The 1979 revolution in Iran had produced a growing support base for Islamization. The revolution would acknowledge the leadership of Khomeini and move towards the overthrow of the Lebanese government, in favor of an Islamic regime similar to Iran’s. Revolutionary Guards were sent in 1982 to help fight the jihad against Israel and to help achieve the aforementioned goals. Lebanese ulama welcomed the Iranian intervention as they provided social and economic aid projects to the distraught local populations. Baalbek, thus, became the first area in Lebanon to assume this new trend toward Islamization and enacted reforms such as prohibition and enforcement of Islamic dress. It is here that the Hizbollah movement was established.
Within a few months of Hizbollah’s establishment in 1982, it became a mass movement. It was joined by other Shiites who broke off from organizations such as Amal al-Islami, Association of Muslim Ulama in Lebanon, the Lebanese Da’wa and Association of Muslim Students. Many of these groups joined the Hizbollah informally while keeping their internalized structures intact. In addition to these groups, Hizbollah gained support from large clans in the Bekaa Valley and from refugees in Beirut who felt a close association with the plight of the Palestinians and deep resentment to the ruling party in Lebanon, Israel, and the West. (p.131 encyc2) As Israeli forces were removed from Lebanon in 1985, the weight of Hizbollah was strengthened because it took a large portion of the credit for this development. With this turn of events, Hizbollah progressed to seek for the establishment of the Islamic state.
Hizb Allah (party of God) is mentioned in Surahs five and fifty-eight to refer to a body of Muslim believers who are promised triumph over hizb al-Shaytan (the Devil’s party). (p.129 encyc2) The struggle of Hizbollah was, as Musawi declared, “against the East and West alike.” (p.125) The formation of this organization, thus, stemmed from the needed ouster of foreign oppressors. As seen is so many other instances, Islam was the answer to the ills of society. Both external and internal reform were needed as Fadlallah called for members to first have internal transformation and spiritual purification in order to develop the strength of the community. (Kramer, 218) Furthermore, Fadlallah called for a “rebellion against fear,” referring to the fear that had been inflicted upon the Lebanese people by foreign and domestic sources.
During the 1980s, most of Hizbollah’s acts were aimed at the eradication of foreign influence, support for Iran in the war against Iraq, freeing imprisoned members, and the establishment of Hizbollah predominance vis-à-vis other Islamist groups in Lebanon. In the “open letter” of 1985, Hizbollah first formulated its doctrine, which further established the goals of: Israel’s complete departure from Lebanon “as a prelude to its final obliteration” and the right of people for self-determination. The need for violence can be understood by the long history of violent struggle that characterizes Lebanon; and though Fadlallah stressed that it was a last resort, it was often the only option for the oppressed Lebanese.
There were three levels of struggle, in which Hizbollah was engaged. The first was the ulama’s preached resistance against the enemies of Islam. The second was the Islamic Resistance that attacked Israeli forces in South Lebanon. The members of this sector were trained by the Revolutionary Guards and allowed Iran to continually assert its influence in Lebanon. The third, and most violent, was the Organization of Islamic Jihad against the West. This group was responsible for the bombings of the U.S. embassy in 1983 and 1984. It achieved its goals with the ouster of American and French troops from Lebanon. Islamic Resistance was also successful in forcing the Israelis to retreat to a “security zone” in South Lebanon.(p.121 encyc2)
As the years progressed and violence mounted, so did the violent methods used to achieve Hizbollah’s objectives. The use of hijackings, kidnappings and suicide bombings were all employed. All of these methods had to be justified by the ulama through Islamic law and had to prove that all actions were guided to a legitimate jihad with the needs of the oppressed at the forefront. It was especially difficult for many ulama to justify suicide bombings because suicide is forbidden in Islam. Fadlallah provided the constraint that the “self-martyring operation is not permitted unless it can convulse the enemy.” (Kramer 223) Ultimately, however, Fadlallah knew that “sacred ends could not be achieved only by profane means.” (Kramer 225) In fact, martyrdom was eventually condemned by the ulama. The western media continued to assert the inherent extremism of Shiism and did not recognize the reality. Extremism was a reaction to the West and as soon as conditions began to change in Lebanon in the 1990s, violence and extremism was curbed.
