- Methodology
The objective of this report is to diagnose whether the war is near to go, in the following points will discuss what were the reasons for India and Pakistan not going to war, did really the nuclear weapons helped not to bring nuclear war between India and Pakistan and did the nuclear weapons played role that made war an impossibility between them?.
4.0 Analysis Is nuclear deterrence worked or not in India and Pakistan?
4.1 Have nuclear weapons made war impossibility between India and Pakistan?
4.1.1 Nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan has worked so far but steps such as making both countries members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would make the regime more effective.
4.1.2 The former foreign secretary M.K. Rasgotra, who played a key role in framing India’s nuclear doctrine, said “India and Pakistan should be admitted to the NPT as nuclear weapon powers. This will make deterrence more effective”(2).
4.1.3 The main argument is that nuclear weapons have effectively contained the opportunity of full scale war between the two nuclear South Asian states. The two major confrontations of Kargil in 1999 and the military standoff of 2002 are used as case models to examine and prove the argument. I would conclude that, in all possibility, Pakistani own of nuclear weapons played active role in preventing India from engaging in a full scale war during the Kargil crisis and in 2002.
4.1.4 Whether Kargil was a war depends on the prism through which it is viewed. If it was a war, it was fought without either country making a declaration of war. India did not horizontally escalate the war by opening a second front. There was no dearth of Indian opinion, military or other about doing so. Both sides lost huge numbers of soldiers “India nearly lost over 1700 men and Pakistan took over 700 dead”.(3)
4.2 What were the reasons for restraint?
4.2.1 Nuclear Strike
India used combat aircraft and both sides used massive artillery fire. In addition, “There was a solid fear of massive retaliation from India, he recalled, as they (the Indians) have a stockpile of more than a dozen warheads”.(4) Yet, India confined its operations to those areas where Pakistanis had occupied territory across the Line of Control (LOC). The authors attribute this restraint to the presence of nuclear weapons with Pakistan. On the other hand, would a broader front war in the immediate vicinity of Kargil and Dras, and some loss of territory persuaded a nuclear strike by Pakistan? Why would Pakistan’s leadership have resorted to a nuclear strike on Kashmiri soil and people in response to some loss of territory? It would have brought about a massive nuclear response from India in keeping with the latter’s nuclear doctrine.
4.2.2 Logically, is it worth destroying one’s country for the loss of a small bit of disputed territory?
This is question, which the Pakistani strategic planners are grappling with and which place a question mark on Pakistan’s claim of having a first strike nuclear policy. After all, nuclear weapons are to be portrayed more for their deterrent value and are to be used if the very survival of the state is in danger. Therefore to argue that India was deterred from going to war in 1999 is only part of the answer.
4.2.3 The U.S. Role
The U.S. had set itself against Pakistan’s occupation of Indian Territory and it was pressing hard on the then Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif to order his army to pull back. The global opinion had turned against Pakistan. Domestic opinion in neither country would have supported a nuclear strike.
- Standoff in 2002 and what was the benefit of this standoff?
4.3.1 Standoff 2002
The military standoff during 2002 after the attack on Indian Parliament was an extremely serious confrontation. The Indian forces were deployed for an offensive into Pakistan. The U.S. and Pakistan were in no doubt about India’s military readiness to go to war. If the war did not occur, it is less due to the presence of nuclear weapons than to other important factors. India attempted a flawed strategy of coercive diplomacy in 2002.
4.3.2 Principle of coercive diplomacy
As the authors point out, the first principle of coercive diplomacy “remains making demands on the adversary”, which give him room to respond. The second principle of “offering viable benefits to the adversary for compliance was also absent”. Third, “Indian threats were neither strong nor credible”.(5) Within days of the Indian military deployment, major powers were on the scene and the pressure on India to prevent from war was greater and more immediate than on Pakistan.
- Conflict Dynamics
4.4.1 Deploying military
Once India laid out impractical conditions for doing so, the threat of war had receded. India was left to fend for itself on the military deployment. No wonder that the former Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee in a reflective moment later had wished he had acted immediately possibly with punitive military or air strikes rather than deploying the military machine for an unlikely war. Khursheed Kasuri Pakistan foreign minister said “The Indians have come to the conclusion that the military solution is just not there”(6).
4.4.2 After 1998 nuclear test
After its nuclear tests of 1998, India has worked hard towards building credibility as a responsible and rational nuclear weapons state. It has concentrated more on its economic growth and for a place amongst the major states. There were and will continue to be major venture in India’s quest for being a major player in the international order. That was a bigger factor in preventing a war in 1999 and 2002 than the nuclear weapons with Pakistan.
4.4.3 Security after 9/11
The global security scene after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the peace process beginning in South Asia are also significant factors that impact on the situation.
- Conclusion
To sum up this report I would say that the most important factor for acquiring nuclear weapons is the security concerns. Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons to balance the Indian threat. The nuclear weapons have deterred India from attacking after the revealed nuclear capabilities of Pakistan. Furthermore, we have seen that the introduction of nuclear weapons has averted the outbreak of any major war in the South Asian region. Another factor for the spread of nuclear weapons is the asymmetrical balance of conventional weapons. The states, which are weak conventionally, seek nuclear weapons to equalize with the adversary. The classic scenario is the case of India and Pakistan. India is stronger than Pakistan in conventional weapons and Pakistan has acquired nuclear weapons to meet Indian aggression. There is little doubt that Pakistan's nuclear weapons stopped India from attacking after the December 13 attack by jehadists on the Indian Parliament. So in that sense I agree with that deterrence did work. It also worked in 1999, and perhaps also in the crises of 1990 and 1987. Islamic jehadists - who must be considered a third force that now operates independently of the Pakistani state - crave for a full-scale war between the two countries. They could easily commit some huge atrocity which turns India into a mad bull dashing blindly into a nuclear-armed Pakistan.
6.0 References
(1) Sumit Ganguly & Devin T. Hagerty, (2005), Fearful Symmetry- India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons, Oxford University Press, P.237.
(2) Sumit Ganguly & Devin T. Hagerty, (2005), Fearful Symmetry- India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons, Oxford University Press, P.233
(3) Dixit, J.N, (2002), India-Pakistan in war & peace, London: Routledge, P.225
(4) Pervez Hoodbhoy, Nuclear Issues Between India and Pakistan Myths and Realities, Occasional Paper No. 18 (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center,1994), pp. 2-3
(5) Bidwai, P & Vanaik, A,(2000), New nukes: India, Pakistan and global nuclear disarmament, Oxford: signal books, P.167
(6) BBC’s Owen Bennett, (2003), Have nuclear weapons made South Asia safer?. Available at:
Bibliography
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Sumit Ganguly & Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry- India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons, Oxford University Press, (2005).
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Dixit, J.N, India-Pakistan in war & peace, London: Routledge, (2002).
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Pervez Hoodbhoy, Nuclear Issues Between India and Pakistan Myths and Realities, Occasional Paper No. 18 (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center,(1994).
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Bidwai, P & Vanaik, A, New nukes: India, Pakistan and global nuclear disarmament, Oxford: signal books, (2000).
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Naizamani, H.K, the roots of rhetoric: Politics of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan, Praeger publisher, (2000).
