The human mind.

However by the principle of Occam’s razor, when two theories of equal explanation powers are available we shall choose the one that is simpler. It is my contention to show that the introduction of the agent-causation is arbitrary as we can explain our decisions in terms of random processes rather than the works of the agency.

The libertarians may argue that, the strong will of some great historical figures showed us that free will cannot be simply accounted by random processes.

In response I will offer a statistical approach. For simplicity the choices of any person who is exposed to moments of decision making are divided into good ones and bad ones. So the process of decision making is essentially like coin tossing. We can actually say that the great historical figures are the one who toss “good” for all 1000 times of coin-tossing in their lives. The probability is extremely small, but it is consistent with the fact that the number of great historical figures is very small.

The libertarians may try to show my analogy is inappropriate. Firstly, they may argue that efforts do not pertain to a few special people. Secondly it maybe further argued that following my logic, it will be like saying the person who has been engaging in his business and went through great difficulties and his success is just like the winning of mark six. In other words, the libertarians will reject my claim that efforts are nothing but probabilities.

In answer to their first counterargument I would say that the claim that everyone makes effort is actually compatible with my coin-tossing analogy. Actually, it is very rare that a person who do not make any effort in his whole life. The fact that nearly all people make effort in their lives is reflected in this analogy as it is very unlikely for a person who does not throw “good” in all coin-tossing in his life.

In reply to the second counterargument, I would say that it will be right to say that both the business man and the man who win mark six are both rich because of probabilities. The business man is the one who is lucky in throwing the internal coin, while the man winning mark six is the one who is lucky in throwing the external coin. If we are satisfied that our mental events are governed by brain states which are determined by atomic motions, then why do we not believe our efforts, which are some brain states, follows the scientific rules just like other things else?  The difference in internal and external probabilities does not justify the claim that the external probabilities are governed by scientific laws but not the internal probabilities. The prima facie difference of the two cases is due to the fact that we do not attribute the success of the man winning mark six to the “right sort of ways”.

4. Compatabilism is true, the instance of exercising our free will and what are the actions caused by the “right sort of ways”

        Therefore, combine determinism is true and free will is true, I propose compatabilism to be the correct solution of the problem. We possess free will not because we have the freedom to act otherwise.

But when are the instances of exercising of free will? Also what is the criterion for distinguishing free and unfree actions? Pink defined voluntariness as we are doing what ourselves have wanted or decided to do or something is done based on our will. But I do not think that is a complete definition as all our actions are caused, what are things done based on our will and what are those do not? Unless satisfactory answers are given to these questions this account of free will cannot be complete.

The remaining discussion will therefore be divided into two parts, first part dealing with the correct understudying of the instance our exercising of free will and in the second part the focusing on making sense of what are the actions caused in the “right sort of ways”, i.e. distinguishing free and unfree actions.

 4.1 The instance of exercising our free will

The most problematic issue is whether we include decision making as voluntary actions.

The traditional compatibilists like Hobbes denies that we exercise free will at instances of decision making. However, it is justly criticized by Pink that our ordinary understanding of decisions shows we exercise our free will when we are making decisions.

        Frankfurt has tried a different approach from Hobbes. He tried to make sense of the free will of the compatibilists by appealing to the “higher-order desires and volitions”. Frankfurt defined free actions as those having higher-order desires and volitions.

        It is quite clear that Frankfurt has included instances of decisions as instances of our exercising of free will. However, Watson challenged Frankfurt’s approach by asking that “Can’t be a wanton (someone is a wanton if he has no second-order volitions), so to speak, with respect to one’s second order desires and volitions?” Watson argued if second order volitions are themselves simply desires, then there definitely can be third order desires, and so on, which will regress to infinity. 

        To propose the solution, I think we should view the problem as a linguistical problem.

Wittgenstein suggested concept of words can be understood by family resemblance. The meanings represented by a word can have meanings that overlap in some ways, but there can possibly be no single common property that links the different meanings together. (E.g. Concept A is 1 and 2, concept B s 2 and 3, Concept C is 3 and 4. There is no common property between A , B and C, nevertheless, they can be treated as family concepts as each member have some features like another member.)

        It is true that second order decisions can be problematic. But sometimes, we can make sense of second order decisions. For example, imagine a case that someone is trapped in a burning room. He has a decision to go upstairs or downstairs. But he also has a second order decision whether to make a decision or not. His second order decision can be said to be voluntary as his decision is made in response to the desirability of making the decision itself as well as the desirability of performing the decision.

In other cases, a decision is made in response to the desirability of the action decided to take in the decision. In this case, his decision making does not respond to the desirability of making the decision itself and in this case, his decision making is non-voluntary.

        But why should we make the universal claim that all decisions are voluntary? Our concepts of decision actually cover at least two distinctively different types of decisions, which are voluntary and non-voluntary decisions respectively. Similarly, if we understand free will in terms of voluntariness, we can see the concept of free will as one of family resemblance. The time of exercising our free will does not restrict to a definite course during our actions. Rather, we exercise free will sometimes in the moment that we make decisions voluntarily, sometimes when we act intentionally.

4.2 What are the actions caused by the “right sort of ways?”

        

Stace suggested free actions are those “whose immediate causes are psychological states in the agent”, and unfree actions are those “whose immediate causes are states of affairs external to the agent”. However, counterexamples can be given to this account. For example, for a man whose psychological behaviors are affected seriously by drugs, do we still regard the man as free? It does not reconcile with what we normally think as free.

We have also already discussed Frankfurt’s treatment of free actions as those having higher-order desires. It is a possible solution as in the previous section it is suggested that free will can exercise in the instances of decision making. The reason why he believed that higher-order volitions are crucial to the freedom of an action is that “only because a person has volitions of the second order that he is capable both of enjoying and of lacking freedom of the will”.He said as second order volitions are important to our perception as self, and therefore crucial to our understanding of free will. But a problem still remains. If we can have second-order volitions, then we possibly can have higher order volitions. Then why don’t we say third order, or nth order volition as the most crucial to the understanding of self? It is not my contention to show that Frankfurt is wrong in this aspect, but I will try to examine other criteria to choose the best one.

        I think the best description is given by Ayer, as free will action that is an action that is not under compulsion. But since all our actions are caused according to Ayer, what kinds of causes are compulsive?

Smith raised some useful complements to Ayer’s view.        His suggestion is that the difference between ordinary behavior and compulsory behavior is that ordinary behavior is rational while compulsive behavior is not. I agree to this approach, as we often categorize actions that are deliberately done as more free and those who are done not after much consideration as less free.

Some may argue that, this approach is vague as it cannot define what is free or unfree actions. Therefore, the issue now becomes what is the threshold of rationality? I believe that free will comes in degrees. I will take a man shooting another with a gun as an example.

        If this man shoots deliberately he is definitely most responsible. If he is pointed with knife by another to shoot, we usually held this man less responsible as we think he is less free. If a man is totally controlled by a machine to shoot, we usually will not say this man as free and held him responsible. So maybe what is the threshold of rationality defining free and unfree actions is something that is subject to human interpretations.

5. Conclusion

        Based on the above reasoning, I come to the following conclusions.

        Firstly, we have free will. Secondly, determinism is true and the libertarian’s “ultimate origination” is unreal in the macroscopic level and arbitrary in the microscopic quantum level. Thirdly, the instances we exercise our free will can include moments of decisions making and we shall see the concept of “decision making” and “free will” as family resemblance concepts. Finally, it is accepted by the author that degree of rationality is crucial in determining what free and unfree acts are, and that “free will” is actually not a yes or no question but it comes in degree.

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