the Anda or blood brother, which was marked by drinking a few drops of blood from each of the
parties and represented eternal friendship. Thus kinship and patrilineal accession to power was
further complicated.
The tribal people were very poor at the time of Temujin’s birth. Through these internecine
conflicts they had not only managed to destroy clan order, but decimate their already scarce
resources. They were reduced to eating whatever they could find, such as dogs, mice, wolves,
horse afterbirth, lice, etc., and wore clothing that reflected the same. Cannibalism was also
observed, although this was surely in extreme cases. The tribes of the steppe were hungry, not
necessarily for power, but to simply survive.
This destitution gave impetus for one who would bring the tribes out of their plight. The tribes
needed a leader who would somehow manage to gather the energies of the tribes into a coherent
force of resource gathering. Thus, Temujin’s birth was foreseen amongst the people.
From a historical viewpoint there are debates about the conditions, especially regarding the
dates of Temujin’s birth, since the nomads were illiterate and uneducated. Zhao Hong would
notice that when he asked the Mongols their age they would laugh and say “We have never
known it”, while Herbert Franke noted that the Jurchids (Chinese nomads) would celebrate their
birthday on any of the feast days, since they didn’t know when they were born. Thus it could
be concluded that as far as dates or events, accuracy is questionable. However, we will assume
that Temujin was born circa mid 1160’s.
Temujin was thrust into a tempestuous world and his existence personified what life on the
steppe was like at the time. When he was a boy, his father Yesugui was poisoned by Tartars in
response to the abduction of his mother Ho-elun from the Merkits. Resources were such an issue
that in response to constant thievery, Temujin killed his half brother Bekhter, though spared
Belgutei at Bekhter’s request. He was kidnapped by the Tayichi’ut, and narrowly escaped. Later,
he married Borte, an Ongirrat, as arranged by his father at a young age.
Temujin’s inferior standing among the tribes sought him to an alliance with the Kerait leader
Toghrul, and pledged himself a vassal to the patronage of this Anda of his father. The Keraits
were a powerful tribe who would help elevate Temujin’s standing by aiding him in battles and
later become a stepping stone to his ultimate rule.
His wife Borte would be abducted by the Merkits, and the Merkits would be defeated by the
combined forces of Toghrul, Jamuka (an boyhood Anda of Timujin), and Temujin. Jochi would
be born to Borte on the way home, and although possibly illegimate by way of the Merkit leader,
would still be embraced by Temujin.
Temujin would become leader of the Borjigid tribe circa 1185, becoming a khan of his own.
He would break with his alliance with Jamuka, due to overt power aspirations. They would do
battle at Dalan Balzhut, where Temujin would be defeated, however alliances were formed that
gave Temujin hope of one day becoming the great Khan. Temujin flees the area and here we find
a long gap in his history, of which it thought that he was in China.
Temujin finally does become the great khan, or Genghis Khan, in 1206. This was after
defeating the other tribes, including those of Toghrul and Jamuka. Although Jamuka had been
proclaimed Gurkhan (universal ruler) in 1201, he was finally defeated and executed by
Temujin after a series of bloody intertribal conflicts. Thus after a sanguinary struggle over the
conniving, backstabbing politics of the steppes, a khuriltai (grand meeting of all tribes) was held
and Temujin was elected Genghis Khan.
The coming of Genghis Khan was a much heralded event, and the shamans, who were the
primary religion of the Mongols aided his rise to power. Like said earlier, the steppe people
needed the ultimate “big man” and the shamans certainly saw Temujin’s potential. Thus shaman-
istic propaganda was used. Kokuchu, Genghis’s leading shaman, would proclaim from God “I
have given the whole surface of the earth to Temujin and to his sons.” Other mystical visions
were reported throughout the steppes, both Genghis’ birth and mandate of heaven.
In order to deny further power struggles on the steppes with regard to his mandate, the Khan
formulated the Yasa, or code of laws. The Yasa was what the nomads needed to bring law and
order, as well as peace, to their lands. This is quite a concept considering everything was done
by the traditional rulings of the tribal chiefs. The Yasa was quite Draconian in its application. For
example, adultery, theft, lying, urinating inside dwellings were all punishable by death. It
contains other less severe rulings on things such as clothes (to be worn until worn out), hygiene
(no bathing in spring or summer), and alcoholism (only three times a month is acceptable).
