both his aims and his control, it was probably wiser not to involve himself further at this stage.
Rome, however was a different matter, for Napoleon was still wary of the strong clerical faction in France even though he desperately wanted to rid himself of the Roman burden. But on the two occasions when Garibaldi threatened to take over the city Napoleon stood firm; in August 1862 he forced the Italians to stop Garibaldi and in November 1867 French troops returned to defend the Pope after a two year absence. Although he thought he could not hold back the expansion of Italian Nationalism, the Emperor was willing to intervene again as a sop to his Catholic support at home. This was the continual paradox of Napoleon's Italian policy. The Franco-Prussian war provided the excuse for a final withdrawal and had France won that war but still lost Rome to the Italians, Napoleon would probably have considered it the perfect result.
Napoleon was determined to fulfil his pledge to free Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic and to remove Austria from Venetia, despite all the other gains which Sardinia had made, mostly to the cost of French lives. The annexation of Venetia in 1866 to the Kingdom of Italy was achieved by Prussia, however. NApoleon misjudged again by assuming that Austria would defeat her German rival. He should receive some of the credit for the diplomatic negotiations that played on Austrian fears and assured the cession of Venetia whatever the outcome, but Napoleon missed the opportunity to strike a bargain with Prussia and achieve something for France. Although he achieved one of his chief long term objectives, the result was again only 'half a victory' since his estimation of the combatants' respective military strength's was poor. Furthermore the map of Italy in the summer of 1866 was immensely different from the confederation which he had previously fought for.
Napoleon made many mistakes and misjudgements in his Italian policy. His principles conflicted with the basis of his domestic support causing his policy to represent a balancing act; but Napoleon was not a good balancer. His caution appeared as nervous hesitancy, his action as rash adventurism. Ultimately therefore he could not control what he began and his vision of an Italian confederation, loyal to and dependant upon the French empire was not realised and a united Italy was created, too strong for France to dictate to and who eventually joined the axis against her. But the policy, although clumsily executed, was not a mistake in itself; French interests lay in a revision of the 1815 settlement and if this could not be achieved on the Rhine then Italy was the nest best thing. Napoleon undoubtedly achieved this in concert with Cavour. In the period 1848-1870, Prussia were the main winners in international affairs, Austria the main losers. French fortunes, it could be described, went round in circles; circles, perhaps, not centred in Paris but in Rome and Turin.
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