The Great Powers and nineteenth century colonialism

University Degree Historical and Philosophical studies

The Great Powers and nineteenth century colonialism

By 1882 Europe's naval superpower, Great Britain, had already acquired a significant global empire. However, it was in the following two decades that two key areas of the world opened up to the imperialist appetites of most of the other great powers of Europe, as well as Italy, Portugal and Belgium. The scramble for Africa and the dash for China, were flippantly referred to as the "Great Game", suggesting that colonies were of less value compared to the serious balance of power issues in Europe. This was essentially true and, despite many crisis points, no two powers went to war over a colonial dispute until the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war in February 1904. However, there were instances where extra-European issues did affect the balance of power and appeared close to producing a serious conflict, and hence the Great Game was a significant development in the European states system.

Since Britain was the chief colonialist power prior to 1882, any extra-European disputes were likely to involve her, and, as she was perhaps the most detached power from the States system, this helped prevent these disputes escalating into a major conflict. In 1882 Britain intervened in the Egyptian revolt and assumed control. This infuriated the French who had their own interests there and shattered Anglo-French relations for two decades. Despite this humiliation, France never once attempted to use force against Britain in Egypt. The balance in Europe had been made secure by Bismarck's Triple Alliance (May 1882) and the Three Emperors Alliance (June 1881); whilst Bismarck was concerned that Britain had gained a head start in the partition of the Ottoman Empire, and whilst he was prepared to encourage France to pursue a colonial policy (to divert them from a restless policy in Europe) he was never prepared to guarantee their interests against the British. Thus, the French were unable to take effective action and the dispute did not impair the balance of power during the 1880's. Indeed other African matters during the 1880's saw considerable co-operation between the powers resulting in agreement over the Congo at the Berlin Conference of 1885.

This is a preview of the whole essay

During the 1880's the Balkans and the Eastern Question remained the prime source of fragility to the Balance of Power. It was not extra-European issues but the Bulgarian crisis which caused the break up of the Three Emperors Alliance in 1887 and the reorganisation of the States System. However, where extra-European issues had an impact on the Eastern Question, such as in the Penjdeh crisis (1885) the other powers became involved. Since the British could not tackle the percieved Russian threat to India on land, their chief form of defence was to attack Russia in the Black Sea. This was a potential threat to the peace of Europe since the British fleet would have to pass through the Straits. It failed to materialise because the terms of the Three Emperors Alliance enforced the Russian interpretation of the straits and with France still seething over Egypt, Britain had no allies at could not force a solution. At this stage, only events which could divide the Eastern monarchies, such as the Bulgarian crisis, were likely to produce a serious threat to international stability.

Events in Africa in the 1890's were to reflect the changes in diplomatic alignments in Europe after 1887, rather than vice versa. That France and Russia, becoming closer after the scrapping of the Russo-German Reinsurance Treaty, supplied Menelik with weapons to repulse Triple Alliance power Italy from Abyssinia, resulting in the battle of Adowa (March 1896), was not the cause of tension but a symptom of it. It also demonstrated that neither Russia nor especially France (who had particular strategic and economic interests in Abyssinia) were prepared to commit their own troops to fight the Italians.

The same was true in Egypt where the British were determined to remain since the Penjdeh crisis had reduced the strategic worth to them of Constantinople. The new angle for France was to secure the Upper Nile (hoping in vain to sabotage its flow into Egypt). This policy ended in the confrontation at Fashoda in 1898. Again the Russians, whose only diplomatic interest in France was protection in a potential Russo-German war, had no intention of bolstering French colonial policy albeit against her own naval rival, Britain. Whilst the Germans hoped to (and had some success earlier in the decade), in aggravating British colonial difficulties in an unsuccessful attempt to secure British support for the Triple Alliance, they could do nothing for the French at Fashoda. The French were forced to negotiate and again a conflict was averted, and British security ensured by British "naval supremacy and the Balance of Power in Europe". Former French Prime Minister Leon Gambetta had declared that "to remain a great nation, or to become one, you must colonise." This was not true for France. French imperial appetite was a response to her lack of manoeuvrability on the continent; and no colony was worth entering a general war for in the same way as would be Alsace-Lorraine.