The household was also seen as very important and wives were expected to tend to the domestic
affairs while the husband was gone, while the adultery prohibitions kept peace within it. There
are other less significant codes of the Yasa, but the main point is that the lawlessness of the pop-
ulation had to be overcome by the central rule which Genghis Khan maintained.
Khan also overturned the power of the tribal aristocracy by militarizing the entire population.
Every male was liable for conscription, and this was welcomed since his military organization
was opportunistic for those considered of inferior status, as Khan once had been, and rewarded
all who agreed to denounce their tribal ties to serve him. The “common” nomad could therefore
be a commander or other exalted position after proving themselves and becoming ba’atur
(hero).
The army was divided into divisions of 10, 100, 1000, and 10000 (tumen). This army was
assigned according to the Khan and organized so as to prohibit any conspiracies against him.
This fighting unit was intended to replace the solidarity of the tribes, and the Yasa strictly enf-
orced this. Warriors were required to aid other warriors, and retreat was not tolerated under
penalty of death. Also, commanders were never to ill-treat their men and those who were unfit to
lead were replaced by a subordinate. In addition to the army, he established a personal guard of
10,000 strong kashik, who were his elite and outranked even the highest army commander.
With these military and civilian laws in place it was now possible for Genghis Khan to move
forward with his vision and save his desperate people. Like any goal, the prerequisites must be
met first in order to continue. Genghis Khan had met those prerequisites: he met the demands of
the people for a consolidated rule, he gave them laws that would facilitate military operations,
he organized the military, and had a prime objective to meet. After living in miserable poverty,
the nomads needed to expand their base of resources if they were going to survive. They were
hungry people, which could be considered the most instinctive motivation for killing and warlike
behavior.
There was little consideration for the logistics of the Mongol army. By virtue of being steppe
nomads they could live off the land. This in turn made for a hardier constitution and their wild,
uncivilized mannerisms only made them more fiercesome opponents. As William of Rubruck
would later write to Louis IX “I tell you assuredly that if your peasants-without speaking of
kings and knights-would march like these Tatar (sic) kings and content themselves with the same
food, they could conquer the whole world.”
The steppe nomads ability to live off the land also gave them a military edge. Their hunting
techniques were ritualized procedures at which beaters would drive the animal into the awaiting
encirclement, from where the animal would be killed. Blood shed was avoided in this killing, as
the animal’s blood was thought to contain it’s soul, so stoning, strangulation, and falcons were
used. The hunt began at an early age (around 3-5), when the child was to make his lifelong
association to the to the tools that would characterize the Mongols militarily, horses and
bows. The Hunt was a more realistic application of military training and was more effective than
any drill techniques because it was fun, inspired competition, and gave rewards (i.e. food).
We cannot overlook the tactical advantage of the horse and the bow. The Mongols were not
the innovators of this style of fighting, as it been for over a thousand years by other steppe
nomads like the Huns or Scythians. The horse provided mobility and the ability to outmaneuver
opponents, while the bow enabled combat to be kept at a distance. Thus any opponent without
these would be helpless. The Mongols could strike at will, without being struck back. Most states
had incorporated some of these elements into their armies, though to a lesser degree. The Mong-
ols were simply an absolute form of this style, and their techniques were age old: feigned retreat,
encirclement, sweep, feint. These were all intended to draw the enemy out of a head on
engagement.
The Mongol cavalry consisted of a light cavalry and a heavy cavalry, with the light cavalry
being more numerous by a typical two to one ratio. The light cavalry was armed with bows and a
quiver of two to three arrows. They were lightly armored with a helmet, round wicker shield, and
padded quilted coat. Usually they carried an additional hand held weapon such as light battle-
axe, mace, lasso, or saber. The heavy cavalry was armed similarly equipped but had heavier arm-
or which consisted of an iron helmet with leather flaps to protect the neck and a cuirass of
lamellar armor.
