The Cold War

University Degree Historical and Philosophical studies

In April 1950, the Secretaries of State and Defense published a document that was known by the name “NSC 68.” NSC 68 was a report on the objectives and programs the US should pursue in its dealings with communism. It outlined the weaknesses and strengths of both the United States and the Soviet Union, the two nations it identified as world super powers. With warring ideologies and high tensions, these two countries were the primary combatants in the conflict known as “the Cold War.” However, the conflict between these two countries spread to other nations, and created other situations. The Cold War became a world war, affecting regions and nations far removed from either the United States or the USSR.

In judging NSC 68, it becomes necessary to examine incidents in which the document’s objectives and programs could be applied. Such a task is relatively simple, as there are a multitude of incidents of conflict between communism and capitalism during the period of 1950 to 1975 (when NSC 68 was released to the public). In this report, evidence will be shown that, during the period of 1954-1961, government officials were sporadic in their applications of NSC 68. Using the Guatemalan Coup of 1954, the Suez Crisis of 1956, and the Bay of Pigs incident of 1961, this paper will show that the United States government of this time applied the principles expressed in NSC 68 in ways that suited their various economic objectives.. Varying situations, with different desired outcomes, changed the way the United States used the guiding principles of NSC 68.

To begin exploring this thesis, Guatemala will be the first incident explored. In 1949, Jacob Arbenz killed his main opponent in the Guatemalan presidential elections and was subsequently democratically elected as the successor of President Juan Jose Arevalo. Upon taking power, Arbenz began to make major reforms, many of which threatened the United Fruit Company of Boston, MA. CIA documents from this period refer to Arbenz’s reforms during his early presidency as "an intensely nationalistic program of progress colored by the touchy, anti-foreign inferiority complex of the 'Banana Republic ( Guatemala 1954 ).” Land distribution was the major focus of Arbenz’s reforms. These land reforms consisted of nationalizing 178,000 acres of land used by the UFC in their business operations, with the government offering compensation in twenty-five year bonds.

Arbenz, who was influenced by Franklin Roosevelt, the Four Freedoms, and the Atlantic Charter, nationalized the UFC lands in an effort to reclaim the Guatemalan economy. The United Fruit Company controlled most aspects of the economy when Arbenz came to power. This control included running the railroads, and all foreign currency coming into Guatemala. Arbenz wanted to turn this control of the economy over to the workers. However, his reforms threatened the profits of the US-supported UFC, and the United States stepped up to intercede on the behalf of the UFC.

The United States used communism as the reason for intervening in Guatemala. In 1953, Arbenz accepted the support of communists in Guatemala, and incorporated several communists into his presidential administration. In addition to this, he had accepted 2000 tons of arms from the Czechs. Eisenhower and Dulles found that these were the actions of a subversive communist plot, and organized a coup to remove this threat to the Western Hemisphere. Using a man named Armas, and a force trained in Honduras by the United States, Arbenz was ousted from power in June, 1954. He and his top aids, hearing the propaganda the United States used against them, were able to flee to Czechoslovakia and, thereby, escape being assassinated.

How did the United States’ actions in Guatemala conform to the behaviors prescribed in NSC 68? In several ways, the US did conform to the actions set down by the Secretaries of State and Defense. For example, the US followed the suggestion of NSC 68 in subverting the influence of communism by using psychological warfare in the form of propaganda. The US had already used television to spread the word of the evils of communism in Latin America, and they stepped up their efforts when Guatemala fell into Arbenz’s control (Hixson, Walter L. Parting the Red Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, ...

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War, 1945-1961(New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1997, 127). Also, by using covert operations and operatives that were Guatemalan nationals, the US was able to maintain the pretense of NSC 68’s position against starting war. However, to further comply with NSC 68, the United States was forced to split semantics.

NSC 68 states that one of the objectives of the United States needed to be defending the Western Hemisphere and strengthening the “orientation toward the United States of the non-Soviet nations (NSC 68, 106).” In 1953, Dulles and the US used these ideas to declare that international communism, like that which he saw in Guatemala, was a threat to the US system and concept of American freedom. Therefore, it was acceptable for the US to act as they did in Guatemala in 1954- the US was merely defending its way of life against the threat communism. NSC 68 gave strict instructions that the US must guard itself from communism, and keep it from secrets attacks against the US, and the Eisenhower administration was following this doctrine in Guatemala.