Germany's entry into the colonial scramble could have potentially upset the balance but again produced little more than temporary tension. Bismarck did not espouse a colonial policy but had his own domestic reasons for securing South West Africa in East African territories in the 1880's (both of which were achieved without serious dispute with Britain). But the Zanzibar-Heligoland treaty with Britain of 1890 demonstrated that continental security was more important to Germany, either under Bismarck or Wilhelm II, than colonial gains. After the Mediterranean agreements of 1887, however, Germany's aim in the 1890's was to progress further and tie Britain in to the Triple Alliance. This could best be done, it was perceived, by exploiting weaknesses to British continental security. Hence German support for France in repudiating Britain's 1895 Congo Agreements with Leopold II.

Britain was less secure in South Africa however, where she had already lost the Transvaal and considerable prestige to Paul Kruger and his rebels in 1883. Wilhelm II's rash telegram to Kruger after the failure of the British (Jameson) raid into the Transvaal in January 1896 which congratulated his success without the "help of friendly powers [Germany]", seriously damaged Anglo-German relations. There were jingoistic calls for war in both countries but again there was no such conflict; even when the British went to war with the Boers in October 1899, "friendly" assistance was not forthcoming from Germany. By siding with either the Triple Alliance or France and Russia who had formalised their entente in the winter of 1893-4, Britain could seriously affect the continental balance. But disputes over Fashoda and the Kruger Telegram ensured that by 1890 she was in "splendid isolation" and more distanced than ever from the States System of Europe.

In the Far East, Britain did not have a head start as in Africa. France in Indo-China and Russia through the development of the Trans-Siberian Railway were probably the leading powers. But the arrival of Japan as a world power through her defeat of China in 1895 was to make this region more significant to the international situation. The 1893 Siam crisis, where British interests in Burma appeared threatened by France, brought temporary shouts for war, similar to those later seen after the Kruger Telegram; but the crisis passed quickly, despite the fortuitous presence of Wilhelm II in London increasing Anglo-French tension at the height of the problem.

In China however, German colonial policy was more dynamic than it had been in Africa. The Kaiser genuinely hoped to benefit from the imminent disintegration of the Chinese Empire following the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 1895). An immediate potential conflict with Russia was avoided however through cooperation, a policy that had prevented many conflicts in Africa. The Russians, for their part, were prepared to take on Japan but not Germany, and whilst they skilfully side-stepped Berlin to ensure that France and herself won the benefits of the revision of Shimonoseki, Nicholas II did not protest to the German tenancy of Kiaochow in 1898. The Germans also, would not fight the Russians, and whilst their Yangtze Agreement with Britain (October 1900) aimed to improve Anglo-German relations, they would not interpret the agreement to prevent Russian expansion in Manchuria. The international situation would only be impaired if a country was prepared to go to war over a colonial issue and was strong enough to fight alone. In the Far East Japan was such a power. In 1905 Russian defeat, and the destruction of two of her fleets, was the first extra-European issue that was in itself, to seriously affect the balance of power and the international situation. Russia tumbled down the Great Power rankings and left Germany as Britain's chief naval rival in Europe.

However between 1882 and 1904, the balance of power was never significantly altered by extra-European ambitions. German attempts to use colonial issues to force Britain into the Triple Alliance always failed. Britain had no desire to be involved in the security of Austria Hungary; and in none of the European alignments did any of the partners have any desire (or obligation) to uphold each others colonial interests. Consequently no country, especially France, could fight alone to win an Empire, without risking her security in Europe. As British Foreign secretary Sir Edward Grey later reflected: "the situation was not in the least alarming - there was no question of a breach of the peace, or a rupture of diplomatic relations - but there was constant friction." Paradoxically, the availability of colonial diversions for Russia in Asia and for France in Africa and Indo-China may have eased their restlessness on the continent and helped maintain the balance. France, however, would not forget 1870 altogether, and the one region that could always upset the international situation -the Balkans- would not stay quiet forever. Extra-European issues did not seriously impair the international situation between 1882 and 1904, but they did not secure the peace either.