The Serbian Crisis however, was more fundamental in the assessment of the outbreak of war. Serbia, to which Russia felt she owed responsibility to defend the Pan’ Slav Movement and the German ‘blank cheque’ offered to Austria-Hungary ensued the partial mobilization of Russia’s army. Russia was in fact the first country to mobilize her army which in essence accelerated the outbreak of war.
‘Russia’s declaration of mobilization severely foreshortened possible diplomatic intervention from London which might have changed Germany’s course.’ Arguably, London’s involvement in foreign affairs was slow and vague. Intervention from Britain was not relied upon, as their neutrality was questioned. Russia’s mobilisation did accelerate and add tension to the outbreak of war but Britain’s intervention may not have been sufficient enough to deter war. The German Government did encourage and in fact desired an Austro-Serb conflict which they knew would lead to war. Additionally Russia’s mobilisation was a means to pressure Vienna into backing down and was by no means a replacement for war since the soldiers could have been stopped by the borders.
Russia did not fully comprehend the consequences of mobilising her army and this was due to the lack of communication of the autocratic government. Nicholas II’s thirst for total control led to a severe lack of communication between cabinet ministers and officials. This took its toll when Danilov mobilised Russia’s army without consulting any of the war ministers.
‘Made in St Petersburg’ is therefore effective in the sense that once Russia mobilised her forces, Germany declared war. Arguably though, other factors came into play with the onset of World War One.
France, another member of the Entente is questionably a minor player in the events that led up to and instigated the outbreak of a general European War. France shared a long standing hostility towards Germany. The Dual Alliance coupled with their Entente status ‘ provoked rather than deterred Germany and thus helped render the diplomatic situation in Europe more perilous.’ The events that led up to 1914 for France were relatively minor in the onset of World War One, it is 1914 itself that was important. France’s alliance and support for Russia detrimentally encouraged a war rather than preventing one. If France would not have supported Russia in 1914 there may be doubts as to whether St Petersburg would have acted alone and mobilised her forces. In this way France’s defensive alliance could have lay the groundwork for the mobilisation of Russia in 1914. France did not have to conjure any major decisions with the arrival of World War One as their tie to Russia ensured that whatever Russia decided, France would follow along. In this way, the statement ‘Made in St Petersburg’ has a deeper meaning than originally thought. The choices and advances made by Russia did not limit the consequences solely to Russia, but by passingly involved France too.
Conversely, looking at France independently, France’s lack of enthusiasm to use force and arbitrate a war, the public opinion of the socialist movements and the uncertainty of Britain’s support if war would occur, epitomised France’s hesitation in going to war. ‘The French delayed reinforcing their frontier, and on the 30 July ordered their troops to stay 10 kilometres behind it.’ Therefore the blame cannot be placed on France herself. Yet this lack of support for the war was not enough to prevent Russia from mobilising her forces. Despite the fact that France had major uncertainties of waging a war, Russia can place some blame on France as their alliance may have enhanced Russia’s confidence when she went to war.
Germany’s responsibility for the outbreak of a general European war in 1914 is immense. The German question of imperialism, Weltpolitik and the determination of the German Empire led to the inevitability of World War One. The question as to whether Germany had been strategically preparing or acted on impulse in 1914 can be argued.
‘Mittleeuropa’ was one method Germany used in becoming a great power and dominating the world. After the unification of Germany in 1870, foreign trade between world markets was increasing rapidly, and Germany was an active player. Weltpolik enforced the idea of German world dominance by averting the German population’s attention from the social unrest at home and accentuating the German quest for expansion abroad. In the summer of 1892 Kiaser Wilhelm II expressed his views on the idea of Weltpolitik as ‘Napoleanic supremacy in the peaceful sense.’ Here the autocratic leader himself highlights his need for a world controlled by Germany. Weltpolitik though cannot be achieved through peaceful methods. Germany must have understood that eventually the only way forward would be by means of a world war. Therefore the planning of an eventual war began with the German Naval laws of 1898 where Germany ordered a massive expansion of their navy. This was not intended to be a war fighting navy. It was a risk fleet that could be used as a power tool for German diplomacy and to promote their power. Despite the fact that Britain outran Germany in the Naval race of 1906 the way in which Germany was building up her navy was increasingly alarming. Germany was building up her navy to increase her strength as a dominant power and to prevent coastal enemy attacks. Additionally, the Schlieffen Plan of 1905 also expressed Germans plans for an eventual war. The way in which Germany would tackle the war on both the eastern and western frontiers was laid out.