The United States, in this instance, used the auspices of NSC 68 to protect the economic interests of the US and US-backed industries. Never, in the rather underhanded actions of the US, is the idea of free will of nations mentions. The ideas of free will, so lauded in NSC 68, seem to be secondary to protecting economic concerns. The US would rather further its war against communism than support the development of independent nations, which is an action clearly stipulated in NSC 68. Also, through its underhanded methods of overthrowing Arbenz, the US lost credibility in Latin America, which also went completely against the guidelines of NSC 68. Such actions did little to orient non-Soviet nations towards the US.

The United States did not always disregard the doctrines of NSC 68 as they had in Guatemala. In fact, in 1956, in Egypt, the US took the opposite actions when dealing with the Suez crisis. In this incident, the United States stuck to NSC 68 almost entirely.

In 1952, Gamel Abd al-Nasser led a coup that brought him to power in Egypt. Like in Guatemala, Nasser wanted independence from outside nations. By this statement, Nasser meant not only no colonialism in Egypt, but also that no outside country should have an influence in the policies of another nation. In this vein, Nasser refused to commit Egypt to either the United States or the Soviet Union. Instead, he used both nations to help his nation.

In 1955, Nasser received an offer from the United States of $100 million of aid in building the Aswan Dam on the Nile. However, in 1956, the US withdrew its offer of support. The US was not happy with Nasser because of several of his actions, most notably his recognition of the People’s Republic of China, his alliance with Syria, and an arms deal he made with Czechoslovakia. Also, Nasser refused to allow Egypt to be part of the Baghdad Pact, the Middle East equivalent to SEATO and other anti-communist organizations. Without the United States’ aid, Nasser did not have the means to build the Aswan Dam. In order to raise the necessary funds, Nasser seized the British-owned Suez Canal with the intention of using the tolls of the canal to fund the dam project. He nationalized the Suez Canal much to the consternation of the West, especially Britain and France. Both these countries saw Nasser as a puppet to the Soviets, and wanted to retake the Suez with force if need be. The US took a softer stance however.

Afraid of alienating the oil-rich Middle East in the same way that it had alienated Latin America with its actions in Guatemala, the United States was willing to accept Egyptian control of the canal so long as the canal remained open (Suez Crisis, ) . The US continued with this policy, even after Israel invaded Egypt in October, 1956, with the backing and support of France and Britain. They asked for the US’s support in containing this communist threat, but the US would not support this military action. This was not only because of the fear of alienating the main source of the US oil supply. The US could not support the actions of its allies because, if the US showed support, it would be supporting actions which it had condemned the Soviet Union for practicing. That is, if the US supported France and Britain, it would be supporting colonization, which was a system it used to show the evils of communism.

To remove itself from this sticky situation, the United States turned to the United Nations to solve the problem of the Suez Canal, first through the Security Council and then through the General Assembly. With the United States against their actions, and Russia threatening rocket attacks if they did not withdraw, the French-British-Israeli alliance had no choice but to remove itself from Egypt. This effectively ended the role of the British and French in the Middle East, and allowed the Soviets to fill in some of the vacuum of power.

In this incident, the government followed NSC 68 very closely. This document was strongly against the use of force or conflict, as the writers of the report feared the military strength of the Soviet Union. By averting war and using the United Nations to solve the conflict, the United States was following NSC 68. Also, in supporting the nationalization of the Suez Canal by the Egyptian government, the United States is sticking to the NC 68 objective of allowing countries free will. Too often, the United States used the issue of free will against the Soviets, claiming that the USSR did not allow its satellites any real say. However, the US was typically equally guilty in imposing its will on those smaller satellite countries. In the case of Egypt, however, the US was allowing a country to forge its own path, despite the fact that said path was Soviet supported. This is not to say that the US was reforming its ways. Rather, the US took the stance it did because of economic interests, domestic situations, and other international events.

To understand why the US followed the NSC 68 guidelines in its dealings during the Suez Crisis in 1965, and not in other instances, one must understand several things. First of all, unlike in situations like Guatemala, the US could not afford to anger the Middle East. As one of the only sources of oil, angering these nations meant threatening the ready supply of a very valuable resource. That was an action the US could not risk. So, in order to maintain an oil supply, the US did not force its anti-communist policies onto Egypt. At the same time, the US was undergoing a presidential election. Eisenhower could not afford to embroil the US in the situation in Egypt because it would threaten his reelection. Finally, there was the issue of Hungary and the Soviet Union.

