The 'War in Sight' crisis of April 1874, was not the concert working as Austria and Italy remained neutral in the affair, (on Austria's part this was a breech of the Schönbrunn Convention) while Britain and Russia warned Bismarck not to extend German frontiers any further. Diplomatic pressure was put on Germany, but Andrassy, the Austrian foreign minister, expressed his fears to Bismarck in private and refused to admonish Germany in public. Instead he kept quiet for Austria's gain and watched the rift develop between Gorchakov, the Russian foreign minister and Bismarck. Italy, after a German promise that Berlin would not allow an attack on her, also remained neutral. After Radowitz, the German Diplomat talked indiscreetly of preventive war, it was Gorchakov who made the first move towards opposition to German demands by sending formal assurance to London that the Russian expansion in Central Asia, which the British perceived as a threat, would cease. Although it is doubtful that Britain would not have opposed German ambitions, Russia's incentive towards her cannot be discounted. During the crisis Russia was the only power willing to uphold the Three Emperor's League, but this was mainly due to Gorchakov's rivalry with Bismarck rather than concert principles. All the powers wished to maintain the status quo, but not through the concert of Europe.
The first half of the Eastern Crisis leading up to the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war on 24 April, 1877 highlighted the attempts the powers made, half-heartedly to work in concert. All powers except Germany had an interest in the Ottoman Empire, Britain needed the Ottoman Empire for the protection of trade routes, Austria depended on free navigation of the Danube for an economic link, France financially aided Turkey and Russian grain exports had to pass through the Straits. It was in all these powers' interests to subdue the Balkan uprisings. If the concert principals had been followed, a solution to the crisis would have been to combine these powers; instead, great lengths were made to keep certain powers out of discussions. Andrassy first proposed that Austria, Germany and Russia should settle the future of the Turks. The tsar insisted France be brought in to the discussions hoping to play France and Germany off against each other; Bismarck insisted that if France was brought in, Britain and Italy to would have to join, his hope being to estrange France. Again it became a question of personal interest and not concert diplomacy.
After the failure of the Andrassy Note, December 1875 and Berlin Memorandum, May 1876, in which Gorchakov gave Andrassy a virtual free hand to compile, the powers were no nearer to a solution. On 11 May, 1876 Gorchakov continued to press for intervention by the six powers, which Derby, British foreign secretary refused. France would not send a fleet without Britain's approval, Bismarck wanted the Ottoman Empire partitioned between the powers; none could agree on the action to be taken. What looked like a triumph for the six great powers' attempt to revive the flailing concert in the Constantinople Conference, May 1876, was rejected by the Turks. Austria-Hungary and Russia saw the concert as useless and formed their own solution, the Reichstadt agreement, a bilateral treaty agreeing to partition the Balkans if it collapsed. The concert of Europe had proved ineffective due to the rivalry and indecision of the powers leaving the fate of the Ottoman Empire in Austro-Russian hands.
Russia's victory over the Turks resulted in the Treaty of San Stefano, (3 March, 1878) which proved unacceptable to the other powers of Europe as it disregarded the terms of the Budapest Convention. The ensuing uproar led to the congress of Berlin in June, where a satisfactory compromise with Russia was reached, although the powers were still primarily concerned with their own interests, and the success of the conference was mainly due to a number of bilateral agreements prior to the congress. Disraeli's attempt to form a Mediterranean League "to secure trade and communication of Europe with the east from the overwhelming interference of Russia" was turned down by Italy, Greece, Austria and France although only after some deliberation. Disraeli hoped that with Austria they could seize territory in the East and stop the others becoming jealous by containing them in the Mediterranean League. France at the congress did not want Syria and Egypt discussed. The Congress was successful and a triumph for concert diplomacy, Russia, financially strained by the war, was in no position to fight for her gains, while the powers were all in agreement to modify the San Stefano treaty. The powers acted together throughout the conference, opposition only coming from the Turkish sector over Austrian rights to occupy Bosnia.
The Egyptian issue in 1879 is also an instance of where the powers had an agreed vested interest in Egypt although did not rely on concert principles. After the Khedive removed the Nubar-Wilson cabinet and put forward his own plan in May to reduce the debt from 7% to 6% and pay 55% of the floating debt; Germany was the first to protest followed by Austria, then later France and Britain. This was an attempt by the four powers to safeguard their finances in Egypt, they did not discuss this course of action together, while it is possible Bismarck lent diplomatic support as hoped that British influence in Egypt would check Russian expansion in Asia. The financial crisis soon dissipated in June when the Sultan disposed Ismail the Khedive under French and British pressure, establishing Dual Control. It was not concert diplomacy and apart from Germany and Austria's protest at the financial reduction Britain and France acted alone.
The Dual Alliance, 7 October 1879 marked the end of a "decade of loose alignments." It was a defensive alliance between the two Germanic powers and heralded the end of what little concert diplomacy there had been. Gladstone in his speech in November 1879 attempted to renew the concert which he outlined in his four main points, the speech had already come too late as Europe was now entering a system of alliances which would preserve the peace equally as well as the congresses and concerts had previously done.
The diplomacy of the 1870's was marked by attempts to use concert principles, such as the pledge to continue monarchical solidarity and the Congress of Berlin, although attempts to use concert diplomacy in this period were marred by each country's self-interest. France was constantly isolated by Bismarck, while the only power willing to uphold monarchical solidarity was Russia in the 'War in Sight' crisis. Attempts before the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war were made to reach a collective agreement and failed; hence the shift at the end of the decade to a system of alliances which replaced the Great Powers' half-hearted measures to invoke the concert of Europe throughout the 1870's.
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