The Mongols also practiced warfare as a means to achieve personal ends, vice political. This
was usually accomplished by the tribal chiefs who would re-distribute the captured booty, and
set aside a portion for the khans. Under Genghis Khan this booty was to be solely collected
through him and he, not the chiefs, would redistribute it. One of the key factors of Genghis
Khan’s success as a leader was his generosity to others, and when Genghis Khan prospered his
armies prospered. Thus war was lucrative, but also good for the supporters of Khan.
If war was rewarding, not just a task to be played out by political pawns, then morale must
have been high. When in battle they would shout “Ur-ah” (thought to be the source of the
modern “hurrah”) and make vicious noises that had a disheartening effect on the populations of
those they encountered. In a much later battle with the Japanese: (circa 1274):
The Mongols disembarked, mounted their horses, raised their banners,
and began to attack….(one Japanese)….shot a whistling arrow to open
the exchange. All at once the Mongols down to the last man started
laughing…..
Other societies may have chosen to express themselves through art, literature, religion, drama, or
technology but the Mongols had found their source of expression: Warmaking.
The attack on China was a geopolitical inevitability for Genghis Khan. These peoples were by
steppe standards very rich, and had only exacerbated the nomads plight by exacting tributes.
China was divided into two states, the Sung in the south and the Chin in the north. Also, as a
buffer zone was the His-Hsia kingdom, which was not truly Chinese but instead Sinicized
Tanguts.
The Tanguts were the weakest, and their conquest was relatively easy for the Mongols.
Genghis Khan would besiege the capital and build a dam to direct floodwaters onto the town.
The siege would last approximately three months, and the end result was a breach in the dam
which flooded out the Mongol camp. Peace negotiations ensued which gave the Mongols a rich
tribute but no auxiliary troops as Genghis had wished. Genghis Khan never forgot this.
The Chin would fall next. Genghis Khan was actually a vassal to the Chin due to his ties with
Toghrul and his exile in China. The emperor had died and been replaced by one that Genghis
disliked. The Sung were threatening the Chin to the south, and there was internal conflict
within the empire itself. Genghis Khan would capitalize on and exploit internal struggles.
Genghis had ambassadors in the Chin who were actually spies and informants for him. He also
took advantage of defectors from the realm, who informed him that a coup was being suppressed
by the ruling house. These factors were crucial since the Chin were by far numerically superior,
with an estimated 120,000 horse archers and 500,000 foot soldiers to Khan total forces of
65,000.
Khan would challenge his standing as vassal to the Chin and refuse to pay tribute in 1211 and
was able to march into Chin territory with the help of the Ongutt turks, who guarded the border
for the Chin but were secretly allied to the Mongols. The Khitans, another Chin ally, were incited
by the Mongols to revolt.
Genghis would go on to take the Chin cities of Xuande-fu and Fouzhou, which was difficult
because the the Mongols were not well versed in siegecraft. However, once again, Genghis Khan
was able to capitalize on the Chin’s internal struggle and take advantage of deserting Chin
engineers who would teach siege warfare to the Mongols. The cities of Xuande-fu and Fouzhou,
and strategic Juyong pass were taken, and the Chin’s spare horse encampments were dispersed.
Genghis suffered an arrow injury and was forced to give command to his son Tolui. Also, a
Muslim spy was able to give them a secret pass which enabled to slaughter a garrison in stealth.
The ruling Jurchids internal strife was compounded by the desertion of key officials into the
Khan’s service. The general Hushashu, who commanded a private army, would desert and enable
the Mongols to take Jijing pass. Hushashu would then go to the capital Zhongdu and murder the
emperor Chung-Hei, replacing him with his nephew. Thus by 1213-1214 the Mongols controlled
most of the territory north of the Huanhe River. The capital Zhongdu still remained unconquered
due to its fortifications, but was still a vested interested of the Mongols due to the Emperor’s
murder.
The city of Liaoyang was taken without a fight due to one of Genghis commanders Yesen.
Yesen knew the city was to receive a replacement commander. He ambushed the appointee
enroute, took his letters of appointment to the city and masqueraded as the new commander. The
city thoroughly fell for the ruse, and their guard was let down. The Mongol general Mukali,
entered three weeks later and took the city without incident.