In addition to Germany being militarily prepared for war, the German chancellors at that time were also mentally preparing for war. Bethmann who became chancellor in 1909 was irritated by the ‘encirclement’ of the Entente and wanted to do everything in his power to split up the enemy that was supposedly ganging up against Germany. In Bethmanns defence, Germany did attempt to use diplomatic means to improve Germany’s relationship with the Entente powers. He tried to improve Germany’s relationship with Russia and halt the naval race between Britain, but it all proved unsuccessful. Moltke too in 1911 had expressed his views that the Great War was to be expected sooner or later.
This therefore indicates that Germany had a preconceived idea that they would eventually use the means of war to increase their empire and take over the countries they desired. This could not have occurred without detailed planning and preparation. Evidently, ‘1914 was a case of premeditated aggression rather than a defensive response to encirclement.’
The July crisis of 1914 highlights Germany’s willingness to go to war whether or not they were prepared. The issue of the German ‘blank cheque’ to Austria-Hungary indicated the unconditional support Germany would offer to Austria-Hungary in any decisions they took against Serbia. This clearly underlines Germany’s willingness to fight a war. Germany did argue that they were entering a defensive war against the ‘encirclement’ and that the fact that Russia mobilised her army gave Germany the excuse she was looking for.
This argument however can be supressed by Helmulth Von Moltke. Moltke who was the German chief of staff can be held slightly responsible for Germany’s determination in going to war. Moltke shared a close relationship with the Tsar and therefore he was able to influence his political ambitions easily. Despite the fact that Motlke understood that Germany, in the current state she was in in 1914 could not have won or survived a war, he nevertheless pressurised Germany and felt it necessary to speed up the events that would ensure Germany would go to war. For Motlke it was either ‘now or never.’ In one sense Moltke can be held to blame for hiding his doubts regarding the limited German military capabilities in winning them the war. Yet it is hard to place the blame on Moltke as an individual. Without any surrounding circumstances such as, the ever ambitious Bethmann, the German public opinion in favour of war, the Austro-Serb conflict and the Russian mobilisation of her army the War could not have occurred.
‘Made in Berlin’ seems to be more of a reputable assessment in the outbreak of a General European war. Looking at 1914 without German intervention clearly indicates that a war may not have occurred. Germany was the main perpetrator, not only in their meticulous planning up to the year 1914, but their involvement in the Austro-Serb conflict seemed to be Germanys ticket in, to a major world war that would hopefully satiate Germany’s war aims.
The Austro-Serb conflict was a major catalyst in bringing about the war in 1914. With the assassination of Franz Ferdinand Austria-Hungary feared the dissolution of their empire. They wanted to take drastic action in order to crush the Serbian enemy which was their main source of instability. Austria-Hungary decided to take a punitive and aggressive strike against Serbia which they knew full well would lead to an outbreak of war. Therefore, Austria-Hungary’s role in the outbreak of war must not be undermined; their decision against Serbia was the first that led to the immanency of World War One. Austria- Hungary turned to Germany for support and Germany replied affirmatively. If Germany would have refused to back Austria-Hungary a war may have been avoided. Once again the blame can be placed on Germany. The assassination and the way in which Germany offered their fully fledged support for Austria-Hungary was the exact pretext Germany needed to launch a full scale war and to implement the German war aims. Despite the fact that Serbia did not reject the ultimatum that was sent to them, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. With or without the support of Germany at this time, Austria-Hungary was the first to declare war and can be held partially responsible for the events that followed.
In conclusion, the German responsibility for the general outbreak of war in 1914 is greater than that of the other European countries. The idea of a world dominated by Germany was deeply ingrained in the minds of the German Government and population and it was this that set Germany on the war path. Despite the fact that Russia and Austria-Hungary performed the initial steps that led to the direct outbreak of war, there is no question that Germany was behind them and had been preparing for war prior to 1914.
‘Made in St Petersburg’ is therefore a statement that is too focused in laying the blame on an individual country. Although Germany’s responsibility was greater than those of the other European powers, without their interference, the different foreign policies and their political and domestic disputes the war could not have occurred in 1914. Collectively, all the European powers hold partial responsibility for the events surrounding 1914. Without the involvement of all the European powers, the war in question may not have occurred.
Bibliography:
- The origins of World War One – Hamilton Herwig – Cambridge University Press – 2003.
- The outbreak of the first world war 1914 in perspective – David Stevenson –Macmillan Press ltd 1997
- July 1914 – The Outbreak of War – Geiss Imanuel 1931
- The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914 – Marc Trachtenberg
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Fischer, F, Germany's Aims in the First World War – Fischer F-1967
The Origins of World war 1 – Hamilton Herwig – pg 197
The Outbreak of the First World war – chpt 3 pg 21
L.C.F Turner- The origins of World War One – Chpt 6 pg 189.
France and the Great war 1914-1918- Leonard V Smith Page 10
Holger H Herwig- orignins of ww1 pg 166
Fritz Fischer – Germany’s Aims in World War One
A Reluctant Military Leader – Moltke and the July crisis of 1914