As stated before, the US could not support the French and British colonization in the Middle East without being hypocritical in its accusations against the Soviet Union. To compound matters, while this situation was playing out in the Middle East, the Soviets were forcibly putting down a student-led rebellion in Hungary. The US could not condone the actions of some colonial powers while condemning another power for the same actions. So, the US decided to not become entangled in such an ethical quagmire. Instead, the US urged a UN-led solution in Egypt and did not interfere in Hungary. It is only this non-interference in Hungary that goes against NSC 68. In all of its other actions during the Suez Crisis, the US followed NSC 69 doctrine- it advocated a non-violent solution through the United Nations, it allowed for self-determination and free will for Egypt, it protected its economic and military interests (as oil was an essential component for the US military). However, in not supporting a nation trying to escape communist control, the US failed to enforce NSC 68. The US’s non-action in Hungary was in direct opposition to the statutes of NSC 68, and proved to be the end of the report’s adhearance to rolling back communism wherever it was found.

As has been shown thus far, whether or not NSC 68 was enforced in different situations depended upon the economics of the situation. In Guatemala, the document in question could be circumvented because the consequences of action were not as dire as they were in Egypt. Latin America did not have the same economic power, namely in oil, to force the US to allow the nations of that region self-determination. By holding the trump card in the form of the oil supply, the Middle East was able to force the US to stick to the principles it spelled out in NSC 68, which mainly covered turning communism back wherever it was found, following an attack strategy of economic isolation, and non-confrontation.

In the Bay of Pigs incident, economics once again played a factor. Much like in Guatemala, the Bay Of Pigs featured a change in government which led to threatened US economics. In this case, however, there really was a communist government to fear. Cuba was taken over by a communist regime, which meant that the US had more maneuver room in its application of NSC 68,

In 1959, Fidel Castro led a coup in Cuba, overthrowing the Batista government and establishing himself as premier. As Castro settled into his new role, he began to nationalize many different industries within Cuba. These industries, like the oil refineries, the sugar mills, and the electric utilities, had previously been run by American companies. Angry that their business interests were being taken from them, companies put pressure on the US government to take action. In 1960, the Eisenhower took certain measures against Cuba. Heartened by the successful use of covert activities in staging the governmental coup in Guatemala, Eisenhower implemented the training of Cuban nationalists. The plan was for these fighters to overthrow Castro in the same manner that the Armas-led fighters in Guatemala overthrew Arbenz. However, as the plan progressed, there was a change in administration in the US, and John F. Kennedy came to power.

Kennedy continued with the training of Cuban nationalists when he took office. Also, by this point, trade embargoes had been enforced against Cuba in an effort to solve this communist crisis through economic rather than military methods. However, Cuba had established a connection to the Soviet Union, which was keeping the small nation was having to bend to the US’s will.

While continuing with the plans for a covert operation which would overthrow Castro, the US also engaged in propaganda to help turn the Cuban people against the communists. Such devices, such as the SWAN radio, were ineffective however. The communist regime enacted countermeasures for the propaganda, releasing pamphlets, etc. of their own in support of the new government. Also, former US action in Cuba and Latin America did not leave the US with a very good reputation in the area.

That left only the covert invasion. On April 17, 1961, a group of CIA-trained Cuban nationals invaded a beach area in Cuba. Castro himself took control of countering the invasion, using the Cuban air force to destroy re-supply boats in the Bay of Pigs area. Cut off from their supplies, and facing a military force that had been quickly mobilized, the invasion was defeated. The Castro government was still secure and in control.

The US was quick to admit collusion with the defeated invaders. However, did the US’s actions in this conflict follow the guidelines of NSC 68? In many ways, it did. The invasion was the result of a threat to the United States and its economic interests, which were two areas that NSC 68 instructed the government to protect. In addition, war was avoided at the cost of the lives of the invaders. Instead of risking a world war, the US chose to help nationals rather than stage a full-on attack itself. It also tried other tactics, to try and achieve its aims. However, the trade embargoes and radio and other propaganda techniques failed.

Once again, however, the US was guilty of not allowing other nations in its hemisphere from practicing self-determination. However, in this case, it was more justified, as the government under attack was not elected in the democratic method the US advocated. Also, unlike before, Cuba did represent a real threat to the US’s safety. Located merely ninety miles south of Florida, Cuba could have served as a launch pad for a communist attack on America. In fact, in 1962, the US discovered that Cuba was housing many ballistic missiles which had been placed on the island by the Soviets. The threat here was very real, and the US still followed its convictions of avoiding war.

NSC 68 is a set of suggestions of how the US should respond to communist threats. It advocates free will, economic actions to bring communism down, and an avoidance of war. The US has used and applied NSC 68 in a manner of incidents over the years. However, the US applied the tenants of this document as it saw fit in each situation. If following the ideas of the document would not have brought about the desired results, then the document was ignored. IN terms of economic desired outcomes, this is the most clear. The US used NSC 68 when it suited its purposes.