Two events were responsible for the shift in Hizbollah policy. With the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1990, new power symmetries were established. In 1991, the Gulf War shifted the West’s focus from Iran to Iraq as the bad guy in the Middle East. As such, western intervention decreased dramatically in the nation and the Hizbollah was able to begin a transformation to a new jihad over ideas. They became more committed to social activism and more willing to accept and participate in democracy. (Kramer 227)
After 1992 Fadlallah advocated the new aim of Hizbollah, which was to be the “normalization of relations with the rest of the world.” (Kramer 226) This normalization was proven by the Lebanese elections of 1992, 1996, and 2000 where the Hizbollah party progressively gained numbers of elected officials. The current leader of Hizbollah, Nasrallah, proved the change in policy by stating that, “Hizbollah is an Islamic movement but also a national party. It does not oppose the rise of a secular political system in Lebanon.” (Kramer 275)
The reversal of the goals of Hizbollah over the course of the 1990s has been the result of improved conditions for the Lebanese people. As this occurred there was a change to a more practical and rational appeal to the people, which as described above, accepted the political and social framework of Lebanese society. This is not to say, however, that Hizbollah has completed eradicated its violent tactics and still made deadly attacks against Israel as evidenced by the Israeli Embassy bombing in Argentina in 1992. Even after the forced disarmament of many groups in 1992, Hizbollah was allowed to retain their arms, in order to ensure the security of southern Lebanon. Their need to use force, however, has been greatly diminished.
In the summer of 2000, Israel withdrew its troops from Lebanon and terrorism by Islamic militants almost disappeared in the region. This fact alone should prove to the world that extremism is not inherent in Shiism or Islam as a whole. Radicalization is a move of desperation, and as soon as the desperation is alleviated, the support for radicalized groups is nearly nullified. After the attacks on September 11, 2001, Hizbollah expressed its sorrow for the loss of life incurred by innocent peoples and worked to ensure the West recognized Hizbollah’s innocence. Nasrallah used this opportunity to call into question the real goals of the U.S. response to terror. He called attention to whether or not it was just a means by which the United States would assert greater hegemony in the world, which would only increase the level of hatred that had caused September 11th in the first place.(Hizbollah.org)
Upon the start of the U.S. led strikes against Afghanistan, Nasrallah denounced the aggression and disavowed the legitimacy of this ‘war on terror.’ The Hizbollah-owned television station, Al-Manar, began to present news which was “justly biased towards the Afghanis, as they were the ones being killed.” In doing so, Hizbollah hopes to “rouse Muslims (everywhere) to denounce the aggression.” (Hizbollah.org) Though, Hizbollah acknowledges the right of the United States to seek justice through apprehending the extremists responsible, it must call into question the motives behind any western action in any foreign nation. This is not the result of inherent extremism, but the consequence of alienating native populations in the west’s search for power and money.
Through the course of the past twenty years, the ideology of Hizbollah has evolved greatly. The trend at the advent of Hizbollah was both a utopian and an emotional appeal, which blamed suffering on the oppressors and proclaimed the Islamic state as the only source for morally sustainable development. The radicalization which followed was short-lived as the hope for establishing an Islamic republic diminished and the oppressors were largely expelled. The shift in Hizbollah’s ideology emerged in the early 1990s and it became a true political party, rather than viewed as a loose congregation of armed militiamen. The goal of integration, as opposed to complete revolution was established. It is important to understand the perspective of groups, such as Hizbollah, as the United States continues its war on terror. Many nations around the world share similar sentiments due to their history of oppression by outside forces. It is the duty of western media and educators to facilitate greater understanding of the reasons behind extremists’ acts and how they became extreme. If we really want to win the ‘war on terror’, understanding the implications of America’s foreign policy is mandatory. The evolution of Hizbollah may serve as one of the best examples of how improved societal conditions may result in a more normalized presence of the, so-called, fundamentalist organizations in the Muslim world and beyond.
