The Materialist contention that the soul cannot exist without the body would ostensibly appear the more rational position. Some elucidation is, therefore, required to account for the otherwise unprecedented attention Dualism has received over the centuries and, accordingly, Ryle’s alleged ‘category mistake’. As may be inferred, the concept of a non-contingent soul affords the possibility of survival beyond physical death. In allowing for the fulfilment of a moral equilibrium; the realization of human potential; a validation of existence; the remuneration of the pious; and a basis for rejecting the alternative, the abrupt termination of individual consciousness, life after death may be considered a desirable objective. However, not one supposition of a seemingly inexhaustible list renders the proposition necessarily true. Is it even coherent to postulate the existence of a non-empirical, unverifiable entity?
There are four kinds of argument that may be raised in defence of the notion. First, we each have a unique consciousness, impenetrable to the outside world. Our thoughts, beliefs etc. may be inferred by others, but never directly experienced. Nevertheless, our body and its processes remain outwardly perceptible. The existence of a soul resolves the seemingly irreconcilable conflict between the public and the private.
Second, the fact that we are held morally accountable for our deeds presupposes that we have complete freedom of choice. However, the premise appears unsubstantiated when countered by the fact that our every thought may be described in terms of the physiological processes occurring in the brain and central nervous system. These processes are accounted for by causal conditions extending beyond a person, prior even to their existence. If we are bound by such conditions that remain beyond our control, how may we be considered free, and, thus, held morally accountable? The postulation of some essence, independent of the deterministic causal chain, and with the capacity to influence moral choices provides a potential solution.
Third, the quandary of multiple personality disorder must be remedied. If a body can house several personalities, each with its own distinct self-concept and set of behavioural patterns, the body is clearly not central to personal identity. How may this be accounted for? It is evident that we each possess a number of different, yet un-fragmented perspectives. In a pathological condition, however, what holds these perspectives together is lost. Does this suggest the existence of some ethereal glue, cementing the various facets of a self as one?
Finally, there exist a number of people claiming to be in possession of paranormal powers such as telepathy, clairvoyance, psychokinesis etc. In assuming these accounts to be accurate, the Materialist notion that the mind remains entirely dependant on intermediate physical agencies is negated.
In sum, if undisputed, the implication of the evidence given is that humans may comprise partly of some imperceptible essence, independent of physical processes. Furthermore, if death remains no exception to the rule, it is plausible that, in a limited capacity, the soul may be preserved, and with it our self identity. However, are there sufficient grounds for refuting the evidence? In truth, convincing though the Dualist arguments may appear, not one case made remains entirely exempt from Materialist criticism. Recently, there has been increasing support for an anthropological view. In attempting an analysis of the brain, in “The Mind’s I”, Douglas Hofstadter offered the analogy of an ant colony: “A colony has different levels: the colony itself, groups of ants such as workers, teams of ants, and individual ants themselves. We assign meaning to the higher levels (for example that a group of worker ants is removing the carcass of a fly) and hold that these higher levels encode information for the colony. But these higher-level patterns of behaviour are ultimately mere products of the random motions of individual, unintelligent ants.” Thus, according to Hofstadter, our every thought, belief or idea is merely a product of random neural firings. It consequently follows that we need not appeal ultimately to meaning to account for reality; we do so purely for the sake of convenience.
How well, therefore, do the four lines of argument raised stand up in light of this? The first may be immediately dismissed: The fact that one individual organism may not experience the neural firings of another is unexceptional. In the case of the second: If, on every occasion, what we formerly considered to be higher ideals and beliefs in truth function as labels, then moral law exists as little more that a highly complex system of control. The requirement to apportion a soul is, thus, mooted. Further more, the condition of multiple personalities may be explained by some form of repression, whilst numerous reports of paranormal incidents have proved fairly dubious. To this the following must be added:
First, functions such as conceptualisation and memory recall are generally considered to be requisites of self-identity. The implication is that these processes are independent of the mind and could, thus, be sustained by our immaterial souls. The dilemma arises when faced with apparently irrefutable evidence of the inverse. It is widely accepted that, not only are certain mental abilities inherited, but that diseases affecting the mind, such as Down’s syndrome, are genetically based. It may be, therefore, surmised that mental ability and function is significantly dependent on the hereditary process.
Second, damage to the brain directly affects cognitive functions. For example, were a person’s brain spheres to be severed, when presented with an object on the left, the right hemisphere of the brain would recognise it. However, the left hemisphere, the main area for speech and communication, would receive no information via the corpus callosum. Thus whilst the person could point at the object, he could not recount what he sees.
Third, certain psychological processes, such as memory, may be discerned as patterns of energy events within the brain. Although, as yet, direct correlation with individual energy transfers has not been possible, the localisation is sufficient to facilitate neurological research. Furthermore, various types of intelligence are associated with specific cerebral hemispheres, for example, the right hemisphere controls artistic and intuitive mental processes.
On evaluation, evidence would appear to suggest that those features generally identified within a soul, could equally be explainable in terms of physiological processes. That is not to say the Dualist has not attempted to evade the predicament. In fact, two schemas have been devised. Those subscribing to the first have postulated the immediate replacement of the body at death. For Buddhists the body is physical, for Christians; spiritual. Although, with the reincarnate generally lacking any awareness of a previous existence and ethereal bodies widely acknowledged to exist on a different spatiotemporal plane, verification remains difficult. Advocates of the second schema have suggested that the soul could exist disembodied, in a very limited capacity. For Catholics this may be temporally (Purgatory) until united with a body (Beatific Vision), or permanently (Hell).
But what of Ryle and his ghost? The situation must be readdressed. It is clear that in attempting to rationalize the theory of the soul, one invariably returns to the starting point; that, whilst the notion cannot be dismissed entirely, it does appear physiologically unlikely. Ryle’s statement, however, was more than just a hypothesis; it was a definitive claim. Thus, though empirical evidence seems to lean in favour of the Materialist, whilst Dualism continues as a legitimate possibility, Ryle’s contention will remain unsubstantiated.
Ultimately, the concept of a soul depends on the equally unverifiable existence of some divine entity to effectuate this recondite posthumous transition. Here lies the significance; although those Dualists subscribing to theism tend to recognise that the confirmation of their faith will be fulfilled by eschatological verification, the concept of some spiritual self within plays a fundamental role in their lives, not only in the provision of an intangible channel through which they might commune with God, but also in apportioning a sense of order, clarity and purpose to their existence.