The capital was finally taken in 1215, and the Mongols commenced their bloody booty calls
which ended up in the deaths of thousands of citizens. He demanded the emperor give all the
territories to him and henceforth call himself “King of Hunan”, instead of emperor. The emperor
declined and Khan handed the campaign over to Shi Tianni, another Chin defector. Genghis
Khan returned to the steppes to defeat insurrections of the Merkits and Naimans.
Genghis would defeat the Uighurs, a Turkic steppe tribe who had writing. Genghis would
adopt the Uighur script as his own and taught his children to read. Not only that, the Chinese had
provided him with educated people to further aid in his conquests and would later play an
important role in the administration of his empire.
Genghis would be drawn into conflict with the empire of Khwarezm, ruled by Ala ad-Din
Muhammed. Trade has been established with the western neighbor of the Mongols, who enabled
western goods to travel untouched to the east. However, a trade caravan with one hundred
Muslim Mongols had been murdered under the notion they were Mongol spies in 1218. Genghis
reasonably asked that the offender, Inalchiq, be handed over for Mongol justice. Muhammed
refused and murdered two envoys, further incensing Genghis. Genghis would go on to conquer
Khwarezm as a result.
The middle eastern armies were similar to the Mongols, in that they were of Turkish horse
rider origin. Here, Genghis Khan had to adopt a different strategy, but also had the advantage of
Chinese siege engineers. Genghis Khan used Chinese auxiliary forces to augment his army as
well, and his army was now estimated to be around 100,000 to 150,000 men.
The city of Ortrar (the sight of the caravan incident) was taken after a prolonged siege.
Inalchiq was executed by pouring molten silver into his eyes and ears. This sort of revenge
violence would further Genghis’ reputation as a terror, to which he will always be negatively
associated with throughout history. Terror was increasingly used as a method of subjugation,
as this could bring about a quicker surrender, avoid battles, and save Mongol lives.
The cities of Signakhi, Jend, Benaket, Bukhara, Samarkand, and Urgench were taken.
Muhammed fled to the city of Balkh south and was fearful of the loyalty of his Turkish troops,
since they too had deserted in Samarkand and been given Mongol uniforms. The Mongols
continued to sack further Khwarezm towns until Muhammed was finally driven out to an island
in the Caspian sea, where he died.
Further raids in the Khwarezm empire would result in the conquest of Afghanistan and
Khurasan. The cities of Balkh, Nishapur, Heart, Thaleqan, and Bamian fell. Muhammed’s son,
Jelal al-Din still continued resistance and had actually defeated a Mongol army commanded by
Shigi-qutugu. Genghis Khan trapped al-Din along the banks of the Indus and defeated his army.
The young shah was allowed to escape, however, and later became an adventurer in Afghanistan.
The middle eastern campaigns of Genghis Khan show a markedly destructive pattern. Cities
were looted, sometimes burned to oblivion and the civilians completely massacred. This
happened in Bukhara, Balkh, Merv, Nishapur, and Bamian. Since the Mongols had no real
interest in occupying these territories it would be inconsequential to them. It was also a harbinger
of doom for any future cities who resisted, terror would work wonders for the Mongols.
The Mongols successes in Khwarezm can be attributed to the use of adopted siegecraft and
terror was further supplemented by the use of Muslim prisoners. These unfortunates were added
to the Mongol forces and served at the forefront of a Mongol rush, absorbing the brunt of the
attack and giving a false impression of numerical superiority. This would exhaust the defenders,
and when the Mongol troops really attacked they take advantage of the fatigue factor.
Genghis Khan would be the controller of the Mongolian steppe lands, northern China, and the
northern Middle East by the time of his death in 1227. He would set up administrations using
the local peoples, and monitor them through the use of darigochi. Upon his death he would
divided his empire into empire into four khanates under the rule of his sons, who later pursue
conquests into Russia, southern China, Korea, Japan, Egypt, and even Europe. His success was
due largely to his leadership and the Mongol armies under him.
The Mongol armies were not bound to the conventions of sedentary peoples, which gave them
numerous advantages. First of all, they were not hindered by religion. The Mongols were of a
one god shaman religion, however some of them were Christian, Buddhist, Muslim. Genghis
Khan respected all religions and through not imposing religion upon them (except for his
mandate) was able to keep their fighting spirit maximized.
The nomadic tendencies of the Mongols enabled them to go anywhere. Mongols were
comfortable where ever they were, and setting up a camp was home to them. The hardships of
the steppe had given them survival skills to which no modern army could compare. Food could
be acquired through whatever means possible, and the plunders of conquest were only more of
an incentive for them to continue raiding.
Also, the nomadic tendencies also enabled them to ensure that any battles fought were on
their terms, attacking cities when they were ready. This element of unpredictability could never
be countered by their enemies, and the only defense was to scatter forces across their lands,
thereby weakening it. Cities and towns were reduced to targets the Mongols could launch a
concentrated attack on and take before reinforcements arrived.
Once conquered, the cities were either assimilated into the army, left to cultivate their products
under a Mongol tax, or destroyed. Assimilation would only increase the Mongols offensive
capability, making the horde like a snowball turning into an avalanche. Taxing the citizens was
was equally beneficial to the Mongols, who directed it towards their steppe land populace. The
Mongols, as pastors and herders, were inherently untaxable which enabled a one way flow of
resources into the land. Destruction would crush the spirit of the enemy, and since the Mongols
really only sought to return to the steppes there was really no issue of hostile occupation to
deal with. Puppet administrators would take of ruling the conquered lands, while diverting its
resources to the steppes.
Use of the horse made the Mongols highly maneuverable. In order to fight them, one had to
catch them as they retreated, and then only be encircled and slaughtered (i.e. feigned retreat).
Mongols maneuverability also allowed their armies to disperse upon different areas and then
come together quickly into a consolidated force not unlike modern armies. As Napoleon would
later state: “March dispersed, fight concentrated”.
The Mongols were already a warrior-like society, and Genghis Khan exploited that to its
fullest through conscription. Being raised from an early age to hunt and use the bow gave the
Mongols an advantage of quality and efficiency over other troops, who in most cases, remained a
separate part of society like the Chin. The Muslims were employing Turkic mercenaries who
could be considered quality professional troops, but loyalty (especially when defeated) comes
into play. These troops could easily abandon their patrons at a single loss. The Mongols were a
quality fighting force whose loyalty was to Genghis Khan.
Genghis Khan was able to harness the energies of his peoples, who rightly saw their leader as
the fittest to lead through the sheer survival of the fittest mentality of the steppe nomads. He in
turn made innovations in the somewhat primitive society, turning them from a chiefdom into an
empire which was to remain a force for several centuries. The Mongol armies under Genghis
Khan had enabled this and were the most effective and successful military ever known.
Paul Ratchnevsky, Genghis Khan His Life and Legacy (USA: Blackwell Publishing, 1991), 12
Paul Ratchnevsky, Genghis Khan His Life and Legacy (USA: Blackwell Publishing, 1991), 12
Paul Ratchnevsky, Genghis Khan His Life and Legacy (USA: Blackwell Publishing, 1991), 19
Paul Ratchnevsky, Genghis Khan His Life and Legacy (USA: Blackwell Publishing, 1991), 41
Paul Ratchnevsky, Genghis Khan His Life and Legacy (USA: Blackwell Publishing, 1991), 187-196
Paul Ratchnevsky, Genghis Khan His Life and Legacy (USA: Blackwell Publishing, 1991), 274
Jean-Paul Roux, Genghis Khan and the Mongol Empire (USA: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 2002), 114
Erik Hildinger, Warriors of the Steppe (USA: De Capo Press, 1997), 120
W. Wayne Farris “Japan to 1300” War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds (USA: Harvard University Press, 1999) 64
Erik Hildinger, Warriors of the Steppe (USA: De Capo Press, 1997), 122
Erik Hildinger, Warriors of the Steppe (USA: De Capo Press, 1997), 123
Erik Hildinger, Warriors of the Steppe (USA: De Capo Press, 1997), 124
Erik Hildinger, Warriors of the Steppe (USA: De Capo Press, 1997), 124
Erik Hildinger, Warriors of the Steppe (USA: De Capo Press, 1997), 124
Erik Hildinger, Warriors of the Steppe (USA: De Capo Press, 1997), 124
Erik Hildinger, Warriors of the Steppe (USA: De Capo Press, 1997), 129